DEFMIN SARGSIAN REVEIWS N-K, IRAN, AND ELECTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 001249

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC
OSD FOR DASD JIM MACDOUGAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AM IR
SUBJECT: DEFMIN SARGSIAN REVEIWS N-K, IRAN, AND ELECTION
ISSUES DURING AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL


Classified By: Ambassador John M. Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sargsian lauded the growing bilateral defense
relationship, before complaining about Azerbaijan's approach
to the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. He said that
Azerbaijan constantly revises its demands, and called for the
Minsk Group Co-Chairs to demand greater consistency from the
Azerbaijani side. Ambassador called on Sargsian (as a top
ruling-party leader) to weigh in for clean elections in 2007,
to which Sargsian agreed. Sargsian took the Ambassador's
point about arms-length relations with Iran, and commented
the Armenian-Iranian relationship was superficial and driven
mostly by Armenia's critical energy needs. Ambassador advised
of EUCOM GEN Ward's upcoming visit, which Sargsian welcomed.
END SUMMARY

--------------
GOOD TIMES IN THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador's September 5 farewell call on Defense
Minister Serzh Sargsian found the minister in good spirits
about the growing warmth in the bilateral defense
relationship. Ambassador reviewed some of the key landmarks
during his tenure: U.S. assistance in the development of
Armenia's new National Security Strategy (NSS),the
successful deployment of Armenian troops in Iraq and Kosovo,
and growing momentum in the FMF/IMET programs. He thanked
the minister for his personal support for these initiatives,
which began with Sargsian's decision to support a Defense
Assessment, and noted his expectation that this cooperation
should continue, full steam, notwithstanding his own
departure. The Ambassador assured Sargsian that
Ambassador-designate Hoagland was a consummate professional,
and predicted the two would get along well. He also advised
Sargsian of the 19-20 September visit of EUCOM Deputy
Commander GEN Ward, commenting that Ward enjoyed a sterling
reputation. The ambassador proposed that Sargsian explore
the feasibility of visiting the Armenian troops deployed in
Iraq.


3. (C) Sargsian responded in kind, with effusive appreciation
for the deepening bilateral defense relationship, and for the
Ambassador's role in fostering it. He expressed hope that
Ambassador-designate Hoagland would call on him soon after
arrival, and continue the tradition of close cooperation.
Sargsian said his ministry had made a policy of complete
openness with the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. advisers on the
NSS, hiding nothing. He welcomed the many seminars and
training opportunities the U.S. has provided the MOD. He
stated that Armenia wanted to give NATO a warm reception.
Sargsian said he would inquire with GEN Ward about the
possibility of a visit to Iraq.

--------------
BEWARE THE PERSIAN NEIGHBOR
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Sargsian--in his role as
chairman of Armenia's National Security Council--to be
cautious about Armenia's ties with Iran, and especially to
consider the bad optics of broadening or deepening those ties
as the UN Security Council deliberates on sanctions against
Iran. At the same time, he encouraged Armenia to look for
opportunities, during its routine contacts with its southern
neighbor, to encourage Iranian officials to turn aside from
the country's defiant posture against the international
community. Sargsian was dismissive of the Armenian-Iranian
relationship. He said that some trade was inevitable,
particularly to satisfy Armenia's critical needs for
diversification of energy sources. Sargsian said that the
bottom line was that Armenia is dependent on gas, and it was
"better to have two pipes than one." Beneath these
superficial commercial relationships and certain
people-to-people connections at the grass-roots level, the
two governments had quite different values and interests,
precluding a close friendship. Sargsian felt that neither
Armenia nor Russia would have any success in altering Iran's
outlook.

-------------- --
N-K: THE EVER-SHIFTING POSITIONS OF AZERBAIJAN
-------------- --


5. (S) The Ambassador broached Nagorno-Karabakh, urging
Armenia to stick with the Minsk Group (MG) negotiation

YEREVAN 00001249 002 OF 003


process, even if (when) the talks hit rough patches. He
pointed out that a credible negotiating process is a
stabilizing factor in the region; should that process break
down, that fact alone could have destabilizing consequences.
Sargsian agreed, but confessed his government sometimes toyed
with the idea of just such a dramatic gesture of displeasure
as withdrawing from the MG process. He thought the
negotiations might be a waste of time if Azerbaijan refused
to deal seriously, and was pessimistic of the chances for a
near-term solution. The minister suggested that the U.S.
review its own satellite imagery over the last few years and
examine the positions of the two sides, defensive
entrenchments. He said such a review would show the
inexorable advance of Azerbaijani positions, moving the Line
of Contact toward the Armenian side.


6. (S) Sargsian complained at some length that Armenia could
not trust the Azerbaijani leadership to negotiate in good
faith and keep its word. Azerbaijan's demands constantly
shift, always demanding some new concession. He predicted
that even if a peace deal were agreed between the two sides,
Azerbaijan would keep coming back for more concessions. He
called for the MG co-chairs to get tough with Azerbaijan, and
not tolerate this continual shifting of the goalposts.
"Speaking quietly to Azerbaijan is like not speaking at all"
he commented, saying Azerbaijan only hears firm and forceful
interventions. Sargsian also complained about the steady
stream of bellicose rhetoric from Baku this year, contrasting
it with Yerevan's restraint, and taking this as further
evidence Azerbaijan is not serious about negotiating with
Armenia, but only posturing. Ilham Aliyev says one thing in
MG negotiations, and then goes straight home to make
inflammatory proclamations in Baku. Sargsian supported the
co-chairs' publication of the basic principles after the
latest round of negotiations, commenting that this level of
public transparency was helpful. Sargsian also stated he was
convinced the co-chairs should have published this
information much earlier.


7. (S) Sargsian thought renewed military conflict unlikely,
because Armenia would not launch hostilities, and (he
asserted firmly) Azerbaijan was quite incapable of doing so.
Sargsian expressed appreciation for U.S. leadership in the
South Caucasus. He said that the level of sniping incidents
on the Line of Contact had decreased sharply following
President Aliyev's trip to Washington. He offered this as an
example to prove that forceful engagement works well with
Azerbaijan.

--------------
THE DEMOCRATIC ROAD
--------------


8. (C) Noting Sargsian's role as a top official of the ruling
Republican Party, the ambassador affirmed the need for
Armenia to perform much better than in the past in the
conduct of elections. Sargsian agreed this was imperative,
and said President Kocharian clearly understood the great
importance of fair elections. He went on to complain of the
irresponsible and destructive behavior of Armenia's fractious
opposition parties, who boycotted parliament and had refused
to play their appointed role in the constitutional
referendum. He said opposition leaders failed to comprehend
they had an important civic role to play even when they are
not in power. The opposition parties just wanted to boycott,
criticize, and obstruct anything the government tried to
undertake, regardless of its merit. They thus abdicated the
role that a political opposition was supposed to fill: to
have a valid debate on issues. Sargsian warned that no
matter how properly the elections are conducted, there would
be local politicians who would seek to inflate minor
violation and discredit the process.


9. (C) In an odd tangent, Sargsian related with sardonic
humor a telephone conversation he said he had had with an
Armenian journalist who had published (supposedly) unfounded
accusations against him. What was he supposed to do, he
asked the journalist, in response to such scurrilous
reporting? Should he send thugs to the journalist's house to
seek retribution? No, that's out of bounds. Could he seek
redress in the courts? No, the courts were corrupt and
ineffective. He was powerless to respond effectively to his
name being unfairly blackened.

--------------
DEALING WITH SARGSIAN

YEREVAN 00001249 003 OF 003


--------------


10. (C) Well-turned out in a fashionable suit-and-tie,
Sargsian was friendly, frank, and engaging, with both sides
speaking exclusively in Russian. He was fully confident on
all topics from defense issues to democratic process.
Normally the most even-tempered interlocutor, on this
occasion Sargsian grew more animated in his irritation with
Azerbaijan's recent behavior.

EVANS


EVANS