AUSTRIA'S EU PRESIDENCY: MANAGING THE GAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 VIENNA 002322 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS - SAINT-ANDRE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN AU SUBJECT: AUSTRIA'S EU PRESIDENCY: MANAGING THE GAME Classified By: Economic-Political Counselor Gregory E. Phillips. Reaso n: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Austrians approached the EU presidency like a solid backup quarterback takes the field: they had modest expectations, they strove for technical competence, and they set realistic goals. Their biggest successes -- winning agreement on a financial perspective, getting agreement on a services directive, and hosting a successful and substantive U.S.-EU summit -- were the result of good preparation and a lot of behind-the-scenes lobbying. The opening minutes of the presidency saw the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis; the Austrian response -- to find a short-to-mid range solution -- was characteristic of their field generalship. On the big issues -- the constitutional treaty, the debate over enlargement, and addressing the sour "mood" among EU member state publics -- the Austrians sought to put the EU in a better spot than when they started. They were largely successful, with January's prevailing sense of doom having given way to pragmatism by June. Austria's management of the ministerial and summit meetings was similarly workmanlike, delivering on Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel's dictum that Austria would be "a good host." This set the stage for a logistically and substantively successful U.S.-EU Summit at the end of the presidency. The Austrians showed real skill in managing the response to the Belarusian elections and in deflecting public criticism of Guantanamo and other counter-terrorism efforts. Anxious to avoid embarrassing missteps in advance of national elections in the fall, Chancellor Schuessel's government "played it safe" by eschewing low-percentage efforts. This worked to our benefit when they practically ignored the China arms embargo, but they could have done more to help find common ground on the Doha Development Round or to address the human rights deficit in Latin America. Nevertheless, at the final whistle, the Austrians could leave the field with the satisfaction of having put in a solid performance. End Summary. -------------- - Setting Expectations: "Execute the Game Plan" -------------- - ¶2. (C) Austria assumed the Presidency of the European Union in January with modest ambitions. Austrian leaders set the tone by repeating that Austria would be a "service-provider" and an "honest broker," seeking to "restore confidence" in the European project. By the start of the presidency, the goal was clear: Austria sought to deliver an unspectacular but workman-like performance, achieving what was realistically possible while deflecting more ambitious expectations. As a mid-sized country with a correspondingly small government, Austria took up the job much like a backup quarterback might take the field. In those circumstances, the goal is not to attempt heroics, but simply to execute the game plan, take advantage of opportunities, and keep making progress. In those terms, the Austrian presidency successfully "managed the game." -------------- Preparation: "You're Starting" -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Like a second-stringer who finds out he's going to start the following week, the Austrians put tremendous effort into preparations. A year and a half before "game time," the government -- especially the Foreign Ministry -- started to assemble a management team of almost 200 new hires to ensure that Austria would be able to host an intense schedule of Ministerial and Summit meetings. In the summer of 2005, the Foreign Ministry made its last major round of assignments, putting key personnel into place in Vienna and Brussels "for the duration." Anyone who had failed to grab an overseas posting found themselves frozen into a headquarters assignment. -------------- Kickoff -------------- ¶4. (C) Austria started in a hole. The French and Dutch rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty had already set a negative mood. Then, on January 1, 2006, the Austrians were barely home from the New Year's Ball when they learned that Russia had cut gas deliveries through Ukraine. The way the Austrians managed that problem was a good indicator of their response to the Presidency as a whole. They did not seek to make a spectacular response. Rather, working with their colleagues in the EU, and with a good deal of engagement on Washington's part, the Austrians were able to turn a potential disaster into a modest gain. The broader issues of VIENNA 00002322 002 OF 005 energy security and of support for democracy in the former Soviet Union would continue to dog them. However, they worked out an operational response that kept gas flowing to Western Europe, while at least gave some breathing room to Ukraine and Moldova. -------------- The Battle for Field Position -------------- ¶5. (C) From the start, the Austrians saw their most important task as advancing the "European Project." The constitutional issue was a key part of this nexus of issues, and the future of the enlargement process was another. In a more diffuse way, the European public's malaise regarding the EU was a matter of concern for Austria, and especially for Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel. However, the Austrians knew they could not achieve huge gains on any of these fronts. Their goals were to regain momentum and to leave things in a better spot than when they started. ¶6. (C) On the constitutional treaty, MFA State Secretary Hans Winkler noted that the EU had called for a "period of reflection" during the Austrian presidency. This meant that there were few expectations. However, the Austrians did not want to preside over the general acceptance that the integration process was dead. Without much fanfare, Chancellor Schuessel sought to generate modest momentum. Recognizing that the two "no" votes, crucial as they were, stood against 15 "yes" votes, Schuessel and his team made low-key public efforts to support the continuation of the constitutional process. By June 16, when the European Council met near Vienna, Schuessel could announce that there was no disagreement as to the "principles" of the constitution. Those principles, as Winkler later enumerated them, were support for a better-functioning EU, the creation of an EU "fit for the future," and underlying democratic values. ¶7. (C) On enlargement, Schuessel faced considerable public anxiety on the EU's plans to take in new members -- especially ones like Turkey. Austria's stubbornness during the discussions of the negotiating mandate for Turkey's accession talks reflected a feeling of political vulnerability. However, Schuessel did not want a fight about enlargement to be the story of his presidency. Schuessel played it safe by handing off the enlargement issue to technical negotiators, and staying away from it. He got a major break with the arrest of Ante Gotovina, which permitted major progress on Croatia's accession process -- a popular proposition in Austria. ¶8. (C) The "mood" of the European public was of special concern to Schuessel. Austrian EU Ambassador Gregor Woschnagg had cited as Austria's top goal "to restore public confidence in the European project." In January, Schuessel had felt the lack of Austrian support for the EU, with almost half of all Austrians expressing skepticism about the EU. By the end of his presidency, Schuessel could reflect on polls showing that 2/3 of Austrians were proud of the presidency, and only four percent (according to Winkler) said they felt uninformed about EU initiatives. In January, Winkler pointed out, the general debate was about "how dead" the constitution and the integration process was. By the end of June, Europe was again looking forward. -------------- Making Forward Progress -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Much of the Austrian presidency's effort went into logistical arrangements for the full series of high level meetings that took place in Austria. Chancellor Schuessel made clear that being a "good host" was an important goal. One of the most complex ministerial meeting was that of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) ministers. The Austrians made this a centerpiece of their presidency schedule. They planned a back-to-back series of three sets of meetings. The first was in troika format with the U.S., the second was an expanded meeting with ministers from throughout Europe and the EU's "Neighborhood" countries, and the third was an ambitious U.S.-Russia-EU meeting. Having almost set too high a bar for success, the Austrians worked to ensure that there would be agreement on a substantive outcome document, and settled for what was possible. In the end, the ministerial meetings went well, and the delegations accomplished everything they could expect. ¶10. (C) An even more complex operation was the EU-Latin America summit. Almost 60 delegations descended on Vienna, VIENNA 00002322 003 OF 005 each with a more or less idiosyncratic and demanding head of state. Adding to the complexity, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and Bolivian president Evo Morales threatened to hijack the Austrian concept by trying to attract attention to an "alternative summit." The Austrians showed a fine capacity for tactical deception. They encouraged Catholic groups, including the Archdiocese of Vienna, to engage heavily in the "alternative summit" as a way of moderating the potentially more disruptive elements. Then they let Chavez and Morales take themselves out of the play by facilitating their engagement in the "alternative summit," while insisting that the two participate in the official summit activities as well. In the end, the events resulted in a solid gain in the EU-Latin American relationship, with a creditable document and a substantive exchange among the leaders. ¶11. (C) The U.S.-EU summit was an even bigger challenge than the Latin American summit, if only because the stakes were so much higher. For the Austrians, dealing with the U.S. was a matter of reading what we wanted to do and then executing. The development of an action-oriented, relevant and operational summit document was a tremendous challenge to all sides, but it was a high-reward task that paid off. Schuessel's personal facilitation of a substantive set of discussions and a public presentation that stressed the need for cooperation on our common agenda was key to pulling off the event. ¶12. (C) The EU, and by implication the Austrian presidency, made significant if unspectacular gains in the Balkans. Austrian facilitation of the Kosovo discussions helped keep progress alive. In Montenegro, there was a good deal of support for the EU's engagement, leading to a result -- the peaceful achievement of Montenegrin independence -- that was significant for the lack of problems that arose. -------------- Making Something out of Nothing -------------- ¶13. (C) There were several instances in which the Austrian presidency were able to achieve forward progress against bad odds. On Belarus, despite a solid game plan for addressing the probability of severe problems in March elections, the events themselves caught the Austrians somewhat out of position. As news broke of the massive irregularities in the Belarus vote, the Austrians were facing an EU which lacked consensus on taking steps such as travel bans and financial sanctions. However, Lukashenko's sheer momentum in the wrong direction let the Austrians facilitate a consensus in favor of the necessary moves. ¶14. (C) Another such instance involved the debate in European countries over the Guantanamo facility and allegations of secret prisons and rendition flights in Europe. In that case, the Austrian strategy was to slow down the development of momentum of public opinion on the issue. They pocketed inquiries, resisted calls to include references to the issue at the March Foreign Ministers' meeting in Salzburg, and deflected public demands to make the issue a central agenda item at the U.S.-EU summit. Schuessel's forthright public defense of U.S.-EU cooperation on terrorism at the Summit effectively defused the topic. ¶15. (C) The North Korean threat to launch missiles, which came to fruition just after the Austrian stint, could have been disruptive. By that point, however, the Austrians had the experience in coordinating EU foreign policy to read the situation immediately. They prepared a draft response that hit the right spot, condemning the North Korean initiative as a provocation and leaving no doubt about international solidarity. -------------- Playing it Safe -------------- ¶16. (C) With modest capabilities and modest expectations, the Austrians were very selective in deciding where to fight their battles. This innate conservatism was, if anything, reinforced by the government's desire to avoid embarrassing missteps in advance of national elections in the fall (now set for October 1). In some cases, this redounded to the benefit of our policy goals. On the EU's China arms embargo, the Austrians, despite a preference for lift, told us early on that they were not going to pursue this during their presidency. Likewise, despite a predilection to press for stricter EU measures against agricultural biotechnology, the Austrians did not undertake major policy initiatives that VIENNA 00002322 004 OF 005 could have poisoned the atmosphere of the summit. Instead, they held two conferences that served to air views and give the Austrian people -- already stubbornly anti-biotech -- the sense that they were winning a hearing in Brussels. ¶17. (C) The Austrians similarly played it safe in areas in which we would have preferred that they take more action. They did not show particular leadership in shaping the EU's policies toward the Doha Development Round. This was largely because of deep divisions within the Austrian government, as in other governments, between free-traders in the Economics Ministry and protectionists in the politically powerful Agriculture Ministry. Clearly, Schuessel decided this was a fight he would rather not have. On foreign policy and the freedom agenda, the Austrians saw no percentage in pressing for a more forthright EU position on Cuba and Venezuela. Instead of heightening the urgency of the issue, Vienna's role as host of the Latin America Summit rather reinforced the Austrian tendency to avoid what the Austrians saw as "buying trouble" by pressing their guests for human rights improvements. ¶18. (C) On the Balkans, an issue of primary importance to Vienna, the Austrians scaled back a concept they would dearly liked to have implemented for a major conference on the margins of the March Foreign Ministers' meeting in Salzburg. They realized that March was simply too soon to try to announce any breakthrough on Kosovo, and they recognized that an attempt to force a public relations coup could be disastrous for the substance of the issue. In the end, they invited Balkan ministers to Salzburg, and issued a statement supportive of UN Special Negotiator Martti Ahtisaari's efforts. -------------- Pushing it Across the Goal Line -------------- ¶19. (C) In addition to the outcome of the U.S.-EU Summit, Austria had two big scores during its presidency. One was achievement of political agreement on the EU's financial perspective. The British Presidency had delivered the conditions for success by finishing negotiations among the member states. However, this left the Austrians with the task of winning agreement for the deal in the European Parliament. For the Austrians, the British achievement was tremendous, but it still left "one hell of a job" to do, as Ambassador Woschnagg put it. The lobbying effort was very much in the Austrian style: it was persistent and rarely public. Winkler said he made 61 formal speeches to the European parliament in the six months of Austria's presidency, and the cloak room discussions that surrounded those appearances were countless. ¶20. (C) The other success was winning agreement on an EU services directive. This had become a highly emotional issue. Some pointed to popular unhappiness on the services directive as a primary reason for the French rejection of the EU constitutional treaty. The Austrians facilitated a compromise that seems simple, but cost considerable cajoling: there would be free movement of labor in the services sector, but the rules under which individuals worked would be those of the country of employment, not of the country of origin. Getting the EU over the top of this issue was a major accomplishment for the Austrian presidency. -------------- Final Stats -------------- ¶21. (C) The Austrians themselves acknowledge that their success lay in doing what they could do, and not trying to do too much. By the end of their presidency, they had stretched themselves to the limit. They were fortunate to have in Chancellor Schuessel an old pro who was confident in reading emerging situations. Nevertheless, this was a team effort in which the entire Austrian bureaucracy engaged. ¶22. (C) Indeed, one of the key lessons the Austrians drew on behalf of the entire EU was how much the EU needs a functioning apparatus to serve as the presidency's "government." The constitutional treaty would provide such a system, and the Austrians feel qualified to say that this is an urgent need. ¶23. (C) A feature of EU decision-making which will not go away soon is the need for consensus among the member states. When any member state has the right to block any piece of text in a document, and has no obligation to explain why, it becomes practically impossible for the presidency and its VIENNA 00002322 005 OF 005 supporting cast in Brussels to conduct a negotiation with agility. In order to arrive at positive, action-oriented results, it is especially important for the United States as a negotiating partner to provide generous lead-time for introducing our concepts, to maintain consistency in our negotiating positions, to avoid unnecessary surprises, and to engage in plenty of personal, face-to-face encounters with the EU team. Kilner