POLAND: WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: SMALLPOX DEMARCHE

UNCLAS WARSAW 000931 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DKOSTELANCIK AND MSESSUMS DEPT FOR IO/T E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL AORC TBIO PL WHO SUBJECT: POLAND: WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: SMALLPOX DEMARCHE REF: STATE 71569 Post received the following response to reftel demarche from Teresa Bondarewicz, Office Director, Department of International Cooperation in Poland's Ministry of Health on May 17, 2006. Begin Text. In response to your request for the Ministry's opinion concerning the retention of smallpox reserves, we would like to inform you that the decision to store the smallpox reserves in two protected places was caused in the past by the necessity of conducting further research on the virus for a variety of reasons, especially for developing new types of vaccines and different possibilities concerning smallpox prevention, diagnosis, and cure. The reasons for retaining smallpox virus are still valid today. We are still not sure that the virus is not possessed by governments or groups whose intentions and activities are not subject to international control, thus making it possible that the smallpox virus, through accident or criminal activity, could be dispersed into the public. If the legally stored smallpox reserves were to be destroyed, humanity would lose an essential tool in the fight against a return of smallpox, and immensely dangerous disease capable of reaching epidemic proportions. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that destruction of the legally stored smallpox reserves would not affect its existence in the hands of those who would use the disease to harm. Total destruction of the smallpox reserves, which come from a legal source and remain under strict control, would lead to a halt in scientific research on the production of new vaccines and work targeted at protecting people from a possible future outbreak of smallpox. Taking into consideration the above, we share the fears expressed in the letter from the United States Government and support the argument for further storage of smallpox reserves. At the same time, we believe that the reserves should be kept in strictly controlled laboratories and remain under the control of the international community. End Text. HILLAS