AUSTRIA ON A WAY FORWARD ON TURKEY/CYPRUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 000324 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU EU AU SUBJECT: AUSTRIA ON A WAY FORWARD ON TURKEY/CYPRUS REF: STATE 16987 Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips., Reas on: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Austrian presidency will seek movement on ending the isolation of Northern Cyprus, starting with direct trade, but will do this quietly in order to avoid a torpedoing of the initiative by the Cypriots or by the British, who (according to the Austrian MFA's Southern Europe head) insist on a rigid linkage of progress on the three elements. The Turkish proposal was "a good first step" and "good diplomacy," but there was really nothing new on substance. UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Gambari had told the Austrian UN ambassador that he planned to visit the region to re-start talks after the Cypriot elections on May 25. The U.S., the UK, and especially the Russians could be helpful. End Summary. ¶2. (C) EconPolCouns presented reftel demarche on February 2 to Clemens Koja, the Austrian MFA's assistant secretary-level Director for Southern European Affairs. Koja said the Austrian presidency would work quietly -- "under the radar" -- to achieve Nicosia's political agreement to permit movement on the three steps the EU had established for ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots -- the green line regulation, financial aid, and direct trade. The Austrians would seek progress first on direct trade. This had to remain quiet in order to avoid both a hardening of the Cypriot position and possible British insistance on a strict linkage of the three elements. The Turkish announcement was "a good first step" that created a positive atmosphere. However, the Turkish agreement to meet its EU obligations by opening its ports and airspace to Cyprus was already part of a binding agreement -- there was really nothing new in substance in the Turkish announcement of January 24 that had not been on the table on May 30. The EU could not really accept the concept of a strict tradeoff, although there had to be movement on the politial commitments which the EU had made in April 2004, and which Cyprus was blocking. ¶3. (C) Koja remarked that the Turkish move was "good diplomacy." The first screening of the "easy" chapters of Turkey's accession package would be ready for presentation in two to three weeks. The Austrian presidency would open new chapters once the Commission asks it to do so -- however, Cyprus, while asserting that it is not "vetoing" agreement, will withhold consent if there is no progress on implementation of the Ankara Protocol. Turkey's move will make it harder for Cyprus to sustain this position. In the meantime, Austria is telling the Cypriots (as it tells the Turks) that the status quo is a bad one, and people will blame the Cypriots. Koja added that there would be a formal review of the Ankara Protocol in 2006, but this would likely take place in the second half of the year -- that is, during the Finnish presidency. ¶4. (C) Koja said it would be practically impossible for Austria to get agreement on a Presidency statement on the issue, since both Nicosia and Athens had reacted so negatively to the Turkish proposal and would almost certainly break silence on anything the Austrians proposed. (He agreed with our suggestion that it was unusual for EU member states to foreclose a common position by making such national statements.) Koja opined that it was particularly "stupid" of the Greek Cypriots to reject direct talks with the Turkish Cypriots, since contacts had already occurred in the past. ¶5. (C) Koja reported that Austria's Ambassador to the UN has discussed the way forward with UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari. Gambari had said that UNSYG Kofi Annan had been "fed up" after the failure of talks in 2004, and Gambari's predecessor, Kieran Prendergast, had considered the "gaps too big" to restart the negotiating process in the short term. Now, Gambari plans to travel to the region (Nicosia, Athens, Ankara and Northern Cyprus) after the May 25 Cypriot parliamentary elections. Koja said the date was something of an artificial deadline which the Cypriots had set, since parliamentary elections would not change the Cypriot leadership. ¶6. (C) Koja said it was important for the U.S. and UK to support this process, but it was even more important for Russia to do so. The Cypriots see Russia as its "protector" among the P-5, and the Russians could most effectivelyi help force the Cypriots to show more flexibility. As for the UK, Koja said the British explicitly admitted during their "handoff" to the Austrians that they had focussed on winning agreement on the Turkish negotiating mandate on October 3, 2005, and that this had "made them no friends in Nicosia." The Cypriots would not give them the satisfaction of presiding over further progress during the remainder of the UK presidency. The British had said that the Austrians would be able to do so, and the Austrians would take up the task. Koja had already held frequent meetings with the Turkish and Cypriot ambassadors. The Turkish Political Director would visit Vienna on February 6; the EU-Turkey troika would take place February 22, Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos would visit Vienna on February 22, and Turkish FM Abdullah Gul would visit Vienna on March 8. McCaw