THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY'S GAME PLAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000302 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 TAGS: PINR PGOV SOCI LA SUBJECT: THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY'S GAME PLAN REF: VIENTIANE 275 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kristen Bauer, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) -- the ruling Communist Party -- has absolute confidence in its ability to govern Laos well into the future. The Party believes that it is responsible for economic gains over the past decade, not comprehending that much of that progress was the inevitable result of Laos' geographic position among economic powerhouses like China and Thailand. With positive economic gains and a pliant population, the Party has set a course to further consolidate and strengthen its control. Communist rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War is in vogue; the LPRP is also convinced that the U.S. is actively trying to undermine its rule, putting an additional strain on our already shaky relationship. Far from moving toward a more pluralistic government, Laos is heading toward deepening authoritarianism and entrenched dynastic oligarchy. End summary. ¶2. (C) The overarching message from the March 18-21 8th Party Congress was the Party's conviction that it alone was responsible for Laos' economic achievements of the past half-decade. The Political Report, which formed the basis of Congress discussions, and the Party Resolution, issued at the end of the Congress, made some mention of shortcomings, especially in the area of implementation of Party doctrine. But those shortcomings were not failures of the system so much as of individuals within it. On overall strategy, the Congress had no criticism of its handling of the country. Its assessment of Laos' economic performance since the last Party Congress in 2001, and more broadly since the country adopted a "renovation policy" in the 1980's, was glowing: the Party took credit for increases in foreign investment, trade and foreign assistance. It also claimed success in raising living standards, signaled by increases in per capita income, life expectancy, literacy rates and other basic quality of life measures. ¶3. (C) The Party's attribution of its economic success to its "renovation policy," the economic liberalization set up in 1986 in tandem with "doi moi" in Vietnam, was disingenuous. Much of what has happened in Laos in the economic sphere has been an inevitable result of Laos' position in the midst of economic giants like China, Thailand and increasingly Vietnam. These are countries that are in need of new markets, sources of energy and raw materials, and places to put their investment money. Laos has played that role well, not so much because of the government's open-armed welcome of foreign investment (Laos remains a difficult place to do business because of a lack of rule of law, corruption, and overall inefficiency),but because it is exploitable. Any government running Laos probably would have done as well. ¶4. (C) By taking credit for economic progress, however, the LPRP has concluded that it alone has the foresight to direct Laos' development. Having convinced itself of the truth of its own rhetoric, the Party believes it has a mandate not only to direct the current program for removing Laos from the ranks of Least Developed Countries by 2020, but to continue to run the country well beyond that time. The political signals from the Congress, and from other political activities of the past several months, point to a shift by the Party toward greater conservatism and less willingness to eventually concede power. Far from seeing economic development as an opportunity for political liberalization, the LDRP is trying to consolidate and strengthen its grip. ¶5. (C) The new initiatives are comprehensive. New Politburo member Somsavat Lengsavad said at a post-Congress press briefing that the Party would work to woo new members, to expand Party membership far beyond its current level of 148,000. The Party's ranks have grown significantly in the last decade, in large part because membership provides the only realistic hope of advancement for anyone in the GoL, including the country's teachers and doctors. The new initiative will increase the pressure on those outside the Party to join. ¶6. (C) The LPRP has also consolidated its grip on the political process. Earlier this year the National Assembly announced that Assembly elections originally scheduled for 2007 would be held in April this year, to make its five-year VIENTIANE 00000302 002 OF 002 tenure concurrent with that of the new Central Committee. That change, in turn, would assure that Party policy could be more effectively translated into legislative action, according to National Assembly spokesman Viseth Svengsuksa. Finally, the LPRP is committed to weeding out its non-performers. Among other measures, the Party announced at the conclusion of the Congress that it had strengthened the authority of the Party Secretariat, the Party institution charged with enforcing discipline. The change would promote "correct" behavior of Party members, thereby preventing the bad actions of a handful from impacting on the population's confidence in the LPRP's infallibility. ¶7. (C) The shift to the right also spells a more troubled relationship with the U.S. According to Singapore Embassy contacts, reporting information they in turn had picked up from the Russians, in the course of the Congress the senior leadership discussed the bilateral relationship, and determined that the U.S. was actively working to undermine the Party. As evidence, the leadership noted that the U.S. Embassy was frequently aware of the GoL's internal activities (possibly referring to our knowledge of the detention of 27 Hmong children by Lao authorities since December). The leadership felt certain there were "spies" working for the USG within the GoL, and that contact with both the U.S. Embassy and with our allies (including the Singaporeans) was dangerous. ¶8. (C) The Party billed the new Central Committee lineup as an injection of youth into the leadership. It was that: the average age of the new members is 51, versus 60 for the Central Committee veterans. The purpose of the shift to a more youthful Committee was not to introduce new ideas, however, but to guarantee the Party's long-term survival: the 19 new members all possess unquestionable credentials as Communist faithfuls, and they are unlikely candidates for change. For example, four of the new members came from the military's political department or from the Party's political school, and are experts on Marxism-Leninism. Several others came from within the Party administration. The new CC may be younger, but it is no less Communist. ¶9. (C) The new appointments also reveal a desire to establish political dynasties. Three new appointments to the Central Committee are children of the senior leaders: Nam Vignaket (son of Politburo member Samane Vignaket),Sonesay Siphandone (son of retiring Party Secretary Khamtai) and Sanyahak Phomvihane (son of LPDR founder Kaysone Phomvihane and the second of Kaysone's sons on the CC). Insiders tell us the leadership has struck a bargain to promote each other's children to the Central Committee, providing for their political futures and thereby their economic futures as well. ¶10. (C) Comment: Although "reform" was a major theme of the 8th Party Congress, that term applied only to changes within the system designed to improve Party efficiency and give the Lao population even less room to complain. Nowhere in the platform was there discussion of any long-term opening of the political system. The message from the Party Congress was not one of gradual change, but of maintaining the status quo as far into the future as possible. End comment. BAUER