Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06WARSAW2433
2006-11-22 07:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:
POLAND OPTIMISTIC ON DRAFT UNSCR TEXT ON IRAQ
how-toVZCZCXRO6034 OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHWR #2433 3260732 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 220732Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2491 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1375
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002433
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2011
TAGS: PARM PREL UNSC MOPS MARR PL IZ
SUBJECT: POLAND OPTIMISTIC ON DRAFT UNSCR TEXT ON IRAQ
REF: A. STATE 188677
B. STATE 188249
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002433
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2011
TAGS: PARM PREL UNSC MOPS MARR PL IZ
SUBJECT: POLAND OPTIMISTIC ON DRAFT UNSCR TEXT ON IRAQ
REF: A. STATE 188677
B. STATE 188249
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Pol External Chief and British counterpart delivered
Ref B points jointly November 20 to Amb. Krzysztof Plominski,
Acting Director of the MFA Middle East Africa Department.
PolExtChief also took the opportunity to share Ref A text of
Secretary Rice's letter to the UNSC President.
SIPDIS
2. (C) Plominski indicated that the GOP had already received
the documents on November 16 from their mission in New York
and had analyzed them carefully on both procedure and
substance. He noted the importance of building on the
precedents of UNSCRs 1546 and 1637, and expressed his
government's satisfaction that the mandate was finite and
expired on December 31, 2007. Overall, the Polish government
was quite pleased with the UNSCR draft.
3. (C) Plominski also reacted positively to what he described
as "appropriate new elements" in the draft resolution,
especially those referring to the changing political
situation in Iraq, PM Maliki's National Reconciliation Plan
and the International Compact. He opined that it was
important from a domestic political perspective to have as
much reference as possible to non-military reconstruction and
assistance. Plominski thought it would have been better to
somehow reflect the "evolution of thinking within the
Coalition" with regard to Iraq, especially given the U.S.
elections and the activity of the Iraq Study Group, as well
as the recent public debate in the UK. However, he
acknowledged that these developments had not yet played out
and there was no time to take them into account given the
need for a new UNSCR well ahead of the New Year.
4. (C) With regard to Poland's own political decision-making
on the Iraq deployment for 2007, Plominski said that passage
of a new UNSCR would leave only one obstacle to the Council
of Ministers submitting a formal decision to President
Kaczynski: the lack of a formal written request from PM
Maliki asking that Polish forces remain in Iraq. He
acknowledged that the GOP had received several oral requests
from senior Iraqi officials, including from Iraqi NSA Rubai
at the October 2006 MNF-I conference in Warsaw. However, the
GOI had still failed to provide a written request despite
numerous reminders from the most senior levels of the GOP.
ASHE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2011
TAGS: PARM PREL UNSC MOPS MARR PL IZ
SUBJECT: POLAND OPTIMISTIC ON DRAFT UNSCR TEXT ON IRAQ
REF: A. STATE 188677
B. STATE 188249
Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Pol External Chief and British counterpart delivered
Ref B points jointly November 20 to Amb. Krzysztof Plominski,
Acting Director of the MFA Middle East Africa Department.
PolExtChief also took the opportunity to share Ref A text of
Secretary Rice's letter to the UNSC President.
SIPDIS
2. (C) Plominski indicated that the GOP had already received
the documents on November 16 from their mission in New York
and had analyzed them carefully on both procedure and
substance. He noted the importance of building on the
precedents of UNSCRs 1546 and 1637, and expressed his
government's satisfaction that the mandate was finite and
expired on December 31, 2007. Overall, the Polish government
was quite pleased with the UNSCR draft.
3. (C) Plominski also reacted positively to what he described
as "appropriate new elements" in the draft resolution,
especially those referring to the changing political
situation in Iraq, PM Maliki's National Reconciliation Plan
and the International Compact. He opined that it was
important from a domestic political perspective to have as
much reference as possible to non-military reconstruction and
assistance. Plominski thought it would have been better to
somehow reflect the "evolution of thinking within the
Coalition" with regard to Iraq, especially given the U.S.
elections and the activity of the Iraq Study Group, as well
as the recent public debate in the UK. However, he
acknowledged that these developments had not yet played out
and there was no time to take them into account given the
need for a new UNSCR well ahead of the New Year.
4. (C) With regard to Poland's own political decision-making
on the Iraq deployment for 2007, Plominski said that passage
of a new UNSCR would leave only one obstacle to the Council
of Ministers submitting a formal decision to President
Kaczynski: the lack of a formal written request from PM
Maliki asking that Polish forces remain in Iraq. He
acknowledged that the GOP had received several oral requests
from senior Iraqi officials, including from Iraqi NSA Rubai
at the October 2006 MNF-I conference in Warsaw. However, the
GOI had still failed to provide a written request despite
numerous reminders from the most senior levels of the GOP.
ASHE