A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH POLISH PM JAROSLAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 002113 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2021 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON OVIP SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH POLISH PM JAROSLAW KACZYNSKI Classified By: Mary T. Curtin, Political Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met with Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski on September 8, 2006 and discussed Ukraine, Belarus, and energy security, all topics that we expect the PM to raise when he travels to Washington next week. Fried also discussed the chilly state of relations between Warsaw and Berlin, urging the Polish premier to establish a firmer path for cooperation between Poland and Germany. A/S Fried also praised Poland's participation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. He urged PM Kaczynski to have the GOP finalize its approval of an anticipated deal with computer manufacturer, Dell Computers, which is expected to bring thousands of jobs to Poland's second largest city, Lodz. End summary. ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S.: Assistant Secretary Dan Fried; Ambassador Victor Ashe; Political Counselor Mary Curtin; Political Internal Section Chief David Van Cleve. Poland: PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski; MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski; Leszek Jesien, Secretary of State, Office of Prime Minister (Foreign policy advisor); Krzysztof Miszczak, Acting Director of the Foreign Policy Department in the Prime Minister,s Chancellery. ¶3. (C) In a meeting scheduled for a half hour, but lasting more than an hour, the PM welcomed A/S Fried and joked that while it was always better to govern from the back seat, he had realized that being the head of a significant Polish political party was not enough, and that he had to step up to the premiership. He offered that Poland had traveled a long way in the years he had known A/S Fried, and he was glad to know he had lived a good portion of his life in good times. UKRAINE ¶4. (C) PM Kaczynski said he had met with Ukrainian PM Yanukovich twice during Yanukovich,s September 6 visit to Krynice, and described Ukraine as a difficult partner. Kaczynski described the political situation in Kiev as strange, but said PM Yanukovich was the critical figure to work with. Kaczynski said he urged Yanukovich to send a letter to NATO asking for a Military Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine. Kaczynski said that, even if it cannot happen at the upcoming Riga summit, it would be good for Yanukovich to request it. Kaczynski said he understood Yanukovich,s background and culture and feared a worsening political climate in Kiev. He said that holding out the prospect of NATO membership was an important incentive to keep Ukraine oriented towards the West. "We want them in NATO," he said. ¶5. (C) Fried described his two-hour meeting with Yanukovich the previous day in Kiev. He said he shared the PM,s assessment of the situation in Ukraine, describing PM Yanukovich as neither a "democrat," nor a "homos Sovieticus," but someone the West could work with. Fried offered that he believed that Yanukovich was committed to a path that would be good for Ukraine, and that while the door was open for Ukraine to join NATO at some stage, offering Ukraine a MAP at the Riga summit was premature. However, if Yanukovich is impressive at NATO then perhaps a positive statement could be worked up for Ukraine for the Riga summit. ENERGY SECURITY ¶6. (C) Kaczynski raised the issue of the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to Plock, where Poland operates its largest refining center. Kaczynski said he expected to raise the issue during his visit to Washington, and viewed the pipeline as important economically. He will also discuss the "more strategic issue" of Poland,s efforts to seek gas and oil from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in order to provide an alternative to Gazprom. A/S Fried assured the Prime Minister that we were ready to cooperate on energy matters, and also viewed diversification of supplies as an issue of critical strategic importance. He mentioned that VP Cheney was closely engaged on this subject. He added that the Russians will not like it, but we must be ready to work together against Gazprom,s monopoly. KAZAKH CANDIDACY FOR OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP ¶7. (C) Kaczynski said that it was also important to the future of "this part of the world" that the sphere of democracy be expanded to the countries of Central Asia. A/S Fried agreed, saying that we want to consult on these issues, especially with regard to the OSCE. In that regard, Kaczynski raised the issue of Kazakhstan,s bid for the chairmanship in office of the OSCE in 2009. Fried agreed with Kaczynski and related his discussions in Berlin about Berlin,s support of Kazakh President Azerbayev. Fried commented that the United States did not disagree in principle to the Kazakh OSCE bid, but believes that it would be better to delay Kazakhstan,s candidacy until 2011. He said further that he had told the Germans that if Berlin had a strong preference for an earlier candidacy, then Kazakhstan would have to show it was ready to respect certain democratic norms. He viewed the problem of democracy in Central Asia as a serious one, and part of Poland,s broader strategy. Poland needed to deal with Kazakhstan on energy issues, but a "trade off" would not be "convincing." He said he wanted to work in common with the United States, and added that he also thought German Chancellor Merkel understood the situation, which, he said had "certain similarities" to the post-Communist period in Poland. In dealing with such regimes Poland did not have illusions, but also did not want to be cynical. Fried urged the Prime Minister to raise the issue of Kazakhstan with Secretary Rice during their upcoming meeting. POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS ¶8. (C) A/S Fried raised the importance of strong Polish-German relations. Echoing statements from his earlier meetings in the day and the previous evening with President Kaczynski, Fried said that the road to greater Polish influence in the EU "runs through Germany." Poland would be more effective in the EU if it could cooperate with Germany on Eastern issues. Kazakhstan was a good example. Poland could work at a strategic level with Berlin during Germany,s upcoming EU Presidency to shape policy towards Kazakhstan. Like Poland, Germany was more interested in working on the EU,s Eastern policy, versus Spain,s and France,s interest in looking south. ¶9. (C) A/S Fried said that he did not like the "Schroeder pipeline," but that it was certainly not the end of Polish-German relations, and it was important for all of the EU and countries lying to the East that Poland and Germany cooperate as fully as possible. Fried added that in Kiev FM Tarasiuk also raised concerns about the chilly state of relations between Berlin and Warsaw, saying that Ukraine needed both Poland and Germany. ¶10. (C) Kaczynski said that the problems in Polish-German relations had been exaggerated in the press, and that both countries wanted correct and good relations. He promised to discuss the issue with Chancellor Merkel in Helsinki in a planned EU meeting two days later, and said that both capitals were working on a new date in October or November for a Weimar meeting. ¶11. (C) That said, Kaczynski went on to describe at great length Polish sensitivity over German MP Erika Steinbach,s plans to develop a center for Germans expelled from Polish territory after World War II, and her group,s call for compensation for lost property. He commented that 34% of Polish territory was formerly German, and called her plans "provocative." He said he wanted to frame Polish relations with Germany towards the future, but possible claims from German expellees could be destabilizing for the Polish state. Kaczynski said Steinbach,s plans would require Poland to "pay a second time for World War II." He reiterated that Poland hoped for better relations with Germany, but made clear that he sees the source of the problem in Germany. BELARUS ¶12. (C) PM Kaczynski raised the issue of "another problem neighbor," Belarus. A/S Fried said "we can,t do anything about Lukashenko," who is a dictator, and described what he saw as three tiers of actors there: the people around Lukashenko, other government officials, whom Poles have suggested we not isolate, and the non-governmental forces, with whom we need to have open contact as the situation allows. He said that contacts with the opposition were good, and we needed to be patient, and asked Poland,s suggestions on how to proceed. ¶13. (C) Kaczynski said he agreed with the U.S. outlook, but added that Poland had a particular problem for ethnic Poles living there which motivated Warsaw,s differing approach. In order to ease their situation, "we may have to talk to Lukashenko." He said he had not yet decided whether to have a meeting with Lukashenko, and if he did, it would be about the situation of Poles in the country. A/S Fried responded that he fully understood that Poles in Belarus were potential hostages, but our view is that it is hard to have contact with Lukashenko. We don,t want to do it and don,t want the EU to do it, but understand Poland has a specific situation. He said that he hopes Poland will be careful and will be in contact with us on tactics in dealing with Belarus and the regime. GREATER MIDDLE EAST ¶14. (C) A/S Fried thanked PM Kaczynski,s for Poland,s active engagement in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. He said that the Polish army was a true partner of the United States and believed furthermore that Polish potential is serious. Kaczynski responded with appreciation for the benefits Poland receives from its partnership, especially the military training, which is "vital." Kaczynski said Poland would remain engaged in Lebanon, although it was not clear if the mission will be successful or if war will break out. Kaczynski said he had consulted with Italian Premier Prodi and promised Poland,s ongoing involvement. DELL ¶15. (C) At the end of the meeting, A/S Fried mentioned Poland,s anticipated deal with computer manufacturer Dell Computers to establish a facility in Lodz, Poland,s second largest city. The Prime Minister agreed that closing the deal shortly would be good for Poland, and would be a benefit to Poland and the United States alike. ¶16. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this cable. ASHE