U.S.-POLAND STRATEGIC DIALOGUE III: EU FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 000176 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR AND EUR/NCE SECDEF FOR OUSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR J5 EUCOM FOR J5/J4 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PL UP BO RU SUBJECT: U.S.-POLAND STRATEGIC DIALOGUE III: EU FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION AND EASTERN EUROPE POLICY Classified By: DCM Kenneth Hillas, reasons 1.4 (B)&(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Septel reports on security and defense issues discussed by EUR A/S Dan Fried and ASD/ISP Peter Flory at the Third U.S.-Polish Strategic Dialogue (SD) January 25 in Warsaw and provides a list of the principal U.S. and Polish participants. This cable covers the SD sessions on Eastern Policy (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) and U.S-EU foreign policy cooperation worldwide, as well as the general discussion of U.S.-Polish bilateral issues. The "Eastern agenda" was a dominant theme throughout the SD and at bilateral meetings with PM Marcinkiewicz and President Lech Kaczynski. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Acknowledging the efforts of President Bush to turn the page on the difficult dialogue with certain European allies over Iraq, A/S Fried said that the United States was pleased that voices in Europe advocating the EU as a "counterweight" to the United States had been pushed to the background, and that we were on a surer footing looking for trans-Atlantic partnership. Fried pointed out that Chancellor Merkel had set a new tone in Germany specifically and the EU more generally, that was "good for the U.S, good for Europe, and good for Poland." Eastern Europe -------------- ¶3. (C) Ukraine: MFA Americas Department Director Henryk Szlajfer addressed the Russian cutoff of gas to Ukraine at the new year. Although Russia had lost political face and galvanized the West on energy security issues as never before, he argued, the actual terms of the renegotiated gas agreement were rather disadvantageous to Ukraine. Szlajfer suggested that the deal should be seen as a temporary measure and that the issue would likely reappear after the March 2006 elections. Recalling his participation in Polish FM Meller's recent visit to Kiev, Szlajfer expressed concern over the deep divisions in the Orange Revolution group. He emphasized the need to drive home to Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and others the great risks that such political disunity posed to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. A/S Fried said his meetings in Kiev had suggested that cooperation within the Orange camp could still be possible after the elections. In any case, it was important to continue pressing a pro-reform agenda with whatever government took power. Yushchenko would be well advised to follow Lech Walesa's example as president and to lead his country toward Euro-Atlantic integration, regardless of changes in government. ¶4. (C) Belarus: U/S Waszczykowski reviewed Polish government support for democratic forces in Belarus, including a planned election monitoring mission, external broadcasting, and expanded people-to-people contacts. He noted that Belarusian opposition presidential candidate Milinkevich was being hosted by the Polish parliament and president even as the Strategic Dialogue was going on. (Septel reports on A/S Fried's meeting with Milinkevich.) A/S Fried sought the Polish side's thoughts on a joint U.S.-EU mission to Belarus, tentatively planned for the following week. Waszczykowski replied that the mission could be worth the inherent risk of giving Lukashenko a propaganda opportunity, provided that those involved believe they could get their message out to the people. ¶5. (C) Russia: MFA Policy Planning Director Jaroslaw Bratkiewicz argued that Russia was suspended in the transition "between post-empire and nation-state," and that this identity crisis was at the root of Russian behavior, especially towards its neighbors. Russia requires clear signals from its western partners that there is no "post-Soviet space" and no "special rights" for Russia. A/S Fried observed that the best course would be to continue trying to strike a balance between realism about Russian intentions and the desire to work with Russia where we can. A/S Fried and ASD Flory emphasized that U.S. policy toward Russia could not be separated from U.S. values. The U.S. would not abandon its values, or its friends and allies, in pursuit of cooperation with Russia. DAS Pekala noted that the Russians had been very good at "knocking on doors" until they received the answers they were looking for, which underscored the need for a common approach. U/S Waszczykowski suggested that, in addition to NATO's taking up energy security, the Alliance should also look more broadly at the strategic implications of economic policy and security. U.S. Foreign Policy Cooperation with the EU -------------- ¶6. (C) Cuba: Szlajfer said there was a serious problem within the EU on Cuba policy. The Spanish had been attempting since 2004 to revise EU policy towards Cuba, saying that the EU's hard line had brought no results and that therefore there should be a shift towards engagement with both the government and the opposition. The Polish government still opposed engagement with the Castro regime, which would be used by Havana to justify its repressive policies. The GOP wanted to strengthen the opposition, and took steps in 2005 to encourage other governments to sponsor the families of imprisoned Cuban opposition figures. Szlajfer reported on his own recent visit to Havana, where he met with opposition figures. He stated that the GOP would work with other European countries -- especially the "Visegrad Four" -- to develop a consistent policy and to secure a smooth transition towards democracy. He noted, however, that not only Spain, but also France and Great Britain might be "playing a different game". Szlajfer said that the GOP would press other Latin American governments to work for the release of Cuban prisoners, but noted that Poland's tough line on Cuba had diminished the GOP's influence with these countries and was affecting Poland's commercial opportunities in the region. (COMMENT. This is similar to the common GOP concern that their tough "pro-U.S." line on issues as the Iran and the China arms embargo has put them at a commercial disadvantage vis a vis older EU members with a "more flexible approach.") Szlajfer concluded that we could expect modest progress in EU policy toward Cuba, but no major breakthroughs. ¶7. (C) A/S Fried expressed appreciation for Polish leadership on Cuba, in contrast to the approaches of other European states that appear to be motivated by economic interests. We recognize that Poland's principled engagement carries some costs, and that the Polish government does not wish to be isolated on this issue. A/S Fried lauded the bravery of the Polish mission in Havana, particularly its Charge, and highlighted the recent videoconference between Lech Walesa and Cuban opposition figures as a great example of Polish initiative. "We are working on Spain," he assured the Poles. ¶8. (C) Iran: U/S Waszczykowski (who had served previously as Polish ambassador to Tehran) maintained that Poland had enjoyed historically good relations with Iran, and observed that U.S. policy on Iran had been too harsh over the years. The U.S. expected the impossible of an Iranian society that, having neither a Solidarity-type movement or a leader like Lech Walesa, was simply not at a stage where major political changes could be expected. Moreover, Waszczykowski asserted, continuing high oil and gas revenues and generous domestic subsidies ensured public acquiescence and allowed the GOI to resist the appeal of international "carrots." Waszczykowski argued that the U.S. had ignored GOI overtures, preferring instead to pursue a policy of waiting for the regime to collapse. Was there any possibility, he asked, of a loosening of American policy? ¶9. (C) A/S Fried pointed out that the GOI had "gone out of its way" to be provocative and ugly, most particularly since President Ahmadenijad had taken office, and had demonstrated little interest in reaching an agreement with the EU-3 on the nuclear issue. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran was of serious concern to the whole world, he underscored, and Iran's approach had to be met with isolation and referral to the UN Security Council. He argued that it was wrong to rule out progress on democracy in Iran and asserted that diplomatic pressure could in fact bring real results. U/S Waszczykowski acknowledged Fried's points and allowed that his own remarks had been "somewhat provocative." Bilateral Issues -------------- ¶10. (C) Over lunch the participants discussed bilateral issues, including goals for President Kaczynski,s planned February visit to Washington. A/S Fried reviewed the schedule for the visit, and emphasized that Kaczynski should view the visit as an opportunity to get to know President Bush and his senior advisors. He emphasized that President Bush will be interested in Kaczynski,s background as a fighter for freedom, as a strong leader, as evidenced by his decision to maintain troops in Iraq, and for his role in promoting democracy in Ukraine and Belarus. ¶11. (C) Szlajfer said that he thought that the U.S. tourist visa regime and U.S.-Polish political-military cooperation were two substantive issues that the two presidents should discuss. The Poles did not, he said, want to "dwell" on visas, but only to have a positive statement that President Bush wanted to see Poland in the Visa Waiver Program. He also expressed the hope that something could be done to eliminate visa fees for student travel, an idea former President Kwasniewski had raised with President Bush in 2005. A/S Fried explained it was not possible to establish such a program for Poland alone. On military assistance, Szlajfer said that Kaczynski would not want to get into figures, but would want President Bush to repeat the United States, strong commitment to close bilateral military cooperation. Conclusions -------------- ¶12. (C) In concluding remarks, both sides expressed their desire to continue the Strategic Dialogue, noting that U.S.-Polish military cooperation would be discussed the following day and that energy security would be discussed further in the framework of NATO. The U.S. and Polish delegations reaffirmed their commitment to sustaining the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking ahead to the upcoming visit of President Kaczynski to Washington, A/S Fried observed that it was now time to take the Polish-American partnership to the next level. ASHE