A/S SILVERBERG MEETS WITH U/SYG DPKO GUEHENNO TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000819 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU KPKO SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG MEETS WITH U/SYG DPKO GUEHENNO TO ENCOURAGE ACTION ON DARFUR Classified By: Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Accompanied by USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Kristen Silverberg met with Under Secretary General for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Jean-Marie Guehenno and DPKO Assistant Secretary General Hedi Annabi on April 7 to urge concrete action on transitioning the African Union Mission in Sudan to a blue-hatted UN Mission (UNMIS). Guehenno,s mantra in response was that continued slow and measured involvement in the region was the best course, stating that much had been done, but there was a continuing need to work with the African Union (AU) and the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) &to get into the details& of the transition. Silverberg also voiced U.S. support for an UNMEE draw-down, and a technical rollover of UNMEE,s mandate for another month. End Summary. Re-hatting AMIS ¶2. (C) U/SYG Guehenno noted that while a number of AU countries view the transition from AMIS to UNMIS positively, others see it as part of a &continued effort8 to push the AU aside. Per Guehenno, an example of the former category is Egypt, who seems to &understand the importance8 of lowering regional tensions and has an interest in the North/South Sudanese peace process. DPKO has been working with Sudan,s neighbors such as Egypt to convince the GNU that an UNMIS operation was not about &crushing Sudan,8 said Guehenno, noting that Algeria and Djibouti have also been approached to help. ¶3. (C) In Guehenno,s view, the GNU is ¶noid,8 and the UN needs to convince them that it is in their interest to protect their people and promote the peace process. At the same time, it is important to protect goals already achieved and not risk losing the successes on the North/South issue while &getting nowhere8 on Darfur. For the AMIS transition to be successful, Guehenno continued, DPKO needed GNU cooperation ) &a collision course with Sudan goes nowhere.8 The implementation of any proposed targeted sanctions would &shut the door,8 per Guehenno, and &there would be no Mission.8 By working with the GNU, the international community can persuade them that a blue-hatted operation is not &an invasion.8 At the moment, the paranoia is only complicating the situation -- &Sudan is hiding behind the AU, and the AU is hiding behind Sudan.8 ¶4. (U) A/SYG Annabi noted the importance of the international community,s continued involvement with the AU &to see that any ceasefire agreed to makes sense and is workable.8 The international community can be most useful, in Annabi,s view, by helping to shape and mold the ceasefire terms, followed by continued engagement in implementation. However, he stressed, a low-key approach in this regard was vital - there have &always8 been AU countries opposed to UN or international involvement. If the mission is going to succeed, the UN needs &substantive8 consent ) coercion can and will be easily undermined. ¶5. (C) In regard to his pending report on Sudan to Council members on April 24th, Silverberg asked if Annabi had requested visas for the UN technical assessment mission to Darfur, to which Annabi responded in the negative, explaining that &we don,t want a no.,8 Acknowledging there was now a timing problem with his scheduled meeting with Council, Annabi rationalized that any written report would not be ready by the April 24th deadline anyway. He added that UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland had recently obtained a visa but had been denied entry to Sudan. In Annabi,s view, for the moment it was better not to ask. ¶6. (C) In reference to the NATO planning piece of the AMIS re-hatting process, Annabi stated &the less talk about NATO the better.8 Many in the region believe the UN is &just a USUN NEW Y 00000819 002 OF 002 front8 for NATO ) &we don,t want to give credence to this belief by being too aggressive.8 The key to UN efforts, stated Annabi, is to be there -- on the ground. This cannot be forced on the GNU ) DPKO needed to move slowly, and with GNU cooperation and consent. Guehenno pointed out that the government in Khartoum was not a failed state, and that the GNU was capable of resisting any unwanted intervention with force. ¶7. (SBU) In response to Guehenno questions about congressional legislation, Assistant Secretary Silverberg advised Guehenno of significant Congressional interest in the present situation, and the view that little is happening. She noted that the process needs to move forward, and a schedule set on the ground for AMIS transition to UNMIS. She added that the U.S. Congress needed reassurance that the UN feels the same sense of urgency that something must be done. Ambassador Sanders echoed the message that Congress is frustrated, and wants to see something positive happen soon in Darfur. UNMEE ¶8. (SBU) Silverberg also advised Guehenno that the U.S. supports an UNMEE drawdown - in this case coincident with our support for a temporary increase in UN troop strength in Cote d,Ivoire. In order to avoid setting a precedent, Ambassador Sanders emphasized that this case was unique, and that a UN drawdown in one region does not, and should not imply an automatic increase in another. Guehenno acknowledged this, but did not volunteer his views. BOLTON