A/S FRIED'S MEETINGS WITH FM FOTYGA, MFA AND MOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 WARSAW 002159 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2021 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON OVIP SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETINGS WITH FM FOTYGA, MFA AND MOD OFFICIALS Classified By: Political Counselor Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: (C) A/S Fried met September 8 with MFA and MOD officials to discuss a range of bilateral issues, and was hosted at dinner later that evening by Foreign Minister Fotyga. An extensive part of both conversations focused on Ukraine, and how to encourage the Ukrainian government to continue reforms and to maintain a western-oriented policy, with Poles urging a more forward-leaning position on a NATO MAP. MFA officials agreed with the need for closer ties with Germany, but pointed to political issues that made that difficult. Both sides agreed on the need for Poland and Europe as a whole to diversify their energy sources. Polish officials described their commitment to improving the situation in the Broader Middle East, and offered to host a ministerial level conference on a range of issues, if that would be useful. They assured A/S Fried of Poland's interest in Missile Defense and understanding that there were no linkages to other issues. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Attending the morning meeting, chaired by MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski, were, MOD U/S Boguslaw Winid, MFA Security Policy Dept Director Robert Kupiecki, MFA Americas Department Deputy Director Andrzej Jaroszynski, MOD Defense Policy Department Deputy Director Piotr Pacholski, and MFA Americas Desk Officer Maciej Pisarski. A/S Fried was accompanied by Poloffs. Fotyga was accompanied at dinner by America,s Director Szlajfer, Eastern Policy Director Wojciech Zajaczkowski, and Wladislaw Lindenberg, Chief of the Minister,s Secretariat. A/S Fried was accompanied by Ambassador, DCM, and PolCouns. -------------- UKRAINE AND BROADER EASTERN POLICY -------------- ¶3. (C) Waszczykowski said that Ukraine and energy security were at the top of the Kaczynski government's agenda. Ukrainian FM Tarasiuk had visited Poland in late August, and PM Yanukovich had been in Poland two days earlier on September 6 and met at length with PM Kaczynski. The Polish message to the United States and the rest of the EU was "Don't forget Ukraine" and "Don't forget MAP." Tarasiuk had suggested indirectly that the West should not worry about changes in Ukrainian foreign policy, as President Yushchenko had constitutional responsibility for foreign and security issues. ¶4. (C) Fried briefed the Polish side on his September 7 meeting with PM Yanukovich, which had been scheduled for one hour but gone on for two. He said Yanukovich was clearly nervous about how the West perceived him and had devoted more than hour to a lengthy explanation of his agenda and motives. Fried informed Yanukovich that the United States supported the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to the Polish refining center in Plock. Yanukovich had then talked about opening up the Ukraine energy sector to Western companies and working with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on energy diversification. Yanukovich had said all the right things on energy, with the significant exception that he did not signal any plans to change the gas deal with RusUkrEnergo. ¶5. (C) Fried said he had told Yanukovich that the best approach to eventual NATO membership for Ukraine was to take it slow and get it right. Better to take a cautious approach and build political support than to be aggressive and outrun his political cover. Fried said he had also told Yanukovich that neither NATO nor the United States were putting any pressure on Ukraine to move faster on membership--it was Ukraine that should decide the pace. Yanukovich had clearly been relieved to hear this. Fried said the Secretary had asked him to reassure Yanukovich that the door to the West was open and Ukraine would always have a "Western option." ¶6. (C) Waszczykowski asked what Yanukovich planned to say at his scheduled meeting with the North Atlantic Council about the Riga Summit and a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine. Fried replied that Yanukovich did not feel prepared to pursue MAP yet and therefore would probably not push for MAP at Riga. However, that did not mean that Ukraine would not be on the agenda at Riga. It was still important to talk about NATO expansion in general and develop a basic plan for the next tranche of NATO aspirants. MOD U/S Winid suggested that it would be good for the United States and Poland to compare notes on Ukraine at the Lisbon Conference in early October, where he expected to see ASD Peter Flory. ¶7. (C) The subject of Ukraine also figured significantly in the discussion at the dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Fotyga later that evening. She argued it would be useful to give Kiev an incentive to good relations with the West by offering a NATO MAP. Fried repeated that a lot depended on Yanukovich,s performance during his upcoming visit to NATO. ¶8. (C) When Fried suggested that we could not make a NATO offer until Ukraine clearly stated it wants NATO, Fotyga questioned whether it would possible to develop "a viable energy perspective" with Ukraine if it does not have a NATO perspective in hand. Fried reiterated that we should hold open the possibility, but it is the Ukrainians who must push. Fotyga argued NATO should make some kind of offer, making it clear we would welcome Ukraine when it is ready. This would then be an incentive for Ukraine to move forward, helping it solidify its interest in NATO. Fotyga argued that we have to remove lingering doubts among Ukrainians that the West does not really want them. Being forthcoming on NATO membership would help. A/S Fried concluded by saying we should wait and see what Yanukovich says in Brussels. -------------- Energy Security and Russia -------------- ¶9. (C) Foreign Minister Fotyga described upcoming EU-Russian discussions on an EU-Russia agreement, and said Poland worried that other EU members wanted a quick liberalization of Russian access to the EU market. Poland wants a strong reciprocity aspect to any such agreement, and sees dangers in quick Russian investment in the Polish infrastructure. Poland wants some guarantees, she said of its own investment possibilities, leading to a diversification of Poland,s energy supply, before agreeing to liberalize the EU market for Russia. She said Poland wanted to ensure liberalization also of the "people-to-people" aspect of EU-Russian exchange, and not limit it to business and political exchanges. She said Poland also had some concerns about Kaliningrad, particularly with regard to weapons and the environment. Other Baltic Sea countries also had some concerns, including regarding security of navigation and the environment. ¶10. (C) She said Poland was actively seeking alternative energy sources. A/S Fried described various efforts underway to challenge Gazprom,s monopoly, and said we are active in talking to a number of governments. We are making some progress, but countries such as Greece and Bulgaria feel Russian pressure not to cooperate. The United States would welcome Poland talking to the Turks about the issue, noting longstanding historical ties between the two countries. Fried also described the importance of Kazakhstan moving gas on pipelines not controlled by Russia. In response to Fotyga,s question about whether they could act independently, Fried said he thought Aleyev was a good strategic thinker, but he was not sure how things would come out. -------------- BROADER MIDDLE EAST -------------- ¶11. (C) During the morning meeting, U/S Waszczykowski said that Poland was deployed all over the BME, from Afghanistan to Lebanon. "All of a sudden we're a power in the Middle East!" He noted Poland's considerable experience in the BME, with military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan to Lebanon and the Golan Heights, and with strong area and language expertise in the Arab and "Persian" world. He said he had encouraged PM Kaczynski to ask Fried a blunt question at their meeting later the same day: "Why won't democracy work in the Middle East the way it did for Poland and its neighbors?" The West had been trying hard to build a democratic Middle East, but it was going poorly. Should we then readjust our goals or set our sights lower? ¶12. (C) Waszczykowski said the GOP was ready to offer Warsaw as the venue for a conference at the ministerial or sub-ministerial level to explore these questions and search for new approaches. Perhaps Central European states could bring useful insights to the table on the challenges and successes of democratization. Foreign Minister Fotyga reiterated the offer at dinner that night, saying that Poland believes that, because of its longstanding engagement in the Middle East, it could bring some value-added to efforts to bring peace. ¶13. (C) Fried responded with interest to Waszczykowski's suggestion and undertook to consult on it with appropriate senior colleagues on his return to Washington. He opined that Polish experience would be particularly valuable with regard to Iran, where the United States was still lacking expertise in both the area and the language. He suggested that Secretary Rice would be particularly interested in the proposal if PM Kaczynski were to raise it at their luncheon on September 13. He reiterated the point to Minister Fotyga, saying Poland probably had much to offer with regards to intelligence on the internal political situation in Iran in particular. -------------- AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶14. (C) Fried noted that SACEUR General Jones had recently visited Afghanistan and had concluded that the British commander onsite had been correct when he stated that the Coalition and NATO needed more forces on the ground. The United States would not press for more troops from Poland, which was already pulling its weight, but there were other Allies who had yet to make meaningful troop contributions. General Jones was likely to raise this issue at the September 7-9 meeting of the NATO Military Committee and NATO CHODs taking place in Warsaw. ¶15. (C) Waszczykowski noted that there were two types of battle going on in Afghanistan, the traditional combat of course, but also the fight to find a cash crop substitution for the renewed cultivation of opium poppies in the south. Waszczykowski informed Fried that DefMin Sikorski would soon be visiting Afghanistan, where he would travel to the Pakistan border area to erect a monument on the gravesite of a fellow journalist (British of Polish descent) who died during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1970s, and to the gravesite of the murdered Northern Alliance leader Massoud (N.B. whom he knew personally),as well as to visit the Polish troops in the Swedish PRT in Masar-i-Sharif. -------------- GERMANY -------------- ¶16. (C) Waszczykowski stated that the MFA was "desperate" to find a positive agenda with Germany. He noted that the GOP had responded quickly to the EU call for forces in Congo and for contributions to UNIFIL-plus. The Poles were also cooperating closely with the Germans (and Danes) in the NATO Multi-National Corps Northeast (MNC-NE),which would be deploying troops to Afghanistan in 2007. However, he feared that "Schroeder's people" continued to control Eastern policy in the Merkel government and were taking an "overly optimistic view" of Russian actions and intentions. Both governments agreed that there was a "deficit of democracy" in Russia, but they differed on how to react. While the GOP was unwilling to accept the situation and continued to push aggressively for democratization in Russia, the Germans seemed to have resigned themselves and were seeking the best way to cooperate with the Putin government under the circumstances. ¶17. (C) A/S Fried stressed that the Polish-German relationship was crucial to Polish success in the EU. He said that in September 6 meetings in Berlin his German interlocutors had expressed concern over the deterioration in relations with Poland, and stressed the importance the U.S. attaches to strong Polish-German cooperation. He said he had told the Germans frankly that he felt the GOP was justified in its anger over the Russian-German pipeline. ¶18. (C) Fried told Waszczykowski the United States hoped to see Poland become a strong player not only regionally but throughout Europe. He cited Spain's resurgence within the EU under former PM Aznar as a possible model. Polish advocacy for Ukraine was not enough, especially if relations with Germany were poor, but a Polish-German partnership could make EU eastern policy a success. Fried reported that Ukrainian FM Tarasiuk had acknowledged that Poland was crucial to Ukraine's future, and had also expressed concern over the apparent Polish-German rift. ¶19. (C) Fried reported that the Germans had a three-prong plan for eastern policy for their upcoming EU presidency: Russia; Central Asia and the Caucasus, with a focus especially on Kazakhstan and Georgia; and Ukraine. Waszczykowski assured Fried that Poland was not looking for a fight with Germany. There were really only two points of contention. The Baltic Pipeline had clearly angered the GOP, but a cooperative approach with the Merkel government could overcome that problem. He acknowledged that public comments by Polish officials, including DefMin Sikorski's reference to a second Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, were not helpful. The second problem was a largely media-generated debate in both countries over "past history." ¶20. (C) He agreed that EU eastern policy was a high priority for both Poland and Germany and that a cooperative approach was necessary. The GOP shared the German's EU presidency priorities, especially with regard to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia. He said Poland had decided not to take an active role in blocking Kazakhstan's bid for the OSCE Chairmanship in Office for 2009. The GOP would not support or advocate within the EU, but it would also not block consensus if the other EU member states fell in behind the Kazakh bid. Fried replied that the United States did not have an objection in principle to the Kazakh OSCE bid but felt that GOK democratic reforms would not have proceeded far enough by 2009, and that a later date such as 2011 would be more appropriate. MISSILE DEFENSE ¶21. (C) Fried thanked Waszczykowski for the close cooperation to date on missile defense. He said that U.S. MD deliberations were moving forward but noted that a decision on whether, and, if so where, to deploy a Third Site for MD in Europe was still a month or two away. He suggested that there was still a real possibility that such a decision would split the interceptor site and the radar site between Poland and the Czech Republic. ¶22. (C) Waszczykowski said the GOP was fully ready to proceed with negotiations, when and if the United States made a concrete offer. He stressed that, despite the recent flurry of media speculation over the terms on which Poland would accept a U.S. MD site, Poland would enter such negotiations with no preconditions. MFA Security Policy Director Kupiecki also commented that, should the United States in fact decide to split MD, trilateral negotiations between the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic would be very important. DELL COMPUTERS INVESTMENT ¶23. (C) A/S Fried suggested to Waszczykowski that it would provide an excellent deliverable for PM Kaczynski's visit to Washington if the GOP were to give its blessing to the pending offer by Dell Computers to invest over $100 million in a production facility in Poland. ¶24. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried. ASHE