Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06WARSAW2057
2006-09-21 15:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Warsaw
Cable title:
(C) MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLAND: REQUEST FOR AN
how-tonull Anne W McNeill 10/06/2006 04:13:13 PM From DB/Inbox: Anne W McNeill Cable Text: C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 02057 SIPDIS CXWARSAW: ACTION: POL INFO: AMB CONS RSO AGRI KRA MGT PASC ORA ODC ECON DCM DAO FCS DISSEMINATION: POLO CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: DCM:KHILLAS DRAFTED: POL:DTMORRIS CLEARED: POL:MTCURTIN VZCZCWRI683 PP RUEHC RHEHNSC RHEHAAA RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUEPGCA DE RUEHWR #2057 2641527 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 211527Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2058 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEPGCA/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002057
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WILSON; STATE FOR EUR/NCE; OSD FOR ISP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PL
SUBJECT: (C) MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLAND: REQUEST FOR AN
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON THE RUSSIAN "THREAT"
REF: WARSAW 1942 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002057
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WILSON; STATE FOR EUR/NCE; OSD FOR ISP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PL
SUBJECT: (C) MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLAND: REQUEST FOR AN
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON THE RUSSIAN "THREAT"
REF: WARSAW 1942 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 7.
2. (C) As reported reftel, public debate in Poland over
Missile Defense is intensifying even as the Polish government
prepares itself for an expected U.S. offer on MD. A critical
element of both processes is the perceived reaction and/or
threat from Moscow in response to any planned MD deployment
in Poland.
3. (C) Over the past few weeks, DefMin Sikorski has argued
publicly and privately that the certain Russian response to a
US MD site in Poland would be to mass short range missiles in
Kaliningrad as a direct challenge to Poland,s security.
During PM Kaczynski,s August 13-14 visit to Washington,
Sikorski repeated his contention that as part of any MD deal
the U.S. should therefore provide Poland with Patriot
missiles to protect Warsaw from attack. (On occasion,
Sikorski has also called for Patriot batteries that would
cover all of Poland.) Polish press reports now suggest that
PM Kaczynski has accepted this argumentation, something that
a senior MFA official recently confirmed to DCM.
4. (C) Sikorski's rhetoric reflects the strong anti-Russian,
indeed Russophobic, attitude of the Kaczynski government. In
order to overcome or at least mitigate Polish fears about the
impact of MD deployment, Post proposes that a team of
intelligence analysts, led at an appropriately senior level,
visit Warsaw within the next several weeks to provide a
detailed briefing to senior Polish leaders and intelligence
officials on the U.S. threat assessment with regard to
Russia. The Polish leadership and analytical community need
to hear an objective intelligence perspective (vice policy
position) on the perceived Russian threat to counter their
instinctive concerns.
5.(C) The issue should be addressed within the next few
weeks, because with time PM Kaczynski will become more
difficult to convince that Polish fears about Russia may be
misplaced. Certainly the visit and briefing should come
before the USG makes a decision on whether and where to
deploy an MD Third Site in Europe.
6. (C) Whether or not Poland continues to believe that
accepting an MD site would constitute a net security loss, a
position which U.S. experts argue against, will be critical
to the U.S. decision on whether and to whom to make an MD
proposal. As part of this effort, we should also ask the
Poles to share with us their own threat assessment on Russia.
7. (C) ACTION REQUEST. Post requests that Department
coordinate the travel to Warsaw of a team of expert
intelligence analysts, led by an appropriately senior
analyst, to provide senior GOP officials and analysts with a
comprehensive assessment of the Russian threat to Poland. As
noted above, such a briefing would be particularly useful in
the context of a possible U.S. offer of MD deployments to
Poland. It should also allow for a reciprocal threat
assessment briefing from the Polish side.
ASHE
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WILSON; STATE FOR EUR/NCE; OSD FOR ISP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PL
SUBJECT: (C) MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLAND: REQUEST FOR AN
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON THE RUSSIAN "THREAT"
REF: WARSAW 1942 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 7.
2. (C) As reported reftel, public debate in Poland over
Missile Defense is intensifying even as the Polish government
prepares itself for an expected U.S. offer on MD. A critical
element of both processes is the perceived reaction and/or
threat from Moscow in response to any planned MD deployment
in Poland.
3. (C) Over the past few weeks, DefMin Sikorski has argued
publicly and privately that the certain Russian response to a
US MD site in Poland would be to mass short range missiles in
Kaliningrad as a direct challenge to Poland,s security.
During PM Kaczynski,s August 13-14 visit to Washington,
Sikorski repeated his contention that as part of any MD deal
the U.S. should therefore provide Poland with Patriot
missiles to protect Warsaw from attack. (On occasion,
Sikorski has also called for Patriot batteries that would
cover all of Poland.) Polish press reports now suggest that
PM Kaczynski has accepted this argumentation, something that
a senior MFA official recently confirmed to DCM.
4. (C) Sikorski's rhetoric reflects the strong anti-Russian,
indeed Russophobic, attitude of the Kaczynski government. In
order to overcome or at least mitigate Polish fears about the
impact of MD deployment, Post proposes that a team of
intelligence analysts, led at an appropriately senior level,
visit Warsaw within the next several weeks to provide a
detailed briefing to senior Polish leaders and intelligence
officials on the U.S. threat assessment with regard to
Russia. The Polish leadership and analytical community need
to hear an objective intelligence perspective (vice policy
position) on the perceived Russian threat to counter their
instinctive concerns.
5.(C) The issue should be addressed within the next few
weeks, because with time PM Kaczynski will become more
difficult to convince that Polish fears about Russia may be
misplaced. Certainly the visit and briefing should come
before the USG makes a decision on whether and where to
deploy an MD Third Site in Europe.
6. (C) Whether or not Poland continues to believe that
accepting an MD site would constitute a net security loss, a
position which U.S. experts argue against, will be critical
to the U.S. decision on whether and to whom to make an MD
proposal. As part of this effort, we should also ask the
Poles to share with us their own threat assessment on Russia.
7. (C) ACTION REQUEST. Post requests that Department
coordinate the travel to Warsaw of a team of expert
intelligence analysts, led by an appropriately senior
analyst, to provide senior GOP officials and analysts with a
comprehensive assessment of the Russian threat to Poland. As
noted above, such a briefing would be particularly useful in
the context of a possible U.S. offer of MD deployments to
Poland. It should also allow for a reciprocal threat
assessment briefing from the Polish side.
ASHE