A SAD ANNIVERSARY: WHERE ARE THE 26 CHILDREN AS WE

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 001141 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC),PRM/FO (DAS GREENE), PRM/ANE (ALBRIGHT),IO/RHS (MCKEE),IO/EDA (CAROTHERS), IO/UNP (MEYER),DRL, EUR/ERA, G-TIP; BANGKOK ALSO FOR REFCOORD (HONNOLD) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2106 TAGS: KCRM KWMN LA PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TH SUBJECT: A SAD ANNIVERSARY: WHERE ARE THE 26 CHILDREN AS WE REACH ONE YEAR? REF: A. VIENTIANE 0928 ¶B. VIENTIANE 0894 ¶C. VIENTIANE 0801 ¶D. VIENTIANE 0660 ¶E. AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach: reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This message contains an action request for the Department. Please see paragraph 16. ¶2. (C) Summary: The case of the 26 missing children has been unresolved since December 2005. Since then, there have been rumors that the children may have been secretly deported back to Thailand or even dispersed throughout the Lao countryside. But the overwhelming likelihood remains that they are still being detained by the Lao Government. Until resolved, we believe this case must continue to be raised both in Vientiane and abroad. Meetings held by UN Under Secretary General Gambari, the raising of the issue at the September UNICEF Executive Board meeting, and the possibility of an intervention by the UN Secretariat during the UNGA have been keeping the pressure on the Lao government to &come clean8 about the whereabouts of these children. The next step: we believe a senior UN official needs to come to Vientiane to press the Lao Government to resolve this case. End summary. The Missing 26 Children: The Chronology -------------- ¶3. (C) Since this case has dragged on for so long, we want to review the chronology and highlight the facts we know: Thai Actions -------------- November 28, 2005: Thai police in Petchabun Province arrested a group of 29 ethnic Hmong from Laos returning from a Christian religious service in Ban Khek Noi. The group, mostly children, was stopped at a roadblock just outside the Hmong camp. Since they were outside the camp, police considered them "illegal migrants." The Thai police held the group members for five days, demanding 200,000 baht ($5400) in cash from the families for their release, but the families were unable to pay. December 2, 2005: 27 of the 29 were sent from Petchabun to Nong Khai Province where they were held for three more days. Two of the older members of the group remained incarcerated in Khao Kho District, Petchabun. ¶4. (C) Lao Actions; the beginning of the ordeal: Arrest and Suspicion -------------- December 5, 2005: 27 members of the group (22 females, all but one of whom were minors, and five males, all minors) were taken to Ban Phak Khad, in Nong Khai Province. Thai police, in conjunction with village officials, sent the 27 across to Houay Khoua Phai, Tha Phabat District in Laos, Bolikhamsai Province in two small fishing boats. December 6, 2005: Lao officials in Tha Phabat District arrested the group and sent them to Paksane, the Bolikhamsai provincial capital, for questioning. (Note: Sources report that Lao police suspected the group members were provocateurs sent by the Thai or even by exile Hmong groups to create disturbances. Lao police were especially suspicious because the children claimed to be Christians, had studied English, and had received assistance from "foreign" organizations in Petchabun. (End note.) Separating the Boys -------------- December 8, 2005: The five boys in the group were separated from the girls and were sent to Vientiane, where they were imprisoned at Phonetong Prison for almost two months. February 4, 2006: Due to publicity and pressure from the international media and diplomatic community, the five boys were blindfolded and flown by military aircraft to Phongsaly, where they were imprisoned at Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly City. To our knowledge, the boys remain at this facility. The Girls -------------- Meanwhile the 22 females (one adult and 21 children) were held at Ban Thong Noi, Paksane Province, close to military encampment number 17, just outside Paksane. The girls were questioned extensively by the Paksane police who reported to Vientiane in early January that they suspected the girls had been sent to Laos by foreigners (i.e. the U.S.) to create disturbances. ¶5. (C) USG and Other Actions during December ) January: December 6, 2005: The U.S. Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok learned of the deportation, made immediate inquiries to Lao and Thai authorities, and raised the case with UN organizations and other embassies. In early January, Embassy Vientiane obtained a Thai immigration police report on the arrest that definitively pointed to the group being in Laos. The Thai information included the names and other information about each of the group members. Subsequently the Embassy also received a copy of the report completed by the Bolikhamsai police after interrogating the group members as well as photos of group members behind bars. January 13, 2006: Convinced that evidence overwhelmingly showed the 27 were in Laos, the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane requested and received Department permission to demarche the Government of Laos (GOL) to seek access to them. January 18, 2006: The Ambassador met with Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad to convey the demarche on the missing children, requesting the GOL to look for them and provide immediate access to them by observers and doctors from the international community. The Ambassador also gave Somsavat a copy of the Thai immigration police report as well as the list of names and other information about the group members. (Note: because of the way the Bolikhamsai police report was obtained, that report was not given to Somsavat. End note.) The Foreign Minister replied that his government would do all it could to locate the children, and requested the USG obtain a Royal Thai Government (RTG) pledge to permit the children to return to Thailand, if they could be located in Laos. January 27, 2006: When quiet attempts to get the GOL to send the children back were rebuffed, the Ambassador requested a second meeting with the Foreign Minister to deliver another demarche demanding immediate access to the missing children. Because the Foreign Minister was unavailable, the Ambassador conveyed the demarche points via letter. January 30, 2006: The Lao MFA Press Spokesman held a press conference to say the GOL had learned of the disappearance of the 27 and "was looking for them." The same day, the UNDP Acting Resident Representative delivered a letter to MFA offering to assist in caring for the group and returning them to Thailand. Just prior to this press conference, Embassy Vientiane learned that Embassy Bangkok had convinced senior RTG members to agree to allow the group to return to Petchabun, provided it was done quietly. The Ambassador conveyed this information to the Lao MFA Press Spokesman after his press conference. He asked that we attest to this in writing. January 31, 2006: The Ambassador sent another letter to the Foreign Minister, again conveying the RTG pledge regarding their return to Thailand. ¶6. (C) February 2006; GOL Demands More Details: February 1: In response to GOL intransigence and refusal to return the children to Thailand as requested in our January 31 letter, the Department issued a statement sharply critical of the GOL and urging immediate access. February 2: the Lao relayed to the Embassy, via indirect channels, that they would now require information from the RTG fully explaining details of the deportation before they would be able to "find" the group. Later that day, the Thai Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Somsavat and promised to relay this request to his Foreign Ministry. February 3: The Australian Government demarched the GOL on the children and requested a meeting with the Foreign Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss the case. (Note: The GOL has refused to the present day to see the Government of Australia about this matter ) stating that the Foreign Minister,s response to the U.S. Ambassador sufficed. End note.) February 7: The U.S. demarched the EU, Japan, and selected ASEAN countries requesting that they, in turn, demarche the GOL demanding the release of the group and their return to Thailand. At the same time, the RTG made public its willingness to accept back the group of 27 but added that "all Hmong in Thailand illegally" would have to return to Laos eventually. February 10: The EU Mission in Bangkok demarched the RTG on the missing children. The same day, the EU representatives in Vientiane (France, Germany and the EU Mission) also demarched the Lao Foreign Minister. February 20: Visiting U.S. Senator Russ Feingold met with RTG PM Thaksin and Foreign Minister Kantathi in Bangkok and raised the Hmong children issue. Feingold's office later issued a press release urging the GOL and RTG to work together to resolve the issue. February 23: USUN officers met with UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Kul Gautam to discuss the children. ¶7. (C) March 2006: UNHCR Becomes Involved: March 28-30: At the urging of the Department, UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Wendy Chamberlin visited Laos. Both Politburo Member Pany Yathoteu and Deputy FM Phongsavath told her that the GOL could not look for the children until the RTG first provided more details of the deportation. Both before and after her visit, Ms. Chamberlin also met with the Thai NSC and MFA in Bangkok. The trip concluded with general agreement among the RTG, UNHCR, and interested embassies that the Thai would call in the Lao Ambassador to Bangkok to explain the deportation, hopefully meeting the GOL demand. ¶8. (C) April 2006: Details ) But Not Enough April 12: The RTG MFA Deputy PermSec formally but verbally informed the Lao Ambassador in Bangkok that the RTG would take back the children on an exceptional basis. The Lao Ambassador asked for more details of the circumstances surrounding the children's deportation, specifically dates, place of deportation, and other additional information. The MFA agreed to try to obtain the additional information. The Thai MFA felt the meeting, overall, was "positive." ¶9. (C) May-June 2006: The UNSYG Weighs In ) And Is Rebuffed May 18: The UN Secretary General sent a letter to the Lao President asking about the missing children and confirming the RTG would accept their return. June 24: Lao President Choummaly Sayasone responded to the UNSYG in a letter saying in part, &... the Lao authorities had never been informed by the Thai side about this matter and in fact the Thai side has neither handed over those 27 Hmongs to the Lao authorities8 (unofficial translation from Lao). According to UN representatives, the UNSYG considered the letter to be arrogant in tone and dissimulating in its characterization of the events revolving around the children,s disappearance. UN officials noted that the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) planned to send a high-level official to Laos (probably in mid-August). ¶10. (C) Summer 2006: No progress: Early July: The Lao Foreign Minister refused to receive a joint demarche from &like-minded8 embassies and UN as well as international organizations, on the missing children. The GOL said the President,s June response to the UNSYG provided the government,s final word on the matter. ¶11. (C) August ) September 2006: UN Pressure ) To No Avail: Mid-August: Bangkok-based UNICEF Regional Director Singh met with Lao Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Thoungloun and raised the 26 missing Hmong children. Singh told the Foreign Minister that the UNICEF Executive Board Members, who control the level of funding for UNICEF activities in each country, would raise the issue of the children. She informed him that the debate regarding funding would not be easy and that Laos, funding could be affected by this issue. August 29-30: UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Gambari met with the Lao Permrep (Aug 29) and the Thai Permrep (Aug 30) to try to resolve the case. The Lao continued to say they lacked precise information from the Thai, and the Thai continued to say they had provided all information orally. Gambari asked that all information from the Thai be put in writing. August 31: UNICEF Executive Director Ann Veneman, in a response letter to Ambassador Haslach, noted that if the case of the missing children remains unresolved in September the &UN Secretariat intends to raise it at the highest level8 with Lao and Thai representatives at the UNGA. Early September: The United States and Sweden raised the issue of the missing children on the margins of the UNICEF Executive Board meeting. Mid-September: A plan for the UNSYG to meet separately with the Lao and Thai Foreign Ministers on the margins of the UNGA is derailed by the coup in Bangkok. ¶12. (C) September 21: The Curious MFA Press Briefing After ten months of stonewalling on the case of the children, Brigadier General Bouasieng Champaphanh, who leads the Lao side of the Lao-Thai Joint Sub-Committee for General Border Security Cooperation (&the Sub-Committee8),gave a press conference at the MFA. General Bouasieng had just returned from an &extra8 plenary meeting of the Sub-Committee held in Bangkok on September 19 (ref a). At this meeting, the Thai side had asked the Lao side to: collect information about the 27 missing children (note: actually 26 children and one adult; end note) and to stop the flow of Hmong who have been fleeing to Thailand. According to General Bouasieng, the Lao side agreed to provide &full cooperation8 regarding the children but asked the Thais to also provide the following information so the Lao &can search for the children until they are found:8 -- the list of each of the Thai officials involved in arresting and deporting the children to Laos, including names, family names, ranks, positions, areas of responsibility, and the units they belong to; -- the place of arrest of the children (in Thailand); -- the exact places, including village, hamlet, district, and province, that the children were deported from in Thailand and where they were deported to in Laos; -- the reason that the Thai officials deported the children, and the names, including family names, of the 26 children and the one adult who accompanied the children as well as their photographs; -- details of their parents, including names, family names, home towns, and present addresses. (Note: even though the GOL already has been given much of the information General Bouasieng listed above, having a senior general give a formal MFA press conference which discussed the children led to a brief spurt of optimism that the two sides had finally agreed on an approach that &saves face8 for both sides and allows the 26 detained children being able to rejoin their families. On the other hand, that was two months ago, and the level of detail demanded by the Lao now appears more like another movement of the goal posts. End note.) Where are they now? -------------- ¶13. (C) To our knowledge, the five boys have never been moved from Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly City. The 21 girls have since been rumored to have been moved to Savannakhet Province or even trafficked to Thailand, but we believe they remain in Laos. The well-connected French Ambassador was &unofficially8 told by senior GOL officials in early November 2006 that the children are still in Laos and are &in good hands,8 and that some may even be attending school. Officially the GOL is awaiting a written response from the Thai on the children, and until they get that they will stick with the &official8 line that the children have not been found. An Additional Confirmation -------------- ¶14. (C) The Ambassador also asked Richard Childress, former Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council under President Reagan, to raise the issue of the children with Deputy Prime Minister/former Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad in a side-bar conversation on October 30. Mr. Childress was visiting Vientiane with National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (NLF) Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths; Mr. Childress is Senior Advisor to the NLF. Both Ms. Griffiths and Mr. Childress have had long working relationships with senior Lao officials on POW/MIA issues. Somsavat told Childress that &we are in direct discussions with the Thai on returning them.8 From his body language and what he did not say (&We don,t know where they are, etc.),Childress believed the GOL may actually have been in discussion on resolving this issue at that point. Future Action -------------- ¶15. (C) A month has passed since the Somsavat-Childress conversation. At this point, we continue to believe that only senior UN officials have sufficient weight to move the detained children,s case toward resolution. We appreciate USyG Gambari having met with the Lao and Thai permreps in late August and are disappointed that a higher-level dialogue during the UNGA meant to bring the two sides together was not possible due to the coup. We believe that a visit by Mr. Gambari or another senior UN official to Vientiane and Bangkok is the only possible lever available to move the case to resolution at this time. Action Request -------------- ¶16. (C) Embassy Vientiane asks the Department to request USUN to contact the UN to push for a visit to Vientiane and Bangkok to pursue a resolution to this case. Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) The GOL strategy seems apparent: continue to stonewall and the outside world will lose interest. Make information difficult to obtain, move the goal posts, and continue intransigence, and the problem becomes just too difficult to try to resolve. In the face of this GOL approach, we are pleased that so many officials and agencies have worked to help resolve the case of these missing children during this past year. Our view here is that this case has become a symbol of how the Lao government operates, and whether the Lao government can be trusted to keep its commitments. The support from the international community remains vital to keeping the pressure on the Lao, so UN efforts -- including the letter from the SYG, support from the UNICEF leadership and USyG Gambari,s role -- have been most welcome. We think, unfortunately, they have to continue. HASLACH