UNSC/SUDAN: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACTION ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000734 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACTION ON DARFUR USUN NEW Y 00000734 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Progress toward transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations operation is stalled due to a stonewalling and recalcitrant Government of National Unity (GNU) in Sudan and a passive African Union (AU). While everyone at the UN talks about engaging Khartoum in the transition process, no one seems willing to do anything about it. The Council is as divided as ever on the issue of Sudan, with Khartoum apologists Qatar, Russia and China arguing for a do-nothing-until-the-GNU-is-onboard approach. Recently others, including Japan and Greece, while not intervening explicitly on behalf of the GNU, seem content to move at a slow pace. Even AU Council Members Tanzania, Congo and Ghana seem hesitant to move forward against the wishes of the GNU. The UN Secretariat exhibits a similar aversion to moving ahead. On the military planning side, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) continues to do what it can in New York but stresses that further planning progress depends on getting its 40-person assessment team on the ground in Darfur. However, as of April 4, there has been no movement within the Secretariat to request visas for the team. The Secretariat is both convinced and afraid of a GNU refusal. SIPDIS USUN intervened repeatedly at both working- and Ambassadorial-level to jump-start this process, but so far without result. An ideal opportunity would have been a phone call to Sudanese President el-Bashir by Secretary-General (SYG) Annan and AU Commission Chairperson Konare during their March 31 meeting, but Annan and Konare ultimately opted not to do so. If we want progress in Darfur, we must step up efforts to create a political environment within which the Council and the Secretariat can move forward. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. DPKO BLAMES ITS VISA STALLING ON DEADLOCKED POLITICAL PROCESS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) As of April 4, there has been no movement by DPKO to request visas for the 40-person assessment team it plans to dispatch in the near future to Darfur. Ambassador Wolff spoke with senior Secretariat staff March 31 on the need for DPKO to move more aggressively on visas for the mission. DPKO A/SYG Annabi reported that the situation with the GNU had deteriorated to such a point that Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Pronk was predicting the team would not be allowed to function even if it secured visas. SYG Annan's Chief of Staff Mark Malloch Brown agreed with Ambassador Wolff's point that the UN had to be more assertive and vowed to address the matter personally. DPKO had looked to a March 31 meeting between SYG Annan and AU Commission Chairperson Konare as a 'litmus test' for how the UN and AU planned to jointly approach the GNU about visas for the assessment team. Originally Annan had plans for a joint phone call with Konare to President el-Bashir, but according to DPKO, Konare needed further convincing before he would agree to reach out to the GNU. According to DPKO A/SYG Annabi in April 4 consultations, Konare refused to acknowledge an eventual UN transition at all in his meeting with Annan. Instead, Konare presented three 'scenarios' for addressing the Darfur crisis: first, a joint UN-AU operation; second, an 'AMIS-plus' scenario; and, as a distant third, transition to a UN operation. Annabi thus urged increased engagement with the AU toward a united position on transition. To this end, a high-level DPKO delegation, to be headed either by U/SYG Guehenno or A/SYG Annabi, will travel to Addis Ababa the week of April 10; among issues to be discussed is the planned assessment mission to Darfur. However, according to DPKO, the UN must not be alone in its outreach efforts; the international community and the Security Council needed to ramp up their own parallel efforts to engage Khartoum. ¶3. (C) DPKO acknowledged a 'hardening' of the positions of el-Bashir and Vice President Taha against a UN operation in Darfur, which was manifesting itself in Khartoum's repeated rejections of all UN overtures to enlist its cooperation in transition planning. Annabi reported that el-Bashir and FM USUN NEW Y 00000734 002.2 OF 003 Lam Akol told SRSG Pronk and Department of Political Affairs U/SYG Gambari that they were not convinced AMIS should transition at all and expressed concern that any contingency planning for such a transition was taking place. Lam will reportedly come to New York this month to discuss transition issues. When pressed in April 4 Security Council consultations by Ambassador Sanders for specifics on any official requests DPKO had made to the GNU for visas, Annabi cited Khartoum's 'rejectionist' posture as evidenced by its refusal to grant OCHA U/SYG Egeland entry to Sudan and then grudgingly admitted DPKO had not yet approached the GNU with a request. DPKO told USUN privately that even without having made a formal visa request, 'of course we have received a no' from the GNU, based on its rhetoric and actions to date. DPKO is quick to throw the ball not in Khartoum's court but rather in that of the Council 'heavies' (U.S., UK) who it views as positioning the UN in the middle of their tug-of-war with the GNU and the AU (NOTE. Despite this characterization by DPKO, the UK does not seem to share our sense of urgency on the need for DPKO to make a visa request. In fact, UK PermRep Jones Parry called Ambassador Wolff to complain about our insistent stance with DPKO on this issue. END NOTE). Visible contingency planning, DPKO argues, is not a substitute for the 'quiet diplomacy' that needs to be done to secure GNU acceptance of AMIS transition. ¶4. (C) Despite the progress it has made in its planning, DPKO admits that the operational feasibility of these plans cannot be determined until completion of an assessment mission to Darfur. DPKO convened an April 3 internal meeting to discuss the assessment team's composition; 12 UK nationals were reportedly part of the original roster, but DPKO was leery of the Sudanese perception of this group. DPKO briefed P-3 political and military experts on April 4 on the status of its planning, noting the information on force size was still close-hold. Its main planning was based on a scenario that assumed partial compliance by Darfur parties to a ceasefire, resulting in two sub-options. The first, and more likely, sub-option assumes a lower level of compliance, under which the force would be in the framework of infantry battalions and would possess both a mobile reconnaissance capability and an active liaison element. Its regional headquarters would be based in el-Fasher, with sector headquarters in Nyala, Geneina and el-Fasher; it would include three battalion areas in the north Darfur sector, and four each in the west and south Darfur sectors, largely oriented on areas of highest rebel activity. DPKO Force strength projections for this scenario are approximately 12,500-13,000 maximum. The second sub-option supposes a higher level of compliance, which would require lower force levels and more liaison activity. Both sub-options would presume an 'agile, capable and credible' force. Sudan-wide DPKO envisions one overall UN Mission under one SRSG and one force commander. Darfur would be one division-sized element, and the existing UNMIS would be a separate division-sized element. DPKO'S FRUSTRATION EXTENDS TO NATO ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶5. (C) A working-level DPKO contact was very defensive about what the SYG's actual request had been in his March 27 call to NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer. DPKO Poloff portrayed it as the SYG's having asked a general question about NATO's capacity/willingness to provide assistance to AMIS, with de Hoop Scheffer then making a subsequent request to the NAC for enablers. DPKO Poloff noted that DPKO senior levels acknowledged the value added of NATO involvement in the transition process, but was quick to claim ownership, at least of the planned assessment mission, saying that there would be no value added by NATO participation, that DPKO would need NATO's assistance only before and after the assessment and that it was important for DPKO to be able to conduct the mission with the UN's own machinery. ¶6. (C) Based on this conversation, it is fair to assert that DPKO - at least at the working level - is wary of NATO's stepping on its toes in contingency planning. There has been much of what DPKO considers 'micromanaging' going on lately: USUN NEW Y 00000734 003.2 OF 003 our checking up on the status of the assessment mission, pressure to make a request for GNU permission for the assessment team to enter Sudan, directives from the UN's 38th floor to 'just give us a plan,' now what it sees as NATO 'oversight' - all of which make UN/NATO cooperation a particularly sensitive matter. In USUN's view, it might be more palatable for the UN in this case if there were a way for NATO to engage in concert with other AMIS partners for any planned assistance (i.e. a less visible effort). DPKO NEXT STEPS AND POSSIBLE COUNCIL FOLLOW-UP -------------- - ¶7. (C) On future contingency planning, DPKO is considering reconfigurement plans for sector deployment, with a goal of maintaining at least half of existing AMIS forces so as not to deplete the Mission's institutional knowledge. DPKO is also looking at an envisaged UN-led training plan to take place in Nairobi and to result in a MAPEX. DPKO sought U.S. expertise in charting measures of effectiveness as the UN operation progresses. Despite its own planned way forward, DPKO insists that political work must be done to correct the 'negative atmosphere' in Khartoum regarding AMIS transition and to dispel any persisting 'misunderstandings' about the goal of transition. As Annabi acknowledged in consultations, the Darfur crisis will have a spill-over effect on personnel throughout Sudan, noting that UNMIS staff in Khartoum had already suffered at the hands of the GNU. ¶8. (C) The Council is more divided than ever on the issue of Sudan, and the GNU's latest affronts to Egeland and to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) only highlight Khartoum's resentment of the international attention focused on Darfur. In consultations, the Council broke down among its typical party lines: we and the UK insisted on maximizing pressure on the GNU to move the process forward and led an unsuccessful bid for Chinese PermRep and SC President Wang to deliver a strong press statement deploring the GNU's rebuffing of Egeland; the French tried to shift focus away from transition and on to the need to bolster AMIS, in a show of 'solidarity' with the African Members of the Council; and Khartoum's apologists - Russia, China and Qatar - insisted on delaying the process to seek GNU 'clarification' on why Egeland's entry was denied, with the Qatari representative citing the Council's failure to respect Sudanese sovereignty and 'its way of dealing with Arab and Islamic issues.' Greece and Japan were also surprisingly unhelpful, insisting that clarification be sought on the GNU's position on UN troops in Darfur and on its rationale for denying Egeland's entry. ¶9. (C) We will work with the UK on a Presidential Statement to address the GNU's actions against Egeland and the NRC, as well as to set a date for the Darfur assessment mission and for the pledging conference to take place. However, securing consensus on such a draft cannot be assured, given the level of tension in New York. Passage of this statement, along with those to come (including our resolution to mandate AMIS transition),would be facilitated by increased engagement with the GNU and the AU at the highest possible levels. If we are to make any progress on the assessment mission and indeed to get any traction for AMIS transition in the Council, we must step up engagement with and pressure on the GNU to create an atmosphere that could empower DPKO, silence the nay-sayers and ultimately turn the tide in New York. BOLTON