UN ON LRA: 'SYMPTOM OF PROBLEM THAT ONLY UGANDA

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000912 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CG ETTC MOPS PGOV PREL SU UG KPKO SUBJECT: UN ON LRA: 'SYMPTOM OF PROBLEM THAT ONLY UGANDA CAN RESOLVE' SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) At April 26 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations, Department of Political Affairs (DPA) Assistant-Secretary-General Kalomoh made recommendations for addressing the regional threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),most of which centered around a more proactive approach from the Government of Uganda (GOU). Kalomoh and UK Permanent Representative (PR) Jones Parry disagreed over the question of including Uganda on the UNSC's agenda, with Kalomoh warning that Council scrutiny could preclude future GOU cooperation on political issues. Meanwhile, Jones Parry has sought to establish himself as the LRA crusader on the Council, hosting a Uganda Core Group meeting on April 26 and a seminar on the LRA threat (with the Ugandan PR as co-host) on April 27, and requesting another briefing on the LRA threat in the coming weeks. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) According to DPA A/SYG Kalomoh, resolution of the LRA threat would come only through the GOU's addressing the 'root cause' of the conflict: resentment by the northern Acholi population at its marginalization by the present government. Kalomoh claimed that less than 200 combatants remain, with considerably diminished strength and resources (COMMENT. This number seemed unrealistically low in USUN's estimation. END COMMENT). Kalomoh said that the GOU had to engage in a 'genuine' dialogue with the Acholis to address their grievances, and he assured that the UN stood ready to assist in this process. UNMIS AND MONUC ARE NOT THE ANSWER -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The scope of the UN's capability to assist, Kalomoh warned, remained limited, especially as LRA insecurity was spreading from northern Uganda to southern Sudan and eastern DRC. In southern Sudan, Kalomoh noted an increase in the number of LRA attacks as combatants were scrambling to re-supply, but he lamented that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) lacked the mandate, assets and offensive capacity to go after the group. UNMIS' current mandate allowed only for the detention, not the arrest, of LRA terrorists, and the Sudanese Government of National Unity's (GNU) memorandum of understanding with the ICC required it to immediately hand over LRA leaders to The Hague. ¶4. (SBU) In the DRC, Kalomoh reported the LRA was using Garamba National Park (near the Sudan border) to re-group. He noted that the battalion-sized force close to the Park would be sufficient for security but added that the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC),together with the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC),were exploring other options to address the LRA presence. Under UNSCR 1565 (2004),MONUC had a mandate to protect civilians but not to tackle the threat of foreign armed combatants; it was authorized only to support the FARDC's disarmament efforts in this regard. According to Kalomoh, MONUC has been encouraged to better patrol the border against LRA activity, especially with the advent of DRC elections in June. The main priority in the DRC, Kalomoh stressed, was promoting a secure environment for the polls. RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Kalomoh asserted that UNMIS and MONUC should not be considered substitutes for Ugandan authorities in addressing the LRA threat. In addition to a credible dialogue, the GOU needed to prioritize its national budgetary assistance to ensure long-term development in the north. Further, the GOU needed to strengthen its data on the LRA, particularly updating background information and acquiring real-time intel. LRA leaders Kony and Otti needed to be isolated and indicted. A credible program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) should be encouraged to deal with the 80 percent of LRA ranks made up of child soldiers. Kalomoh solicited Members' assistance in establishing a Panel of Experts to expose and ultimately cut off the LRA's financial backers and supply channels, noting that some of these groups were based in southern Sudan. ¶6. (SBU) On the issue of a Special Envoy to Northern Uganda, Kalomoh said President Museveni had agreed in principle to the office but only if it steered clear of addressing internal issues. In a subsequent meeting of the Northern Uganda Core Group representatives hosted by UKUN, the Norwegian PR said that former Mozambican President Chissano's name was circulating in Kampala diplomatic circles as a possible candidate. Kalomoh appealed for GOU acceptance of such an appointment, particularly in working with the Core Group on the reintegration of ex-combatants. He also recommended a Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict liaise with the Core Group on the reintegration of child soldiers. Finally, Kalomoh urged increased regional cooperation through the Tripartite Plus Commission. UK AS LRA CRUSADER -------------- ¶7. (SBU) As host of an informal meeting of Core Group representative, UK PR Jones Parry suggested that there would eventually need to be a military solution to the problem posed by the '20 percent' of the LRA that were 'sociopaths' and beyond redemption through any DDR effort. He hinted broadly that none of the regional militaries was up to the challenge and that some sort of 'special operation' would likely be required. ¶8. (SBU) In the UK's April 27 LRA seminar, Ugandan PR Butagira made clear the GOU supported neither inclusion of Uganda on the SC agenda nor appointment of a Special Envoy or a Panel of Experts. OCHA U/SYG Egeland reported that nearly 1.7 million persons still remain displaced by the LRA conflict. NGOs OXFAM, CARE, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group were represented. BOLTON