DAS ERIC JOHN VISIT: PREDICTABLY, LAO MFA DENIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000386 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016 TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL TH LA SUBJECT: DAS ERIC JOHN VISIT: PREDICTABLY, LAO MFA DENIES HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS REF: A. VIENTIANE 321 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. VIENTIANE 360 Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During his April 25-26 visit to Vientiane for ASEAN-related meetings, DAS Eric John met with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad, who categorically denied Laos faced any human rights problems in the areas of religious freedom or treatment of the ethnic Hmong minority. Somsavat said the Lao had "heard about" Thailand's expulsion of 27 Hmong people to Laos, but the Thai government had still not handed over information Laos needed to complete its search for the missing group. DAS John also met with the UNDP ResRep, Australian and French Ambassadors, and EU and Swedish Charges, who generally agreed that, for the moment, the diplomatic dance between Laos and Thailand over the 27 Hmong should be given time to play out. Unfortunately, many in this group wish to give the Lao the benefit of the doubt on human rights problems rather than holding the GoL accountable for its actions. We are much less inclined to see the silver lining, but we do support an expanded dialogue with the Lao as the best way to make progress on issues of interest to us. End summary. Somsavat meeting -------------- ¶2. (C) DAS John used his visit to Vientiane for the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Cooperation meetings to meet with FM Somsavat and with members of the international community to discuss the Lao human rights picture. Accompanied by Ambassador, he met with FM Somsavat Lengsavad April 26 and raised several key human rights concerns that have plagued the relationship. ¶3. (C) DAS John told the FM that the two countries shared many interests, especially in the economic field, and worked closely in a number of areas of mutual interest, such as finding the remains of Americans lost in the Vietnam War and fighting narcotics. Moreover, Laos and the U.S. now had a Bilateral Trade Agreement and Normal Trade Relations which over time could stimulate investment and trade, as had happened between the U.S. and Vietnam. As in any relationship, however, there were issues of concern. Most prominent was the fate of 27 Hmong people, 26 of whom were minors, deported from Thailand to Laos last December and now being detained, incommunicado, by Lao authorities (ref A). The international community's interest in this case wasn't to embarrass the Lao government, but to see the children reunited with their families. By the same token there were many people in the U.S. concerned about the plight of Laos' "remote people," ethnic Hmong living deep in the forests who according to some reports were under intense attack by Lao military forces. ¶4. (C) Somsavat broke in to say it was important in any relationship to resolve problems through quiet discussion rather than public blame. For example, Laos respected religious freedom but Christians who broke the law and who were arrested often claimed their arrest was for their religious beliefs, inciting outsiders to unfairly criticize Laos. He also claimed churches sometimes inflamed local communities by saying other religious beliefs, like Buddhism, were "wrong." From religious freedom, Somsavat moved on to the Hmong, uncharacteristically referring to that ethnic group by name. He stated categorically that all reports of the Lao government mistreating the Hmong were "lies" concocted by Vang Pao, and should not be believed. He told DAS John said Laos' Hmong were thriving under the GoL's leadership. ¶5. (C) Somsavat then addressed the 27 missing Hmong. He told DAS John that the week before, the Thai Ambassador had seen the Deputy FM and had informed the GoL that Thailand had indeed expelled the children to Laos last December. Unfortunately, the Thai Ambassador had not provided details of the time and place of the expulsion, with the result the VIENTIANE 00000386 002 OF 003 Lao were unable to complete their "search" for the children. Since Lao people were free and could move about the country at will, the children could be anywhere. The government would continue to look for them, but would need more information from the Thai before it could proceed in earnest. However, he added, if his government could not find the children, Thailand rather than Laos should be blamed for their disappearance. Meeting with Embassies and UN -------------- ¶6. (C) In addition to his meeting with the FM, DAS John met with the UNDP Resrep and several diplomats who closely follow Lao human rights. UNDP ResRep Finn Reske-Nielsen described the previous day's meeting of UN agencies and interested embassies on the children, telling DAS John the group had agreed that there appeared to be ongoing discussions between the Lao and the Thai on the return of the children and this process should be given time to work itself out. There would be other occasions to raise the issue with the Lao over the next few weeks, such as the FM's upcoming visit to Sweden and the EU Ambassador's scheduled visit to Vientiane in early May. These meetings would serve to remind the GoL that the issue would not disappear. Reske-Nielsen said that if after several weeks there had been no movement on the children, the "like minded group" had agreed it would be time to take more forceful measures, such as a joint demarche to the GoL. Resek-Nielsen also said that he had been instructed by the Political Directorate at the UN to raise with the Lao recent reports of killings of Hmong civilians by Lao security forces (ref B). ¶7. (C) In a separate meeting organized by the Ambassador, DAS John heard from the French and Australian Ambassadors and Swedish and EU Charges on the human rights situation in Laos. The four painted a generally positive picture of Lao human rights, saying they believed there had been some improvements in recent years. They felt the Lao could not be pushed on human rights, but rather had to be encouraged through quiet dialogue and diplomacy. However, all four acknowledged that this tactic had so far produced meager results and it remained difficult to have any sort of dialogue with the government on sensitive human rights topics. The EU and Sweden had both established human rights dialogues with the GoL, and the Australians would follow suit later this year. These dialogues were a potentially helpful mechanism for addressing human rights concerns. ¶8. (C) The group thought that the Lao wanted better relations with the U.S. The French Ambassador pointed out that younger Lao leaders had a more nuanced understanding of foreign policy than the old generation and sought balance in Laos' foreign relations. To the younger generation, the U.S. was a welcome counterweight to offset Laos' atavistic fears of Chinese and Vietnamese hegemony. Turning to the Hmong children, the French Ambassador and EU Charge both felt the Lao had been backed into a corner and would not release the children unless they felt confident the release would not embarrass them. The French Ambassador described the essence of the problem as one of "face": the Lao could not back down if there was any chance they would be blamed for the children's detention. Reassuring the Lao that a quiet solution would remain quiet would be crucial. All the participants in the meeting believed that the best outcome would be that the Lao would release the children directly to the Thai, with no recriminations following. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Securing the release of the Hmong children is our key concern at present, and DAS John's conversations with the international like-minded group were useful for identifying advantages and pitfalls of various strategies for reaching a solution. The consensus is that for the moment the process initiated by visiting UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Chamberlin in March should be allowed to play itself out. With luck, the Lao and Thai will come to an accommodation to return the children to Petchaboon. That said, we worry that the poor treatment the boys, in particular, have been subject VIENTIANE 00000386 003 OF 003 to will make it hard for the Lao to release them under any circumstances. ¶10. (C) On the overall human rights picture, however, we believe our "like-minded group" isn't so like-minded after all. With the exception of the Australians, our colleagues continue to hold a patronizing attitude toward the Lao which exonerates them for any blame for their actions and sees "progress" in the feeblest gestures. The Lao government is masterful at playing the international community's sympathies, making the most serious human rights charges go away though a policy of concerted and coordinated denial, such as that displayed by the Foreign Minster in his meeting with DAS John. The Lao are serial human rights abusers, especially toward the remaining Hmong groups still in the forest. The last of these groups are dying daily in penny packets or sometimes (as the massacre of April 6 demonstrates) in larger groups. Most of those dying are women and children. Yet tragically this story is being ignored by even those here in Vientiane's diplomatic community who should be paying attention, and the Lao government is once again getting off scott-free for its egregious conduct. ¶11. (C) While we have our differences with our like-minded colleagues, we share the view that we need more dialogue with the Lao. The GoL's mistrust and misunderstanding of us could hardly be deeper. Expanding our dialogue with the government on many levels will, we believe, help allay some of their fears of us and in the longer term give us more leverage in moving the Lao in the right direction, in human rights as well as in other areas. End comment. ¶12. (U) DAS John did not clear this cable. HASLACH