NORTH KOREA: POLISH MFA ASKS FOR INTENSIFIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 002224 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2011 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP PL KN SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA: POLISH MFA ASKS FOR INTENSIFIED BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH U.S. REF: A. STATE 172816 ¶B. WARSAW 2176 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Political Counselor Mary Curtin, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. MFA East Asia Pacific Department Director Jacek Najder invited Pol External Chief in for a lengthy discussion of Polish policy on North Korea, which culminated in a request for intensified bilateral consultations. Poloff took advantage of the opportunity to deliver Ref A demarche on UNSCR 1718. END SUMMARY. Poland lead in EU Discussion -------------- ¶2. (C) Najder began by describing Polish actions within the EU in the days before the October 8 North Korean nuclear test. The MFA sent instructions October 6 to the Polish Embassy in Pyongyang, containing proposals for reacting should North Korea in fact carry out on its threat to conduct a nuclear test, to be presented to the other EU embassies in Pyongyang (Czech Republic, Germany, Sweden, UK). The proposals were: - EU visa/travel sanctions on a list of key North Korean government and political leaders; - EU visa/travel sanctions on all other North Koran individuals clearly associated with the nuclear program, including officials, scientists and experts; - cancellation of all EU and member state student exchanges in the relevant scientific disciplines (but not other areas); - a new program of closely monitoring delivery and use of existing EU and member state humanitarian aid to North Korea; - foregoing for the time being the recall of Ambassadors, in favor of keeping a channel of communication open; - maintaining for the same reason working level contacts with the North Korean government, below the A/S-equivalent level. ¶3. (C) According to Najder, the five EU embassies in Pyongyang met on October 9 (by then after the test) to discuss a joint recommendation back to the EU in Brussels. he said that the group had essentially adopted verbatim the Polish proposals, which he described as "the only well thought out options presented," and forwarded them immediately to the Commission and Council Secretariat in Brussels. However, when the PSC met at the working level to consider the proposals a majority of member states preferred to take no action pending a decision by the UN Security Council. ¶4. (C) Najder commented privately that the GOP had been greatly disappointed that other EU member states had chosen to defer to the Security Council, thereby for all practical purposes "ceding EU decision making authority to the Russians and Chinese, who will always take the most conservative approach to sanctions." Poland hoped to continue playing a prominent position in EU decision making on North Korea. He noted that, although Germany was the current "EU lead" in Pyongyang and would remain so through its EU presidency in the first half of 2007, Poland would take over the EU lead for the Portuguese presidency in the second half of 2007. GOP consultations outside the EU -------------- ¶5. (C) Najder said that Poland had also stepped up its discussions with the other key players on North Korea, including joining the Japanese for a joint approach to Beijing in the context of the existing mechanism of annual trilateral consultations on North Korea. He said the focus of these talks would be pursuing real implementation of UNSCR ¶1718. Poloff took this opportunity to share Ref A information on the resolution. ¶6. (C) On the separate subject of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC),Najder said that Poland was under some criticism from its fellow NNSC members Sweden and Switzerland in advance of their annual consultations in early WARSAW 00002224 002 OF 002 November 2006 in Stockholm. Apparently the Swiss/Swedish have suggested that as a member of the EU and NATO and a close ally of the United States (including Coalition activities),Poland can no longer claim neutrality. Request for Intensified U.S.-Polish Dialogue -------------- ¶7. (C) Najder observed that over the past several years Poland has appreciated senior contacts with the U.S. to discuss North Korea, including a May 2005 visit by then-MFA U/S Zaleski (accompanied by Najder) to Washington for discussions with EAP A/S Hill, at which time A/S Hill had suggested more U.S.-Polish consultation and coordination on Korean Peninsula issues, both in capitals and in Seoul, Beijing, etc. Poloff noted that A/S Hill had met with current MFA U/S Waszczykowski in early 2006, which Najder acknowledged positively. However, Najder reiterated his belief that greater and more frequent U.S.-Polish consultations would be fruitful for both sides. ¶8. (C) COMMENT. Embassy has enjoyed an excellent working relationship on Korean issues with the Polish MFA at all levels, including Waszczykowski and Zaleski before him. Poland has an active Embassy on the ground in Pyongyang and they are always prepared to share information and experience. They are also willing to take a leadership role in EU discussions as noted above. We understand that Embassies Seoul and Beijing also have good contacts with their Polish counterparts. In addition to passing on the Polish request for greater contact (at the A/S or DAS level),it might be useful for Washington and relevant posts to establish a regular channel for sharing such contacts. ¶9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. The Russian Federation is conspicuously absent from the list of Polish consultations on North Korea. However, given that the GOP is attempting to reduce the current tensions between Moscow and Warsaw on a host of bilateral and regional issues, the Poles should be forgiven for not adding another contentious problem to the mix. END COMMENT. ASHE