SCENESETTER FOR DAS ERIC JOHN'S VISIT TO LAOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 000335 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP DAS ERIC JOHN, EAP/MLS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 TAGS: PREL LA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ERIC JOHN'S VISIT TO LAOS REF: VIENTIANE 302 Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) You are visiting Laos at a time when Lao-U.S. relations are at their lowest ebb since 1999, when two Lao-Americans disappeared on the border between Laos and Thailand. The Lao government's detention of 27 Hmong deported from Thailand in December has much to do with the strain, but there are other factors -- the killings of American citizens in northeastern Thailand, Lao backsliding on religious freedom, and Lao failure to implement the Bilateral Trade Agreement, for example. The March Party Congress showed that the Lao government's distrust of the U.S. is as strong as ever. Far from liberalizing, the Party is strengthening its power. The Lao drift toward China is unabated, although Vietnam remains the preeminent relationship. Thailand-Lao ties are cordial on the surface but suffer deep strains. India and Japan have more limited influence. ¶2. (C) Only within the context of ASEAN do the Lao appear to be moving in a positive direction -- ASEAN membership is slowly leading Laos toward economic, and perhaps eventually political, integration with the region. Although relations with the U.S. are not good, we have a role to play here and U.S. assistance can go far in influencing Laos' future. While in Vientiane, you will be able to explain to senior GoL officials the U.S. role in the region and more particularly our interests in Laos, reassuring them that our goal is not regime change but improved behavior and better treatment of the Lao people. It will also be an opportunity to press at senior levels the need for movement on our key concerns. Talking points on Lao-specific issues for the meeting with the Foreign Minister are at the end of this cable. End summary. Poor relations -------------- ¶3. (C) The bilateral relationship is at its lowest point since two Hmong-Americans went missing along the Lao-Thai border in 1999. Their disappearance was never solved, but all signs pointed to Lao security officials being responsible. For now, we have only minimal contact with the GoL, and we are limiting our training and assistance for Lao officials to the extent possible. The Lao appear to believe at least some of the recent events troubling the 
relationship, like the disappearance of the Hmong children, were provocations engineered by the U.S. ¶4. (C) The central issue between the two governments today is the Hmong children. This issue has dragged on for four months. The visit of the UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Wendy Chamberlin to Thailand and Laos the week of March 27-31 promised some hope of a resolution, but so far there has been no breakthrough. The missing children are not U.S. citizens and the case does not immediately affect our interests. It does, however, get to the heart of what we are trying to accomplish in Laos: promote human rights and respect for rule of law. It also has shown the Lao government's paranoia and unscrupulousness. The case reminds the international community just how little influence it has with the senior leadership. ¶5. (C) While the issue of the disappeared children has dragged on, other problems have come up. In January, two American citizens were murdered in Nong Khai, Thailand, just across the river from Vientiane. These murders were the most recent of a string of killings in northeastern Thailand of persons associated with anti-Lao government activities. Among those killed since the beginning of 2005, in addition the Lao-American couple, were two other U.S. citizens. Thai police investigations of the murders have been inconclusive, but information collected by DEA indicates the GoL may have been behind the killings. ¶6. (C) The GoL's behavior in other areas over the past year has been nearly as reprehensible. On religious freedom, the government has taken steps back from several years ago, when it seemed to be on a course to institutionalize religious tolerance. Lao officials burned a church and arrested Christians in Bokeo province last October, and have refused to permit the Catholic Church to ordain Laos' first new priest since 1975. The government has also lost momentum on its anti-trafficking efforts. While it continues to spend donor money on anti-trafficking, it has made few real attempts to prosecute traffickers or to punish officials involved in facilitating illegal migrations to Thailand. ¶7. (C) The Lao have also failed to respond to repeated appeals from the international community to establish a durable program for ending the Hmong insurgency. Reports from the jungle indicate the military may have stepped up efforts to eradicate the last pockets of insurgent resistance. The GoL has been dilatory in approving USG-funded NGO projects, leading us to believe the government may have made a conscious decision to limit U.S. participation in developmental activities. Finally, the Lao government has largely ignored inconvenient provisions of our Bilateral Trade Agreement signed in 2004. The Agreement remains only incompletely implemented and, partly as a result, the benefits of Normalized Trade Relations have been minimal. Political stagnancy -------------- ¶8. (C) In part, this across-the-board backsliding can be attributed to growing conservatism within the Communist Party. The Party Congress held March 18-21 reaffirmed the leading role of the Party. It also instituted measures, like the creation of a new Party Secretariat and an accelerated membership drive, designed to further consolidate Party control. The changes in leadership were cosmetic: the new Party Secretary, Choummaly Sayasone, is a protege of his predecessor and comes from the same conservative, pro-Vietnam military background. Choummaly is a Khamtai crony and is unlikely to bring new ideas to the table. ¶9. (C) There are no clear explanations for the Party's turn to the right, since its deliberations are opaque. However, it may be a product of the Party's new-found confidence in its economic leadership. Laos is attracting limited foreign investment, mostly in the mining and hydropower sectors. The Nam Theun 2 Dam, a $1.2 billion project which will bring in hundreds of millions of dollars over a period of years, is under construction. Trade is picking up and foreign aid -- so far -- has kept close to a $400 million a year level, thanks in large part to Japanese, WB and ADB assistance. The Lao believe they can sustain a six percent growth rate for years, enough to raise PCI figures to $800 a year by 2010 -- twice the current level -- and to bring Laos out of the ranks of Least Developed Countries by 2020. Convinced that its continued leadership is a sine qua non to achieving these developmental goals, the Party has rationalized its monopoly on power. China, Vietnam and Thailand -------------- ¶10. (C) The real engine of Laos' development is China. Relations with China have never been closer. Chinese trade, investment and assistance to Laos are all growing at an unprecedented rate, as China looks to Laos as a source of cheap raw materials and a place to trade and invest. Laos has embraced the relationship, seeing China as a successful Communist country to emulate. China is playing the role of socialist big brother that the Soviet Union played in the 1980's and 1990's. Laos' relationship with Vietnam remains strong, and changes to the Central Committee lineup made in that last Party Congress guarantee a continued pro-Vietnam policy. But on the practical level of trade and investment, Vietnam lags behind China. Laos' relationship with Thailand is neurotic: superficially the two countries could not be closer, and share a similar language and culture, but beneath the surface the GoL distrusts the Thai, and the Thai are frustrated with Lao intransigence on issues like the Petchaboon Hmong. Other countries play a lesser role here. India and Japan both use their assistance to steer Laos away from over-reliance on China, although their influence is limited. ASEAN -------------- ¶11. (C) Laos' ASEAN membership stands out as the bright spot in an otherwise dismal political picture. Having joined ASEAN in 1997, Laos has become an active player. In 2004-2005 Laos was ASEAN chair, and hosted major ASEAN events like the Summit and Post Ministerial Meeting. The government rated its chairmanship of ASEAN as a great success. Other ASEAN member countries agreed that Laos played its "process" role well. Foreign Minister Somsavat owes his promotion to the Politburo at the Party Congress to his ASEAN success. Laos sees ASEAN membership as an avenue for integration into the larger ASEAN economy, and believes ASEAN membership will pay economic dividends. More importantly for Laos' long-term development, ASEAN membership could eventually help steer Laos toward more responsible political behavior, as it slowly adopts its institutions to conform to ASEAN norms. On the other side of the coin, the Lao remain resentful that the Secretary did not attend the Post Ministerial Meeting in SIPDIS Vientiane. The U.S. -------------- ¶12. (C) Lao-U.S. relations are not good, and many of our programs here -- counter-narcotics and UXO especially -- benefit Laos more than the U.S. The state of our relations begs the question why we need to be engaged in Laos at all. Yet on a person-to-person level, ties with the United States, and its 500,000 strong community of Lao-Americans, is strong. Most Lao (outside the Party) probably have a generally benign view of the United States and its allies. Only the government here is venal; left to its own devices, Laos' present political course could threaten the entire region. We have already seen signs of Laos taking a turn for the worse: narcotics, especially amphetamine, trafficking by authorities, for example, is a well-known problem that appears to be growing. Laos could easily become a haven for drug and human traffickers and terrorists. U.S. aid can help thwart this trend. Continued assistance to Laos' counter-narcotics drive is money well invested. Assistance to the Lao on CT, and in particular creation of a mil-to-mil relationship, will help steer their security forces toward more responsible behavior. Most importantly, a continued and growing U.S. aid presence will convince the Lao people that the United States is engaged and concerned about their country's future. Your visit -------------- ¶13. (C) We have requested a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad, who is now a Politburo member. We have also asked the MFA to prepare a venue, either the National Assembly or MFA's Foreign Affairs Institute, for you to give a formal presentation. ¶14. (C) The Lao fundamentally misunderstand the U.S., and their outmoded Cold War view of us is frustrating even to their Vietnamese colleagues, who see us in a much more nuanced way. Although the Foreign Minister regularly meets with high-level U.S. officials, he has rarely had a discussion that encompassed the range of bilateral issues. The formal presentation to the National Assembly or the Foreign Affairs Institute will allow you to explain the U.S. role in the region, from a strategic perspective. in the meeting with the Foreign Minister you can also discuss our specific interests in Laos: POW/MIA, UXO, counter-narcotics, economic development, and promotion of human rights. ¶15. (C) These exchanges may help convince the Lao that we are not attempting to subvert their regime, but will send a message that we believe strongly they must open their system and provide their citizens greater rights if they wish to be accepted as a member in good standing of the international community. Suggested talking points for meeting with FM -------------- -- The U.S. is an active participant in Laos' development and has many important interests here. -- Locating remains of Americans lost in the Indochina Conflict remains a priority. We appreciate the Lao government's cooperation in this important effort. -- The U.S. is also the leading donor in the area of UXO. We expect to give on the order of $6 million this year for UXO activities. -- We remain deeply committed to helping Laos fight drug trafficking. Laos achieved a great success this year in eliminating significant opium production, thanks in part to U.S. assistance. Laos deserves much credit for this unprecedented achievement. We are continuing to help, providing assistance to confront the more insidious problem of methamphetamine (ATS) trafficking and abuse. -- The U.S. is also providing significant assistance to Laos to confront a potential outbreak of Avian Influenza. -- Through the Global Fund and through USG assistance to International Financial Institutions like World Bank and ADB, the U.S. is actively contributing to Laos' development in many areas -- education, health care, and infrastructure. -- In all these areas, we are grateful for Laos' cooperation and we congratulate your country on the results that have been achieved to date. -- But we remain very concerned about some developments that are not positive. In the area of human rights and political liberalization, your country has less to boast of. -- Our biggest concern is the continued detention of 27 Hmong people deported from Thailand in December. Most of these people were children. They should not have been detained and they should be released immediately to rejoin their families in Thailand. -- I would like to emphasize that this is a humanitarian issue. But your government's handling of this issue has put Laos in a very poor light internationally. -- We are also concerned about the fate of "remote people" in Laos' forests. We often receive reports from credible sources that Lao military forces are attacking these groups. The use of military force against them has made it impossible in some cases for them to resettle under your government's care. We urge you to reach out to these groups to encourage their resettlement and to allow international assistance to reach them after they resettle. -- In the area of religious freedom, there have been setbacks, especially at the district and provincial levels. Lao officials have arrested persons for their religious faith. The government has also so far not permitted the Catholic Church to ordain its first new priest since 1975. This is inexplicable. -- The Lao government needs to show that it is fully committed to stopping human trafficking. More effort needs to be put into arresting and prosecuting traffickers here, including Lao officials involved in trafficking Lao people to Thailand. -- Finally, we have noticed that NGO projects receiving USG funding face a difficult time obtaining MOUs from your government. We worry that the Lao government does not wish to see USG money being used in developmental work here. We urge you to look into this issue to ensure that USG-funded activities are vetted impartially. At a time when many developing countries are seeking developmental funds, Laos should be taking steps to make it easier, not more difficult, for donors to assist. HASLACH