UN: FIFTH COMMITTEE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A SCALE OF

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000756 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC KUNR UNGA SUBJECT: UN: FIFTH COMMITTEE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A SCALE OF ASSESSMENT RESOLUTION ¶1. Summary. Following weeks of discussion and then negotiation on a draft resolution, the Fifth Committee had agreed to all paragraphs except operative paragraph (OP) 5, which included eight proposals to be forwarded to the Committee on Contributions (CoC) for its consideration this June. In the face of Russian and Chinese opposition to forwarding elements in the draft which their delegations did not agree with, the Committee became deadlocked over how to send forward Member States' proposals to the CoC. After numerous attempts by the coordinator and delegations to break the impasse, Fifth Committee chairman Ashe announced on April 4 that no agreement could be reached on the resolution and the item would be deferred to the 61st GA. End summary. ¶2. The Fifth Committee spent nearly two weeks negotiating a draft resolution to forward eight methodology proposals from individual or groups of Member States for the consideration of the CoC (in addition to the existing methodology, proposals were made by Saudi Arabia, US, EU, Japan, Mexico, Caricom and Singapore, and a "like-minded group" of some G-77 delegations). Though the proposals were grouped together in one paragraph (OP5),there were a number of additional paragraphs in the resolution that were the subject of lengthy negotiation in the committee (relating to the principle of capacity to pay and requests for additional information from the CoC). Following two weeks of debate, these paragraphs were agreed to informally, leaving only OP5 to be agreed. Most delegations had been working on the assumption that this would automatically be agreed, however, this assumption was soon challenged, and ultimately blocked, by Russia and China. ¶3. In both 1997 and 2000 the General Assembly could not agree on one set of criteria to be sent to the CoC for consideration, and opted instead to send forward all proposals without prejudice to the deliberations by Member States on the scale later in each respective year. It was apparent to all delegations from the outset of the current negotiations (which began in November 2005) that a similar approach would have to be employed this year given the divergent views among Member States on the various elements of the scale methodology. As such, there was a working assumption that Member States could table any proposal to be forwarded to the CoC. The Committee would have an opportunity to ask questions and seek clarifications from the proponents and from the Secretariat on each proposal but, ultimately, the proposals would not be negotiated at this stage and would be sent forward to the CoC for information only. ¶4. As the discussion evolved, two -- and later three -- options were tabled to address OP5. The first option was to follow the existing practice of 1997 and 2000 by requesting the CoC to present scales based on the eight proposals enumerated in the draft resolution. There was broad agreement by Member States to follow this precedent, with the exception of Russia and China who refused to forward any of the proposals in a resolution because they were not agreed to by all Member States. (Comment: The position of Russia and China was precipitated foremost by the inclusion of the Japanese proposal of a P-5 floor rate, and to a certain extent by the inclusion of the US proposal on purchasing power parity. End comment.) ¶5. As the committee came close to agreement on all other paragraphs in the resolution, India introduced six new paragraphs that directly targeted the US proposal on PPP. Immediately rejected by the US, EU, Japan and CANZ for being judgmental in nature, the paragraphs nevertheless remained on the table. To broker a compromise, the coordinator (Iran) proposed 1) modification of the chapeau language to OP5 to make clear that the proposals were submitted separately by various Member States for information only and without prejudice to the decision to be taken by the GA on the scale in the 61st GA, and 2) deletion of the Indian paragraphs. In the hours after the "compromise" was introduced, there seemed to be growing momentum towards acceptance of this package. The US, EU, CANZ, and Mexico all agreed, while Japan, India and China indicated their willingness to "think it over" and possibly proceed on the compromise as a way forward. ¶6. Two days later, on a Sunday afternoon, delegations reconvened with the intent of finalizing the resolution by Monday morning. However, this was prevented by the Russian and Chinese proposal of new language. Their language -- to replace OP5 in its entirety -- would result in the deletion from the resolution of all proposals, and would allow for proposals to be submitted bilaterally to the CoC by Member States. It also stipulated that the CoC only had to consider those proposals that were in accordance with the principle of capacity to pay. The language created a role for the CoC (which is a committee of only 18 members) to take decisions on which proposals did and did not meet the principle of capacity to pay. This judgement, however, is reserved for Member States in their consideration of the methodology to be used in calculating the scale of assessment and does not constitute a part of the CoC's mandate. In short, the Russia/China proposal represented a radical departure from past practice and would set precedent for an entirely new manner of interaction between Member States and the CoC. ¶7. Despite numerous questions on the proposal, and suggestions on how to change it to make it acceptable, the Russians would not depart from their original proposed language. As such, the proposal was strongly opposed by Japan, the US and EU, with Mexico and the Caricom Group expressing their strong discomfort with the language. Egypt and India, however, were prepared to work on the Russia/China language. And so the gap in positions widened, making the prospect of any agreement even more distant. In a last attempt to bridge the divide, the US and Mexico proposed amendments to the coordinator's "compromise" language to explicitly take into account the concerns of Russia and China that the eight proposals have not received the full support of all Member States. This was immediately rejected by Russia, and the negotiations ended. Following this deadlock, and in light of the growing divide in the Committee, Chairman Ashe announced to all delegations on April 4 that no agreement could be reached on the resolution and the item would be deferred to the 61st GA. ¶8. Without a resolution from the GA, the CoC will likely continue to consider elements of the current methodology (including the base period, low per capita income adjustment, and debt burden adjustment). It does not have a mandate to consider any of the eight proposals tabled by Member States this March. Member States may write to the CoC and request that it consider their proposals, however, as the CoC operates by consensus it is highly unlikely that the committee would agree to consider any/all of the proposals forwarded by individual Member States. This is a practice that has never before been used and would most likely create gridlock in the CoC. ¶9. It is clear, however, that some or all of the eight proposals (and maybe more) will be tabled by Member States this fall. In preparation for this, the Secretariat has already indicated that it will attempt to gather as much pertinent information and data as possible. BOLTON