THINLY STRETCHED NEW ZEALAND MILITARY AIMS HIGH,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000449 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR D (FRITZ),EAP/FO, AND EAP/ANP NSC FOR VICTOR CHA SECDEF FOR OSD/ISD LIZ PHU PACOM FOR JO1E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL NZ SUBJECT: THINLY STRETCHED NEW ZEALAND MILITARY AIMS HIGH, BUT CAN IT DELIVER? Classified By: Ambassador William McCormick, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) is being rebuilt after decades of neglect. The Labour Government, ideologically drawn to a peace-keeping role for the NZDF, has nonetheless proved willing to deploy small expeditionary forces around the world. Given that the entire military is the size of a single U.S. base, even after the build-up is complete there will be limits to what the NZDF can do. Some capabilities will actually decline temporarily as new equipment is introduced and old equipment is refitted. For these reasons, the United States should continue to encourage New Zealand to work with us and Australia on fewer, smaller scale operations where NZDF can be most effective, such as helping to maintain order in small, destabilized countries in the Pacific and assisting Afghanistan's reconstruction. New Zealand's practice of sending one or two military liaisons to a variety of operations, while in keeping with the country's image as a good world citizen, is of less benefit to us, and may be depriving NZDF of the middle management it needs at home to rebuild. End Summary. -------------- Background: A "Seismic Shift" in Role of NZDF -------------- ¶2. (C) The current growth of the military comes after a series of government reports and initiatives undertaken since the late 1990s, when the then National Government initiated a review of defense policy. The Labour Government's report arising from that study, the June 2000 "Defence (sic) Policy Framework," provided the basis for later decisions on the appropriate capabilities, resources, and funding of the country's defense forces. One of the decisions the Government made as part of the early review process was to dismantle the Air Combat wing in 2001. The move was not just designed to save funds, but also to reorient the NZDF from a combat into a peacekeeping force in line with the goals of Labour. It was arguably a costly decision, as military personnel left in significant numbers, many to join military forces in Australia, the UK and elsewhere. ¶3. (C) In 2002, the Labour Government launched a "Long Term Development Plan," which (together with its subsequent updates) began to address the needs to upgrade military equipment. However, personnel continued to leave NZDF, which also faced trouble recruiting in a tight labour market. These gaps, combined with the need to pull people offline for training and introduction of new hardware, reached a crisis point in 2004. In May 2005, Labour launched the Defense Sustainability Initiative (DSI),designed to enhance recruitment and retention, including by increasing salaries and upgrading facilities. -------------- What the Build-up Entails -------------- ¶4. (C) NZDF currently has about 13,100 personnel, including about 8,700 regular force (active duty),2,275 territorial force (reserves),and 2,134 civilian staff. Of these, about 7,000 are in the army, and 2,700 each in navy and air force, the rest being in NZDF and Joint Forces NZ headquarters. Major units include two infantry battalions, 2 logistical battalions, a Special Forces Group (SAS),artillery and engineer regiments, a health services battalion, and a signals squadron. Currently, the navy has just two ANZAC-class frigates, having decommissioned two others in 2005 and earlier this year. The navy also has a supply ship and a number of small patrol boats. Since 2001, the Air Force no longer has combat capabilities, but instead is assigned to patrols (including of fisheries around New Zealand and Antarctica) by its six P-3 Orions as well as transport by its two Boeing 757s, five C-130s and 14 UH-1 helicopters. WELLINGTON 00000449 002 OF 004 ¶5. (C) In the 2006 budget announced in May, defense spending makes up about 3% of the total NZD 52.3 budget, or about NZD 1.7 billion (about USD 1 billion). This is up from recent years but still well below the 10% or more spent on defense in the 1960s or 5% from the mid-seventies to mid-eighties. (By comparison, GNZ's "Working for Families" and other family support payments will cost the Government NZD 1.7 billion this fiscal year, and forgiveness of interest on student loans will total NZD 1 billion.) Included in this year's defense outlay is about NZD 305 million in new spending for capital equipment under the Long Term Development Plan, and about NZD 72 million in spending on personnel and other operating costs under SDI. New Zealand's defense spending is equivalent to about 1% of total GDP and 1.7% of per capita GDP, compared to Australia's defense budget equivalent of 2.7% of per capita GDP. ¶6. (C) Under the Long Term Development Plan (LTDP),NZDF has already procured two Boeing 757 aircraft, which are being refitted to allow for cargo shipments on top of their existing troop transport and emergency evacuation capabilities. The sensors and mission management systems of the 6 P-3 Orion maritime patrol craft are being upgraded to improve surface surveillance, which NZDF says will better enable it to meet its Pacific search and rescue obligations, conduct surveillance for Pacific Island states, and meet its obligations under agreements with Australia and Five Power Defence Arrangement partners. The avionics and aircraft systems of the five aging C-130 Hercules will also be upgraded and refurbished to extend their life. A multi-role vessel, essentially a refitted European ferry boat designed to provide tactical sealift for NZDF and support for disaster relief, peacekeeping, and training, will arrive in New Zealand later this year, as will two offshore and four inshore patrol vessels. (NB: The purchase of the seven vessels is cumulatively called "Project Protector.") NZDF has also purchased 105 Light Armored Vehicles LAVs) and 308 Light Operational Vehicles (LOVs) for the Army and Special Forces, as well as funded a new building for the Ministry of Defence, which is due to open later this year but is already too small to house all offices. There are also plans to replace 14 Iroquois and 5 Sioux training helicopters, though this project has been hit hard by an 11% decline in value of the New Zealand Dollar over the past year. ¶7. (C) The objectives of the 10-year, NZD 4.6 billion (about USD 2.9 billion) Defense Sustainability Initiative are to increase personnel and training and help retention, maintain and improve the infrastructure of camps and bases, increase the reserve stocks of equipment and spares, improve administrative capabilities, and cover the depreciation of defense assets. According to Deputy Secretary of Defence Chris Seed, the Defense Sustainability Initiative is on track and there have been modest improvements in retention this first year of the program. Seed did not provide numbers, but said if trends continue, NZDF is on track to increase personnel by 15% (to about 15,000) over the next ten years. (FYI: The last time NZDF personnel came close to this level was in 1998, when they numbered 15,512. By 2003, the number had dropped by almost 17%, to 12,904) -------------- No Quick Fix -------------- ¶8. (C) Even if both the LTDP and DSI proceed as planned, it will take time for the military to significantly improve its level of capability. Indeed, over the short-medium term, some capabilities may decline. For example, aircraft sent for upgrades over the next few years will obviously be unavailable during these periods. Seed admitted that it may be hard to train enough personnel for the new Project Protector ships, and there may not be enough adequate port facilities for them. Only about NZD 104 million has been budgeted for the first two years of DSI. Ministry of Defence WELLINGTON 00000449 003 OF 004 and NZDF officials have confided to us that this is because there is no capacity to absorb more funding. In the last five years of the initiative, once the program reaches critical mass and sufficient improvements have been made to infrastructure, the bulk of the remaining allocated money will be spent. -------------- What We Can and Can't Expect -------------- ¶9. (C) The upgraded force's primary role will remain peacekeeping, at least as long as the Labour Government remains in power. But NZDF will be able to provide some of its own transport, both for air and sealift and to assist deployments on the ground. While more expensive for the Government, at least high profile problems such as the need for the Australian Defense Force to transport SAS troops into Afghanistan during OEF and the breakdown of P-3 Orion during tsunami relief work should disappear. In GNZ's eyes, this SIPDIS will make NZDF contributions more effective and more valuable for the success of an operation. Size will remain a limiting factor in New Zealand's global defense contributions even after upgrades, but even more so over the short-medium term. More than one NZ official has told us that had Fiji had a political crisis after elections, it would be hard for NZDF to get involved given current increased deployments to the Solomon Islands and E. Timor. Nor would not expect NZ's defense budget to increase more than projected for the foreseeable future. Although the government currently has an operating surplus of NZD 8 billion, there is already an outcry among many voters that none of these funds are being returned as tax cuts. Labour will be very unlikely to increase military spending substantially under the circumstances. And even if a National Government is elected in two years and seeks to increase military spending, it will still face the NZDF's capacity/absorption constraints over the near term. ¶10. (C) On top of the limitations of NZDF's size and role, the government's objectives and priorities for deployments at times seem to lack focus. The five key objectives laid out in the 2000 Defense Policy Review and repeated in this year's NZDF Statement of Intent, are to: -- defend New Zealand and to protect its people, land, territorial waters, EEZ, natural resources and critical infrastructure; -- meet (New Zealand's) alliance commitments to Australia by maintaining a close defense partnership in pursuit of common security interests; -- assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to (New Zealand's) South Pacific neighbors; -- play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting (New Zealand's) obligations as a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangements; and -- contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian operations. For a force as small as New Zealand's, assigning enough weight to each priority is a challenge. At times, however, GNZ seems most heavily focused on the last priority, despite statements by the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister about the importance of regional stability (especially in the Pacific Islands) to the country's national security interests. As of June 3, almost nine percent of New Zealand's defense force were overseas, about 500 on operational duty and about another 290 on training exercises or diplomatic or exchange missions. Before the recent WELLINGTON 00000449 004 OF 004 deployments to East Timor and the Solomons (162 and 124 personnel, respectively),the majority were on the Te Mana frigate on a mission to SE Asia and India (175),and Afghanistan (134, including the 123-member Provincial Reconstruction Team). Deputy Defense Secretary Seed believes that it is the "far away" issues that GNZ considers crucial for security. For this reason, he believes NZDF will remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, well after the current commitment ends in September 2007. ¶11. (C) But there are arguably other reasons for the emphasis on "far away" deployments. Contributing forces farther from home is in keeping with New Zealand's identity as a global good citizen, always ready to pitch in (reftel). (Strikingly, the entire defense outlay this year is included in the portion of the budget entitles "national identity.") Many times this means sending a few military liaisons/advisors, such as the 11 now in Bosnia and the three in Sudan. Matt Paterson, a Policy Officer in the Security Policy Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that GNZ maintains that even though the numbers of military personnel committed is small, they are of a higher quality than forces from many other countries. The Embassy would add also that these small deployments give New Zealand a presence in key world events, as well as access to U.S. and other training and intelligence. ¶12. (C) Even when New Zealand focuses more closely to home, its view on regional security threats is very different from ours and Australia's. Phil Goff's recent speech to the National Defense University in Washington only mentioned Pacific Island instability as a source of concern for New Zealand's own security. He did not mention the potential for conflict in the Taiwan straits, North Korea, or China/Japan tensions as his US counterparts would have. This may in part be because he and other GNZ officials are generally averse to publicly criticizing their future Free Trade Agreement partner China. But it is also a sign that New Zealand tends to see itself as isolated from most world dangers except those closest to its shores. Even instability in the Pacific Islands is viewed mostly as a potential threat for the country's law enforcement and immigration policies. The Ministry of Defense still sees NZDF as an expeditionary force. In a very real sense, for the past thirty years, NZ officials have seen all of the country's military engagements as optional. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Recent experience has shown New Zealand can and will play useful roles in "niche" areas such as its SAS and PRT contributions in Afghanistan. Given the NZDF's small size and resource limitations over the next several years, U.S. interests will best be met by encouraging New Zealand to also maintain its focus on working with Australia to help stabilize Pacific Island countries, where even small deployments make a difference and New Zealand's cultural/diplomatic expertise gives it the edge. McCormick