(C) MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLAND: REQUEST FOR AN

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 002057 SIPDIS NSC FOR WILSON; STATE FOR EUR/NCE; OSD FOR ISP E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PL SUBJECT: (C) MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLAND: REQUEST FOR AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING ON THE RUSSIAN "THREAT" REF: WARSAW 1942 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 7. ¶2. (C) As reported reftel, public debate in Poland over Missile Defense is intensifying even as the Polish government prepares itself for an expected U.S. offer on MD. A critical element of both processes is the perceived reaction and/or threat from Moscow in response to any planned MD deployment in Poland. ¶3. (C) Over the past few weeks, DefMin Sikorski has argued publicly and privately that the certain Russian response to a US MD site in Poland would be to mass short range missiles in Kaliningrad as a direct challenge to Poland,s security. During PM Kaczynski,s August 13-14 visit to Washington, Sikorski repeated his contention that as part of any MD deal the U.S. should therefore provide Poland with Patriot missiles to protect Warsaw from attack. (On occasion, Sikorski has also called for Patriot batteries that would cover all of Poland.) Polish press reports now suggest that PM Kaczynski has accepted this argumentation, something that a senior MFA official recently confirmed to DCM. ¶4. (C) Sikorski's rhetoric reflects the strong anti-Russian, indeed Russophobic, attitude of the Kaczynski government. In order to overcome or at least mitigate Polish fears about the impact of MD deployment, Post proposes that a team of intelligence analysts, led at an appropriately senior level, visit Warsaw within the next several weeks to provide a detailed briefing to senior Polish leaders and intelligence officials on the U.S. threat assessment with regard to Russia. The Polish leadership and analytical community need to hear an objective intelligence perspective (vice policy position) on the perceived Russian threat to counter their instinctive concerns. 5.(C) The issue should be addressed within the next few weeks, because with time PM Kaczynski will become more difficult to convince that Polish fears about Russia may be misplaced. Certainly the visit and briefing should come before the USG makes a decision on whether and where to deploy an MD Third Site in Europe. ¶6. (C) Whether or not Poland continues to believe that accepting an MD site would constitute a net security loss, a position which U.S. experts argue against, will be critical to the U.S. decision on whether and to whom to make an MD proposal. As part of this effort, we should also ask the Poles to share with us their own threat assessment on Russia. ¶7. (C) ACTION REQUEST. Post requests that Department coordinate the travel to Warsaw of a team of expert intelligence analysts, led by an appropriately senior analyst, to provide senior GOP officials and analysts with a comprehensive assessment of the Russian threat to Poland. As noted above, such a briefing would be particularly useful in the context of a possible U.S. offer of MD deployments to Poland. It should also allow for a reciprocal threat assessment briefing from the Polish side. ASHE