UN REFORM AND THE P-5

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000907

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC UN
SUBJECT: UN REFORM AND THE P-5

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Permanent Representative, for
reasons 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) USUN has engaged in a concerted effort to reinvigorate
the P-5 as a tool for advancing U.S. interests here in New
York, including through more frequent and regular P-5
consultations to discuss a wide range of topics. These
consultations, at the Permanent Representative, Coordinator
and expert levels, complement the parallel use of the P-5 to
address immediate issues before the Council, including Iran,
non-proliferation and the Secretary-General selection
process. Many of these meetings are prepared through
informal P-3 (U.S./UK/France) coordinating sessions to
promote wherever possible allied solidarity in this effort.


2. (C) Through active P-5 coordination, we have ensured that
the members of the P-5 are permanently present on the
Peacebuilding Commission's Organizational Committee. A
coordinated P-5 response to the drafters of a pernicious
General Assembly resolution on Security Council working
methods has at least postponed any action on that measure.
Continued P-5 consultations on the SYG selection have gone
beyond agreeing on Council procedures, to ensure a
coordinated position in response to General Assembly calls
for a disruptive role in the process. Our effort to gain
real oversight of the Secretariat's peacekeeping operations
will only be possible through a reinvigorated use of the
capability and expertise of P-5 military advisors.


3. (C) There can be no guarantee of P-5 solidarity on
specific policy issues. Where China or Russia find it in its
national interest to oppose U.S. objectives on Iran or Sudan,
we will not bring them to our side or eliminate the prospect
of a veto solely through a "P-5 first" approach to the
consultations or by invoking an appeal to "P-5 unity."


4. (C) On questions of UN structure, processes, and
membership, however, there is a measure of P-5 unity that, as
noted above, we have exploited over the past months. The
sense of collective or shared purpose among P-5 members
reflects the fact that the Charter establishes the notion of
special privileges and responsibilities for the P-5. Despite
all the talk in the General Assembly about the "principle of
sovereign equality," the UN Charter recognizes and
legitimizes the special role the permanent members play on
the international stage.


5. (C) USUN believes that safeguarding the principle of
special privileges, obligations and responsibilities for the
permanent members is an important tool to advance our
interests here in New York. Unfortunately, this principle is
under attack by the broader membership. Some aspirants to
permanent membership in the Council have based their
candidacy on the argument that the current P-5 membership is
unrepresentative and P-5 members abuse their privileges.
Resistance to serious reform, and the most unhelpful
alternative reform proposals, are being justified on the need
to reestablish the principle of sovereign equality (see the
management reform debate) and on the perception that the
Security Council, and in particular its permanent members,
need to be reined in.


6. (C) One manifestation of the Charter-endowed "special
status" of the P-5 is the "P-5 convention." Though much
maligned in recent years, the "convention" remains a
principle that P-5 members have continued rigorously to
uphold. The convention is neither a treaty nor a written
agreement but rather a custom that developed during the early
days of the UN. It consists of two working assumptions. One
is that the P-5 members agree to support each other's
candidacies or candidates in all UN elections. The United
States has consistently adhered to this element of the
convention, which is of particular importance in votes such
as election to the ICJ that require a Security Council
majority. The other assumption, that the P-5 members should
have any seat on a UN body that they seek in exchange for
refraining from seeking chairmanships in the GA and ECOSOC,
has not been honored by other UN members. The broader
understanding among the general membership that P-5
participation in any UN body is good for the organization as
a whole has eroded in recent years. P-5 members now fight,
lobby and trade for votes just like any other member. The
convention, in practice, only guarantees that a P-5 candidate
should get the four votes of the other P-5.


7. (C) However, we continue to support the principle that
underlies the convention - that any UN body is made more
effective with the participation of the P-5 members - and
believe that it serves the best interests of the UN as a
whole. This is especially important for the United States

since we have no regional group we can count on, unlike the
other four permanent members. For our own interests in
seeking election to UN bodies, the Charter-based notion of a
special role and responsibilities for the P-5 gives us
additional leverage in support of our own candidacy or, as we
successfully argued with the Peacebuilding Commission, allows
us to negotiate for our permanent presence on important
bodies.
BOLTON