POLISH PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH UKRAINIAN, GERMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000953

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV GM UP PL
SUBJECT: POLISH PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH UKRAINIAN, GERMAN
COUNTERPARTS


Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: The Ukrainian and German presidents paid
reciprocal visits to Polish President Lech Kaczynski in
mid-May, marking the importance of those bilateral
relationships and the slow warming of personal contacts
between the apprehensive Polish leader and his colleagues
next door. With Yushchenko, Kaczynski discussed regional
cooperation, energy, and domestic politics, and offered a
gesture of reconciliation for World War II-era atrocities (in
this case, those committed by Polish forces). Kaczynski and
German President Koehler closed out a commemorative
Polish-German year and continued their discussions on the
Baltic gas pipeline and other bilateral concerns (Kohler
appeared to make an extra effort to win over his Polish host,
reportedly offering to defend Poland against charges of
anti-Semitism and intolerance because of the new governing
coalition). Kaczynski's staff remarked on the president's
deep satisfaction with the recent Vilnius conference and his
meeting with Vice President Cheney, which informed his
exchanges with Yushchenko and Koehler. Presidential staff
and MFA officials also noted separately Kaczynski's
determination to assert complete control over Polish foreign
policy. End summary.


2. (C) Presidential Chancellery International Affairs
Director Mariusz Handzlik characterized both visits as a
further step in his new president's familiarization with his
nearest counterparts, noting that Kaczynski had already made
his initial trips to Berlin and Kiev. Yushchenko's two-day
visit had an especially broad agenda, Handzlik reported. The
Ukrainian president briefed Kaczynski on his efforts to
revitalize GUAM at the Kiev summit, and regretted that other
commitments (including the upcoming papal visit to Poland)
would prevent Kaczynski from attending. In a last-minute
reversal, Kaczynski made a surprise visit to the summit. The
visit was portrayed in the Polish Media as supporting GUAM as
an alternative to the Commonwealth of Independent States,
which may further complicate Polish Russian ties.


3. (C) Although convinced of the need for further
diversification of energy supplies, Kaczynski was less
optimistic than Yushchenko concerning the immediate prospects
for the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline project, Handzlik said,
while the Ukrainian leader appeared bullish about possible
U.S. investment and Kazakh participation. Both leaders
agreed that greater infrastructure and staffing are needed to
reduce long waits at the Polish-Ukrainian border. Yushchenko
and Kaczynski also discussed strategy in support of their
joint bid to host the 2012 European football championship,
Handzlik mentioned.


4. (C) The Polish and Ukrainian presidents took part in a
solemn ceremony May 13 in the southeastern Polish town of
Pawlokoma, marking a 1945 massacre there of Ukrainian
civilians by Polish units (part of the bloody wartime history
of conflict between Polish and Ukrainian forces). Handzlik
acknowledged that negotiations on the ceremony had been
"difficult" because of sensitivities on both sides, but
stated that the Ukrainians had appreciated Kaczynski's
recognition that crimes had also been committed by the Polish
side. The Polish MFA's Ewa Figel, senior desk officer for
Eastern Europe, suggested, however, that many Ukrainians
believed that the Polish gesture fell short of an explicit
admission of culpability and that some -- including some
Poles -- were disappointed that the Polish president had not
demonstrated greater courage in promoting national
reconciliation.


5. (C) Handzlik reported that Yushchenko had told Kaczynski
that he "favored" an Orange coalition for the next Ukrainian
government and that he expected to be able to achieve that in
the days ahead. Kaczynski made clear to Yushchenko his
preference for such a coalition and offered his support if he
could be helpful in any way. Figel cautioned, though, that
Yushchenko may have been telling Kaczynski what he thought
the Polish president wanted to hear, as she understands that
a coalition with the Party of Regions remains very much in
play. Figel said that she and other GOP officials believe
that an Orange coalition may depend on whether or not
Tymoshenko will accept a position other than prime minister,
such as parliamentary speaker.


6. (C) Recalling that Kaczynski's discussions with German
president Koehler had been among the high points of the
Polish president's trip to Berlin, Handzlik indicated that
the two leaders appear to be establishing a personal
connection, which he attributed in large part to Kohler's
evident efforts to reach out to Kaczynski. Koehler was well
prepared to address the Baltic gas pipeline issue, Handzlik
said, taking exception to Polish Defense Minister Sikorski's
allusions to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (which Kaczynski did
not completely disavow) while seeking to allay Polish
concerns. Parenthetically, Handzlik confirmed that Polish
Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz had displeased Kaczynski by
suggesting that Poland might participate in the Baltic
project and that PM advisor Ryszard Schnepf had been fired to
take the rap for the PM.


7. (C) Whether out of conviction or interest in currying
favor with Kaczynski, Koehler reportedly insisted that he
would defend Poland against charges of anti-Semitism and
intolerance stemming from the new governing coalition with
Self-Defense and the League of Polish Families. Europe needs
moral leadership, Koehler reportedly told Kaczynski, and the
German president is prepared to speak out when necessary.
Alluding to gay rights protesters who greeted him during his
appearance at Humboldt University in Berlin, Kaczynski
assured Koehler that he did not want to take away anyone's
rights, but he could not permit threats to family values,
such as same-sex marriage.


8. (C) Comment: Handzlik portrayed his president as a leader
growing in confidence through these exchanges with his
counterparts, and decisively strengthening his control over
Polish foreign policy. He suggested that newly-appointed
Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga, a long-time Kaczynski
confidante, will offer good counsel, but ultimately serve as
Kaczynski's "right hand," implementing whatever policy course
he sets. Handzlik confirmed that Presidential Chancellery
head Andrzej Urbanski's position as national security advisor
will be made permanent ("why would he give up that power?,"
Handzlik asked rhetorically). From now on, "everything will
be decided here," Handzlik stated baldly -- an assertion so
far not refuted by anyone in or out of government.
ASHE