CYPRUS: BRYZA AND SILLIMAN'S NEW YORK MEETINGS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000974 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC TU CY SUBJECT: CYPRUS: BRYZA AND SILLIMAN'S NEW YORK MEETINGS WITH MOLLER AND GAMBARI Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: On May 10, EUR DAS Matt Bryza and EUR/SE Director Doug Silliman traveled to New York for meetings on Cyprus with U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari and SRSG on Cyprus and UNFICYP head Michael Moller. In a lunch meeting with Moller and his deputy Susan Allee joined by USUN Ambassador Sanders, they discussed prospects for finding a way forward on setting up technical committees through his step-by-step approach. During the course of the discussion, Moller asserted strongly that Greek Cypriots would not accept the Annan Plan as the sole basis for discussion on a way forward, but allowed, however, that the Annan Plan contained many important ideas that could not simply be tossed aside. He suggested that "the Annan Plan plus other elements" was the right solution to propose to the two sides. Bryza countered that the Turkish side would almost certainly reject the formulation "plus other elements," but might accept that the sides proceed from the ideas defined by the Annan Plan, but without explicit reference to the "Annan Plan." Moller also stated in confidence (comment: rather unconvincingly - end comment) that ongoing close-hold meetings between Moller, Padadopoulos advisor Tzionis and Talat advisor Pertev were proving "fruitful" and might led to the start of technical talks in the near future. This, he continued, could lead to a new political initiative. Ambassador Sanders sought Moller's views on UNFICYP's mandate and how it might be changed in the future. Moller conceded that a change might be in order in the future, but cautioned against any premature reduction that could upset attempts to launch a new political process. ¶2. (S) Summary Continued: Later in a meeting with U/SYG Gambari that also included Moller and other UN officials, Gambari said that the UN planned soon to respond to Ankara's action plan that would include these basic ideas: 1) Turkey's obligations to the EU cannot be linked to any quid-pro-quo, but, it might be possible to borrow the best elements of the plan along with a fulfillment of Turkey's obligations; 2) Turkey's proposed quadripartite meeting was a "non-starter" since two of the four participants rejected it and; 3) Gambari plans to visit the island in late June-early July after first going to Ankara and Athens. Gambari envisioned his trip as a means to put pressure on the parties to move forward, as a catalyst and an opportunity for assessment. He suggested it would be helpful in this regard for the U.S. to increase its cooperation with Turkish Cypriot authorities on practical security issues such as Avian Influenza and the security of cross-boundary movement. Gambari noted that Papadopoulos had promised him that he would meet Talat when Gambari comes to the island. Gambari explained that if Moller's approach seemed to be working by the time he visits the island and there is dialogue, then he might be willing to launch a new initiative. He made repeated pleas for greater support from the P5 and UNSC for his mission. End Summary. Lunch With Moller: Annan Plan As Sole Basis for New Talks is Dead -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) Speaking first in the lunch meeting, Moller noted that the Turks had been upset with him after the SYG's meeting with Papadopoulos in Paris and had used him as a scapegoat, but that they had sat down and talked several months ago and rapport was improving. Moller said he had appealed to both Cypriot communities to address the conflict directly. The Turkish Cypriots, particularly, need to "take more ownership independent of Turkey." Bryza agreed, noting that we had been telling the Turks that they needed to work more productively with Moller. Moller explained that he had held ten secret meetings of three-to-five hours duration to date with only Tzionis and Pertev to iron out an agenda for the proposed technical talks. Things were going well and while no agenda had yet been agreed upon, Moller hoped that there would be agreement soon, noting that the technical talks might pave the way for a new political initiative. Moller pointed out, however, that he thought it would be best to start modestly with "two or three technical committees as opposed to all ten." Moller also said that if the Turkish Cypriots would agree to go just a bit beyond the original ten committees then it might give the Greek Cypriots the extra little incentive they would need to seal a deal. In addition, Moller said there is an agreement that Padadopoulos and Talat would meet at the installation of the third member of the Committee on Missing Persons, who he said had already been appointed and would arrive on the island in June, starting officially July 1. USUN NEW Y 00000974 002 OF 003 ¶4. (S) Moller emphatically declared that the Annan Plan was dead as the sole basis for discussion on a way forward because it was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. "If the Turkish Cypriots keep saying that for a process to begin the Greek Cypriot leadership needs to put down what was wrong with the Annan Plan, which is now null and void anyway, then we will not be able to move forward." He suggested using the phrase "the Annan Plan plus other elements" as a basis for new discussions. The Annan Plan needs to be "a basis, but not the basis" for new talks. Bryza countered with his assessment that the U.S. would probably not be able to convince Ankara to accept the Annan Plan as only "a basis" rather than "the basis" for the start of new talks. Bryza opined, however, that Ankara would likely agree to begin talks on the basis of "the Annan Plan by a different name." ¶5. (C) Ambassador Sanders then asked Moller for his thoughts on possible changes to UNFICYP's mandate. Moller said that some believe that UNFICYP impedes a solution since the two sides turn to it rather than one another to resolve conflicts. While admitting that there was very little chance of hostilities, on balance Moller thought UNFICYP continues to play a moderating role. Under the current mandate, he argued, the mission cannot be trimmed any further. However, at some point in the (undefined) future, "it might make sense to change the mandate to an observer mission." It would be better to do this after a political process is re-launched to nudge parties along toward further progress than to do it now, which could interfere with starting a political process. Bryza agreed it would make the most sense to consider a change in the UNFICYP mandate at a time and in a way that would maximize the chances such a move could have on a positive impact to the settlement process. Gambari: Coming Soon: Response To Ankara's Action Plan, Followed By Trip -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) U/SYG Gambari told Bryza that he planned soon to answer to Ankara's January 2006 action plan. He explained his likely three-part response: 1) Turkey's obligations to the EU cannot be linked to any quid-pro-quo, but, it might be possible to borrow the best elements of the plan in parallel with a fulfillment of Turkey's obligations; 2) Turkey's proposed quadripartite meeting would be impossible since two proposed participants immediately rejected it; and 3) Turkey should work closely with the EU and UNCTAD to see what might be possible on opening ports in Turkish Cypriot areas to international trade. Turning to the question of whether to launch a new political initiative, Gambari said "the present circumstances neither preclude, nor justify a quick resumption" of the Good Offices Mission. ¶7. (S) Gambari said that he saw it as a means of pressure, a catalyst and an opportunity for assessment. Gambari noted that Papadopoulos had promised to meet Talat when Gambari visits Cyprus. Gambari explained that if Moller's technical talks seemed to be working by the time he visits the island, he might be willing to recommend that SYG Annan launch a new initiative. Gambari also noted that USUN's support in the Council would be very helpful as coordination with the P-5 would be good. ¶8. (S) Moller noted that the Greek Cypriots had been actively discouraging contacts with Turkish Cypriots, and that this policy was beginning to hurt implementation of UNDP projects. He asked the U.S. to ask the G/Cs to stop this campaign. UN Europe Pol Director Laura Vaccaro noted that G/Cs were also trying to "diminish the status" of the T/Cs in UN discussions, noting that the UN must protect the equal status of the two communities under the Good Offices Mission. Gambari suggested that the U.S. could help elicit a more cooperative G/C approach by increasing U.S. cooperation with T/Cs on practical matters such as Avian Influenza and the security of cross-boundary transit. ¶9. (S) Both Gambari and Moller seemed ready to abandon the UN's two-year old policy of asking the G/Cs for their proposed changes to the Annan Plan with clarity and finality and in writing as the only way to move past G/C stalling. ¶10. (U) Participant Lists -------------- USUN NEW Y 00000974 003 OF 003 Lunch Meeting UN: SRSG Michael Moller, Susan Allee US: Ambassador Jackie Sanders, EUR DAS Matt Bryza, EUR/SE Director Doug Silliman UN Meeting UN: U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari, SRSG Michael Moller, Europe and Americas Director Lara Gabriel, Senior Political Affairs Officer Laura Vaccari, Political Affairs Officer Shin Umezu BOLTON