CYPRUS: BRYZA AND SILLIMAN'S NEW YORK MEETINGS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000974

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC TU CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: BRYZA AND SILLIMAN'S NEW YORK MEETINGS
WITH MOLLER AND GAMBARI


Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: On May 10, EUR DAS Matt Bryza and EUR/SE
Director Doug Silliman traveled to New York for meetings on
Cyprus with U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari and SRSG on Cyprus and
UNFICYP head Michael Moller. In a lunch meeting with Moller
and his deputy Susan Allee joined by USUN Ambassador Sanders,
they discussed prospects for finding a way forward on setting
up technical committees through his step-by-step approach.
During the course of the discussion, Moller asserted strongly
that Greek Cypriots would not accept the Annan Plan as the
sole basis for discussion on a way forward, but allowed,
however, that the Annan Plan contained many important ideas
that could not simply be tossed aside. He suggested that
"the Annan Plan plus other elements" was the right solution
to propose to the two sides. Bryza countered that the
Turkish side would almost certainly reject the formulation
"plus other elements," but might accept that the sides
proceed from the ideas defined by the Annan Plan, but without
explicit reference to the "Annan Plan." Moller also stated
in confidence (comment: rather unconvincingly - end comment)
that ongoing close-hold meetings between Moller, Padadopoulos
advisor Tzionis and Talat advisor Pertev were proving
"fruitful" and might led to the start of technical talks in
the near future. This, he continued, could lead to a new
political initiative. Ambassador Sanders sought Moller's
views on UNFICYP's mandate and how it might be changed in the
future. Moller conceded that a change might be in order in
the future, but cautioned against any premature reduction
that could upset attempts to launch a new political process.


2. (S) Summary Continued: Later in a meeting with U/SYG
Gambari that also included Moller and other UN officials,
Gambari said that the UN planned soon to respond to Ankara's
action plan that would include these basic ideas: 1) Turkey's
obligations to the EU cannot be linked to any quid-pro-quo,
but, it might be possible to borrow the best elements of the
plan along with a fulfillment of Turkey's obligations; 2)
Turkey's proposed quadripartite meeting was a "non-starter"
since two of the four participants rejected it and; 3)
Gambari plans to visit the island in late June-early July
after first going to Ankara and Athens. Gambari envisioned
his trip as a means to put pressure on the parties to move
forward, as a catalyst and an opportunity for assessment. He
suggested it would be helpful in this regard for the U.S. to
increase its cooperation with Turkish Cypriot authorities on
practical security issues such as Avian Influenza and the
security of cross-boundary movement. Gambari noted that
Papadopoulos had promised him that he would meet Talat when
Gambari comes to the island. Gambari explained that if
Moller's approach seemed to be working by the time he visits
the island and there is dialogue, then he might be willing to
launch a new initiative. He made repeated pleas for greater
support from the P5 and UNSC for his mission. End Summary.

Lunch With Moller: Annan Plan As Sole Basis for New Talks is
Dead
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3. (S) Speaking first in the lunch meeting, Moller noted that
the Turks had been upset with him after the SYG's meeting
with Papadopoulos in Paris and had used him as a scapegoat,
but that they had sat down and talked several months ago and
rapport was improving. Moller said he had appealed to both
Cypriot communities to address the conflict directly. The
Turkish Cypriots, particularly, need to "take more ownership
independent of Turkey." Bryza agreed, noting that we had
been telling the Turks that they needed to work more
productively with Moller. Moller explained that he had held
ten secret meetings of three-to-five hours duration to date
with only Tzionis and Pertev to iron out an agenda for the
proposed technical talks. Things were going well and while
no agenda had yet been agreed upon, Moller hoped that there
would be agreement soon, noting that the technical talks
might pave the way for a new political initiative. Moller
pointed out, however, that he thought it would be best to
start modestly with "two or three technical committees as
opposed to all ten." Moller also said that if the Turkish
Cypriots would agree to go just a bit beyond the original ten
committees then it might give the Greek Cypriots the extra
little incentive they would need to seal a deal. In
addition, Moller said there is an agreement that Padadopoulos
and Talat would meet at the installation of the third member
of the Committee on Missing Persons, who he said had already
been appointed and would arrive on the island in June,
starting officially July 1.

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4. (S) Moller emphatically declared that the Annan Plan was
dead as the sole basis for discussion on a way forward
because it was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. "If the
Turkish Cypriots keep saying that for a process to begin the
Greek Cypriot leadership needs to put down what was wrong
with the Annan Plan, which is now null and void anyway, then
we will not be able to move forward." He suggested using the
phrase "the Annan Plan plus other elements" as a basis for
new discussions. The Annan Plan needs to be "a basis, but
not the basis" for new talks. Bryza countered with his
assessment that the U.S. would probably not be able to
convince Ankara to accept the Annan Plan as only "a basis"
rather than "the basis" for the start of new talks. Bryza
opined, however, that Ankara would likely agree to begin
talks on the basis of "the Annan Plan by a different name."


5. (C) Ambassador Sanders then asked Moller for his thoughts
on possible changes to UNFICYP's mandate. Moller said that
some believe that UNFICYP impedes a solution since the two
sides turn to it rather than one another to resolve
conflicts. While admitting that there was very little chance
of hostilities, on balance Moller thought UNFICYP continues
to play a moderating role. Under the current mandate, he
argued, the mission cannot be trimmed any further. However,
at some point in the (undefined) future, "it might make sense
to change the mandate to an observer mission." It would be
better to do this after a political process is re-launched to
nudge parties along toward further progress than to do it
now, which could interfere with starting a political process.
Bryza agreed it would make the most sense to consider a
change in the UNFICYP mandate at a time and in a way that
would maximize the chances such a move could have on a
positive impact to the settlement process.

Gambari: Coming Soon: Response To Ankara's Action Plan,
Followed By Trip
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6. (S) U/SYG Gambari told Bryza that he planned soon to
answer to Ankara's January 2006 action plan. He explained
his likely three-part response: 1) Turkey's obligations to
the EU cannot be linked to any quid-pro-quo, but, it might be
possible to borrow the best elements of the plan in parallel
with a fulfillment of Turkey's obligations; 2) Turkey's
proposed quadripartite meeting would be impossible since two
proposed participants immediately rejected it; and 3) Turkey
should work closely with the EU and UNCTAD to see what might
be possible on opening ports in Turkish Cypriot areas to
international trade. Turning to the question of whether to
launch a new political initiative, Gambari said "the present
circumstances neither preclude, nor justify a quick
resumption" of the Good Offices Mission.


7. (S) Gambari said that he saw it as a means of pressure, a
catalyst and an opportunity for assessment. Gambari noted
that Papadopoulos had promised to meet Talat when Gambari
visits Cyprus. Gambari explained that if Moller's technical
talks seemed to be working by the time he visits the island,
he might be willing to recommend that SYG Annan launch a new
initiative. Gambari also noted that USUN's support in the
Council would be very helpful as coordination with the P-5
would be good.


8. (S) Moller noted that the Greek Cypriots had been actively
discouraging contacts with Turkish Cypriots, and that this
policy was beginning to hurt implementation of UNDP projects.
He asked the U.S. to ask the G/Cs to stop this campaign. UN
Europe Pol Director Laura Vaccaro noted that G/Cs were also
trying to "diminish the status" of the T/Cs in UN
discussions, noting that the UN must protect the equal status
of the two communities under the Good Offices Mission.
Gambari suggested that the U.S. could help elicit a more
cooperative G/C approach by increasing U.S. cooperation with
T/Cs on practical matters such as Avian Influenza and the
security of cross-boundary transit.


9. (S) Both Gambari and Moller seemed ready to abandon the
UN's two-year old policy of asking the G/Cs for their
proposed changes to the Annan Plan with clarity and finality
and in writing as the only way to move past G/C stalling.



10. (U) Participant Lists
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Lunch Meeting
UN: SRSG Michael Moller, Susan Allee US: Ambassador Jackie
Sanders, EUR DAS Matt Bryza, EUR/SE Director Doug Silliman

UN Meeting
UN: U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari, SRSG Michael Moller, Europe and
Americas Director Lara Gabriel, Senior Political Affairs
Officer Laura Vaccari, Political Affairs Officer Shin Umezu
BOLTON