CASTRO SUCCESSION: POLAND SUGGESTS A "FRESH START"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001580

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CCA
ALSO FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2011
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CU PL EU
SUBJECT: CASTRO SUCCESSION: POLAND SUGGESTS A "FRESH START"

REF: STATE 125684

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David T. Morris, reasons 1.4(
b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The GOP has not yet developed a policy on
Castro succession, but Henryk Szlajfer, the senior MFA
official dealing with Cuba, suggested that the best approach
would be to "set aside" the existing record on Cuba and make
a fresh start at reaching a trans-Atlantic consensus with the
EU. Szlajfer also reported on a recent lull in Cuban
government repression. END SUMMARY.

Succession Planning
--------------

2. (C) Acting PolCouns delivered reftel demarche on Castro
succession on August 2 to MFA Americas Director Amb. Henryk
Szlajfer and Deputy Director Amb. Piotr Jaroszynski, who
provided their private, informed reactions to the situation
but cautioned that the GOP had not yet developed an official
policy.


3. (C) Szlajfer began by saying that he felt the temporary
transfer of power to Raul Castro required a "fresh start" in
the discussion. The recent CAFC II report had contained some
"useful hints" at how to approach the current situation, but
in Szlajfer's view the discussion to date on dealing with
Cuba should be "set aside" for the time being. The starting
point should be the fact that Raul was in power, however
temporarily, and the discussion should center on how to deal
with Cuba during that period.


4. (C) Szlajfer opined that the EU was still deadlocked
thanks to the "Amigos and the Amis." Raul's temporary power
would be a good pretext to sideline the ongoing, unproductive
EU debate and try a new approach to reaching a
"trans-Atlantic" position on Cuba. In order for such an
initiative to succeed, it was crucial to disregard
temporarily the existing documents and discussions about Cuba.


5. (C) He said that Poland was seeking a bilateral meeting
with the Finnish EU Presidency to discuss the Cuba situation.
According to Szlajfer, The Finns had already expressed
interest in such a meeting to the Poles before assuming the
Presidency on July 1. After meeting with the Presidency, the
GOP would then consult with individual EU members to develop
a group of like-minded states.


6. (C) In Szlajfer's view, the best approach would probably
be to establish a "Group of Friends" of Cuba. However, such
a group could not go outside of or bypass the EU. Any EU
member states participating, including Poland, would have to
represent the common EU position. He commented that the
language on Cuba in the U.S.-EU Summit declaration had been
constructive and suggested that the U.S.-EU dialogue would be
a good forum for building a trans-Atlantic consensus on Cuba.


7. (C) In any event, Szlajfer said, dealing with Raul would
be a delicate problem. Raul was at least as bad as Fidel, if
not worse.

Recent Opposition Contacts
--------------

8. (C) Szlajfer said that on July 28 he had received a
message indicating that Cuban opposition leader Oswaldo Paya
had approached the Polish Embassy in Havana to request
diplomatic assistance in the face of an expected repressive
campaign against him by the Castro government. Paya told the
Poles that he had heard the government was planning to begin
this campaign on July 29 or 30, and he asked whether Polish
diplomats could come to his home to provide moral support and
bear witness.

9. (C) In the end, the government apparently did not harass
Paya during this period as expected, perhaps in some way
because of the transfer of power to Raul. However, Szlajfer
said that in the course of approaching other EU embassies in
Havana to join in helping Paya, the Poles had sensed a more
constructive attitude, including from those embassies that
have been "the least helpful in the past."
HILLAS