Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENNA715
2006-03-09 11:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:  

REPORT ON EU INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERIAL IN

Tags:  PREL MARR CG BK SR EUN AU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3369
PP RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHVI #0715/01 0681110
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091110Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2652
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0033
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 000715 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR EUR, EUR/PRM, EUR/ERA, EUR/AGS, EUR/SCE AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MARR CG BK SR EUN AU
SUBJECT: REPORT ON EU INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERIAL IN
INNSBRUCK


This message is sensitive but unclassified.

Introduction
-------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 000715 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR EUR, EUR/PRM, EUR/ERA, EUR/AGS, EUR/SCE AND AF/C E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MARR CG BK SR EUN AU SUBJECT: REPORT ON EU INFORMAL DEFENSE MINISTERIAL IN INNSBRUCK This message is sensitive but unclassified. Introduction -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Discussions of a possible EU mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) dominated the EU Informal Defense Ministerial in Innsbruck on March 6-7. Despite press speculation that countries would offer up forces for such a mission while in Innsbruck, the ministers agreed only to dispatch CFSP High Representative Javier Solana to talks with the DRC and African Union (AU) leadership before making a firm commitment to a mission. Civil-military coordination in disaster relief -- Austrian Defense Minister Guenther Platter's original headline objective -- settled for second billing in the end. However, both Platter and Solana lauded the progress made in Innsbruck. Democratic Republic of Congo: Willingness but no commitment -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) The ministers discussed possible EU participation in a mission to support the Congolese elections in June at length in the March 7 sessions. Platter reported to the press that the ministers had expressed a collective willingness to participate in the mission "in principle," but there are several concerns that must be met before the mission can become a reality: a) there must be close cooperation between the EU and other parties including the DRC government, the AU and regional organizations; b) the mission must have a detailed mandate from the UN Security Council; and c) the mission must be limited to supporting the electoral process. ¶3. (U) Solana confirmed he would establish formal contacts -- as opposed to the current informal contacts -- with DRC president Laurent Kabila and the African Union. He strongly denied a suggestion from an AFP reporter that the process of developing a Congo mission had been "amateurish" and said that one should expect such a process to be complex and relatively deliberate. Solana emphasized that the troops will be a deterrent force located "over the horizon," meaning outside of Congo but still relatively close. He did not yet know exactly where this would be. This force would then deploy quickly to any potential problem areas during the election process. About 100 EU military personnel would be stationed in DRC to make logistical arrange
ments for a deployment, should one become necessary. Solana said he was confident that DRC President Kabila would agree. ¶4. (U) Germany is the prospective leader of such a force, and German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung repeatedly raised many of the above concerns in press interviews while in Innsbruck. When reporters pressed Solana on whether German leadership of the Congo mission was necessary, he opined that "In the end, the force will be German ... I think." Iran: Little hope, but channels should stay open -------------- --- ¶5. (U) Solana said that he was not optimistic that the Iran nuclear crisis could be resolved without a referral to the UN Security Council. He said that Iran must stop enrichment activities in order for negotiations to move forward, but said Iran was unwilling to do so. He stressed that there was time for a resumption of negotiations and it was important to keep channels open. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Possible Timeline for Force Reductions -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Both Platter and Solana stressed during press events that it was important to watch the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina carefully and decide on potential troop withdrawals only after the country holds elections and forms a new government. Platter later outlined a possible plan for reduction, saying that the current 6700 troops could be reduced to 6000 relatively quickly "in the short term" through elimination of redundancies. Then, should the formation of a new government proceed well, the possibility of a reduction to 2500 exists. An unnamed &EU diplomat8 told a reporter that plans for a drawdown were "nonsense." ¶7. (U) In one of the few mentions of Kosovo, Minister Platter used one of the official press conferences to call on NATO explicitly not to reduce its current troop strength in Kosovo. VIENNA 00000715 002 OF 002 Sudan: EU will cooperate with AU or UN -------------- ¶8. (U) Solana said that the main question on Darfur was whether the AU should continue to head the force and expand its responsibilities, or whether the UN should take over these additional responsibilities. He stressed that the EU would cooperate with either an AU or UN mission. He confirmed that -- regardless of whether the mission remained AU or went to the UN -- the vast majority of forces would be African. He mentioned logistical support in the form of strategic lift and communications as potential areas in which non-African, possibly EU, forces could help. Closer Civil-Military Cooperation -------------- ¶9. (U) In the first sessions on March 6, the ministers discussed closer civil-military cooperation and EU operations abroad. Platter noted that the United Kingdom, Austria and Finland had decided to make civil-military cooperation a centerpiece of their respective EU presidencies, ensuring continuity in development of this issue. The EU civ-mil initiative seeks better utilization of existing instruments and infrastructure within the EU for EU-led disaster relief operations. The EU Council will flesh out concrete proposalsQr implementing this policy, followed by a detailed report to the EU Summit in June. EDA Defense Research Fund: Basis for Agreement -------------- - ¶10. (U) Regarding the proposal for a common fund to support European defense research projects, Solana reported in a March 7 press appearance with EDA chief executive Nick Witney that all ministers have agreed on the "basis" of such a project. However, he later noted that no country had formally committed to it. He said that the fund would be flexible enough to meet the needs of countries with extremely diverse needs and capabilities. He emphasized that not every country would have to participate in the fund. Force projection is the proposed pilot research topic, with possible follow-on projects in logistics, strategic lift and transport. In response to a question about UK objections, Solana conceded that the UK "prefers to do (defense research) differently," but has nevertheless agreed with the basis of the project. In a separate press conference immediately afterwards, French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said she was confident that the British would eventually participate. Long-Term Vision for EU Defense Capabilities -------------- ¶11. (U) Platter reported that the EU was making good progress on battlegroups, but it was time to look beyond the 2010 goals and to develop a "long-term vision" to 2025 for EU security policy. He said that a first version of such a vision would be available by this fall. The document would address three key questions: 1) In what areas should EU capabilities be developed; 2) what areas of technical development are most important; and 3) how will these needs develop in the future. Platter said that the areas of rapid decision-making, mission sustainability, and force deployability were some of the key focuses. He also pointed to air and sealift gaps as target areas. Congo's Long Shadow -------------- ¶12. (SBU) COMMENT: While Platter and Solana claimed the ministerial discussions were useful and productive, the lack of concrete progress on a deployment to Congo overshadowed other topics. Solana, in particular, was often placed on the defensive on the status of the proposed mission. German reluctance to commit to leading this mission was likely the biggest stumbling block, as German Defense Minister Jung repeatedly called for clearer parameters for the deployment -- citing the need to convince a skeptical Bundestag to endorse the mission. One of the most visible agenda items prior to the meetings -- the proposal to launch the common defense research fund -- in the end received little attention, despite Solana's success in convincing skeptics such as the British to allow work on the project to move forward. McCaw

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -