CASTRO SUCCESSION: POLAND SUGGESTS A "FRESH START"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001580 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CCA ALSO FOR EUR/NCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2011 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CU PL EU SUBJECT: CASTRO SUCCESSION: POLAND SUGGESTS A "FRESH START" REF: STATE 125684 Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David T. Morris, reasons 1.4( b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The GOP has not yet developed a policy on Castro succession, but Henryk Szlajfer, the senior MFA official dealing with Cuba, suggested that the best approach would be to "set aside" the existing record on Cuba and make a fresh start at reaching a trans-Atlantic consensus with the EU. Szlajfer also reported on a recent lull in Cuban government repression. END SUMMARY. Succession Planning -------------- ¶2. (C) Acting PolCouns delivered reftel demarche on Castro succession on August 2 to MFA Americas Director Amb. Henryk Szlajfer and Deputy Director Amb. Piotr Jaroszynski, who provided their private, informed reactions to the situation but cautioned that the GOP had not yet developed an official policy. ¶3. (C) Szlajfer began by saying that he felt the temporary transfer of power to Raul Castro required a "fresh start" in the discussion. The recent CAFC II report had contained some "useful hints" at how to approach the current situation, but in Szlajfer's view the discussion to date on dealing with Cuba should be "set aside" for the time being. The starting point should be the fact that Raul was in power, however temporarily, and the discussion should center on how to deal with Cuba during that period. ¶4. (C) Szlajfer opined that the EU was still deadlocked thanks to the "Amigos and the Amis." Raul's temporary power would be a good pretext to sideline the ongoing, unproductive EU debate and try a new approach to reaching a "trans-Atlantic" position on Cuba. In order for such an initiative to succeed, it was crucial to disregard temporarily the existing documents and discussions about Cuba. ¶5. (C) He said that Poland was seeking a bilateral meeting with the Finnish EU Presidency to discuss the Cuba situation. According to Szlajfer, The Finns had already expressed interest in such a meeting to the Poles before assuming the Presidency on July 1. After meeting with the Presidency, the GOP would then consult with individual EU members to develop a group of like-minded states. ¶6. (C) In Szlajfer's view, the best approach would probably be to establish a "Group of Friends" of Cuba. However, such a group could not go outside of or bypass the EU. Any EU member states participating, including Poland, would have to represent the common EU position. He commented that the language on Cuba in the U.S.-EU Summit declaration had been constructive and suggested that the U.S.-EU dialogue would be a good forum for building a trans-Atlantic consensus on Cuba. ¶7. (C) In any event, Szlajfer said, dealing with Raul would be a delicate problem. Raul was at least as bad as Fidel, if not worse. Recent Opposition Contacts -------------- ¶8. (C) Szlajfer said that on July 28 he had received a message indicating that Cuban opposition leader Oswaldo Paya had approached the Polish Embassy in Havana to request diplomatic assistance in the face of an expected repressive campaign against him by the Castro government. Paya told the Poles that he had heard the government was planning to begin this campaign on July 29 or 30, and he asked whether Polish diplomats could come to his home to provide moral support and bear witness. ¶9. (C) In the end, the government apparently did not harass Paya during this period as expected, perhaps in some way because of the transfer of power to Raul. However, Szlajfer said that in the course of approaching other EU embassies in Havana to join in helping Paya, the Poles had sensed a more constructive attitude, including from those embassies that have been "the least helpful in the past." HILLAS