Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06VIENNA230
2006-01-25 16:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Vienna
Cable title:  

JANUARY 30 GAERC PRE-DEMARCHE: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE

Tags:  PREL AU EUN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000230 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PREL AU EUN
SUBJECT: JANUARY 30 GAERC PRE-DEMARCHE: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE

REF: A) STATE 11254 B) STATE 10181

Classified By: ECONOMIC-POLITICAL COUNSELOR GREGORY E. PHILLIPS
REASONS: 14.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 000230 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016 TAGS: PREL AU EUN SUBJECT: JANUARY 30 GAERC PRE-DEMARCHE: AUSTRIAN RESPONSE REF: A) STATE 11254 B) STATE 10181 Classified By: ECONOMIC-POLITICAL COUNSELOR GREGORY E. PHILLIPS REASONS: 14.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) EconPolCouns and Pol Unit Chief delivered ref (a) demarche to Austrian MFA Common Foreign and Security Policy Coordinator Andreas Riecken on January 24. Riecken noted that, in addition to the topics mentioned in reftel, the EU Foreign Ministers would discuss the problem of granting visas to Burmese officials for an upcoming ASEM Deputy Finance Ministers meeting. The Dutch Foreign Minister had also asked for time to talk about Afghanistan in preparation for the London Conference. Riecken noted that this session of the Council was likely to be brief, since important participants, including Austrian Foreign Minister Plassnik, would have to leave early for other meetings in London. ¶2. (C) IRAN: Riecken told us that the Austrian MFA had been in intensive contact with the EU-3 and the EU Council Secretariat on draft language for the GAERC Conclusions. The SIPDIS draft was now with the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC),which hoped to finalize the language on January 24. For the moment, the role of the IAEA was paramount, but it was not too early to think about a strategy for the period after a referral to the UN Security Council. U.S. contacts with London, Paris and Berlin would be the determining factor, Riecken thought. We agreed, but said that Austria's chairmanship of EU Councils, plus its commercial and diplomatic engagement with Iran, gave it important leverage with the Iranians and Austria should use it. ¶3. (C) IRAQ: Riecken thought there would be an abbreviated discussion on Iraq centering on the outcome of the elections. An upcoming expert level seminar in Brussels sponsored by the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) would likely have a significant impact on European thinking about Iraq. Gudrun Harrer, the new Austrian/EU Presidency envoy in Baghdad, would brief the seminar on her findings and activities. Riecken said EU thinking focused on providing assistance on constituional issues. ¶4. (C) MEPP: Riecken echoed Robert Cooper's comments at the U.S.-EU Political Directors' Meeting in Alpbach (ref b). The EU would watch Hamas' performance in the Palestinian elections carefully. Hamas, if it did well enough, would be a political reality that we somehow had to manage. Getting Hamas to lay down its arms and change its attitude toward Israel was crucial, but it would be a long-term process. ¶5. (C) BELARUS: The EU's focus in the January 30 GAERC would not be on travel bans, but on how to deal with the run-up to the presidential election, Riecken said. The Belarus government had communicated to ODIHR in Warsaw on January 19 about sending a an election observer mission. This would allow enough time to set up a credible monitoring presence and was a positive contribution to the discussion. On the other hand, Solana was wary of the invitation he had received to meet Lukashenko in Minsk and did not want the regime to use such a "photo-op" for pre-election propaganda purposes. ¶6. (C) MONTENEGRO: Solana's new special representative, Slovakian PolDir Miroslav Lacjak, will report to the GAERC on his findings, Riecken said. While it is clear that the current government feels confident it can win a referendum on independence, it must also take account of the political opposition. The EU's chief concern is that a referendum be a reliable indicator of the true wishes of the Montenegrin people. It was also important to avoid cross-linkages with the situation in Kosovo. ¶7. (C) KOSOVO: The Commission was preparing a paper on the West Balkans for the March Gymnich ministerial in Salzburg, Riecken told us, but the issue was not yet ready for consideration in formal Council meetings. Rugova's death had caused delays in the process and possibly complicated the situation. The EU and Austria were prepared to take over certain tasks from UNMIK, such as policing, but did not want UNMIK to dissolve at this stage. Riecken remarked that in Bosnia, expectations for the EU security role had been too high, but perhaps some of the lessons learned there could be applied in Kosovo. KILNER

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