A STEP CLOSER TO TRANSITION: WITH UNSCR 1663

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 000618 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: A STEP CLOSER TO TRANSITION: WITH UNSCR 1663 PASSAGE, SYG CAN REACH OUT TO NATO REF: A. 03/21/2006 USUN E-MAIL ¶B. SECSTATE 045066 USUN NEW Y 00000618 001.2 OF 005 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sudan Jan Pronk's March 21 SIPDIS briefing to the Security Council revealed persistent divisions among Members on the prospect of African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) transition and imposition of targeted sanctions. Members spoke to the need to address problems created by the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in southern Sudan. The UK raised the possibility of a Council visit to Sudan, which was well-received. After protracted debate between USUN and the French delegation over how to characterize AMIS transition in the draft text, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1663 on March 27; text in Paragraph 13. OP6 of the resolution provides for the SYG to reach out to 'international and regional organizations,' something which the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has indicated Annan is 'bullish' to do. However, the other P-5 delegations, in spite of their rhetoric that something must be done on Darfur, are still on the whole unwilling to act expeditiously, and the process of AMIS transition, at least in New York, is forced to follow suit. END SUMMARY. PRONK STRESSES DARFUR PEACE AND PROTECTION THROUGH ABUJA AGREEMENT, NEW CEASEFIRE AND ROBUST FORCE ¶2. (SBU) SRSG Pronk's March 21 presentation to the UN Security Council (ref A) focused on Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation and the Darfur situation. Pronk stressed the need for 'enlightened leadership,' as demonstrated by President El Bashir in his speech in Juba, to further CPA progress and to ensure that southern Sudan would get its share of the peace dividend. Pronk lamented continued problems in Abyei, including violent clashes between rival factions and Government of National Unity's (GNU) obstruction of UNMIS' freedom of movement. Pronk remained concerned about Eastern Sudan stability. He acknowledged that the LRA posed a regional threat but that UNMIS, with its Chapter VI mandate, lacked the troops and weapons to appropriately address this threat. Pronk cited lack of trust between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the GNU as the main obstacle to their cooperation with the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in tackling the LRA. Pronk also made a bid for an augmented role for UNMIS in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) to address insecurity in the South; DPKO offered a paragraph (OP9),tweaked considerably by the Japanese Mission, for incorporation in UNSCR 1663 (2006). ¶3. (SBU) Pronk identified two goals with regard to Darfur: peace between factions and protection of unarmed civilians. Reaching these goals, according to Pronk, would require swift agreement in Abuja, followed by Darfur-Darfur dialogue; a comprehensive ceasefire agreement, buffeted by 'unequivocal' sanctions language; and a robust, large, strong, omnipresent peace force. Pronk made note of the 'carefully orchestrated' public information campaign unleashed by the GNU against a UN Darfur presence, noting in particular the notion that Darfur would become another Iraq (NOTE. DPKO cites this rhetoric as the main obstacle to its planned assessment mission, which is envisaged for April but which is off to a slow start - the UN has not yet requested visas from the GNU. END NOTE). Pronk stressed the need for consultations as soon as possible with the GNU to correct these misperceptions, adding that the international community's delay in doing so had resulted in Khartoum's resentment. Pronk declared that the 'UN was good USUN NEW Y 00000618 002.2 OF 005 for Sudan,' given its status as the chief world organization to facilitate decolonization and to guarantee national sovereignty. Pronk opposed the attaching of preconditions to AMIS transition, noting they could be used as stall tactics by those parties seeking to postpone the peace process. DIVISIONS REMAIN ON AMIS TRANSITION AND SANCTIONS ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Bolton raised concerns over the potential implications of decelerating the UN's contingency planning process for AMIS transition, citing the need for the Council to look beyond the qualifications contained in the AU PSC March 10 Communique and to focus on its decision instead. He stressed the need for GNU to accept DPKO's assessment team. Ambassador Bolton urged Council Members to support a broadening of the AU's March 10 decision in order to enhance the re-hatting effort. He addressed Pronk's concerns over possible UNMIS 'cannibalization' by explaining that incoming military elements should take advantage of logistic and administrative capabilities with a view to maximizing efficiency and expanding UNMIS' footprint in Sudan. ¶5. (SBU) China, Qatar and Russia continued to insist on preconditions for AMIS transition to a UN operation, with China going so far as to disregard the AU PSC March 10 decision and to requst that the AU make a formal decision on transition for eventual presentation to the Council. In addition to a formal AU decision, China considers GNU consent an equally 'irreplaceable precondition' for AMIS transition. Russian DPR Dolgov added that the SC must ensure the AU's April 30 deadline for a peace agreement in Abuja, noting that parties there had responded favorably to the idea of an enhanced ceasefire. Dolgov, like the Chinese delegate, noted the need for contingency planning but stressed the key importance of a peace agreement and of GNU voluntary consent and cooperation for any activities of UN peacekeepers. Qatari PR Al-Nasser was quick to jump on this bandwagon, saying a transition would be effective only with GNU 'consent and blessing.' He urged the international community to cooperate with the GNU toward a comprehensive peace in Sudan and to provide financial support to AMIS until any transition is completed. ¶6. (SBU) Other Members were more forward-leaning in their thinking on the transition. UK PR Jones Parry insisted on a concept of operations from DPKO by the end of March. Peruvian PR de Rivero noted that achieving peace in Abuja could take a prohibitively long time and added that protection of civilians could not be accordingly deferred, citing the possibility that the Council would encounter a 'pre-Dayton, ex-Yugoslavia syndrome.' De Rivero declared that regardless of the outcome in Abuja, 'nothing could replace the need to plan and deploy a UN force with a robust mandate.' He further stressed that the GNU, which could not protect its own population, should be convinced to desist in its resistance to a UN force in Darfur. ¶7. (SBU) Greek PR Vassilakis and Slovakian PR Burian urged expeditious AMIS transition planning, and Tanzanian PR Mahiga suggested formation of a subcommittee to enhance AMIS during the transition (NOTE. Mahiga also supported the idea of formation of a 'Group of Friends of Abuja,' with the UK at the helm. END NOTE). Danish PR Loj urged an assessment mission be dispatched as soon as possible and urged GNU cooperation to this end. The Congolese delegate observed that the slow pace of Abuja negotiations was prolonging Darfur suffering. While Congo acknowledged that GNU agreement was 'vital' to the success of an eventual UN Darfur mission, it pointed out that without active GNU participation USUN NEW Y 00000618 003.2 OF 005 in the transition, the international community would become increasingly 'mobilized' to act in the interest of protection of civilians. Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng reiterated his delegation's support for transition and hope for AU-UN cooperation, particularly in the form of an assessment mission. He recommended an aggressive public relations campaign against GNU propaganda. ¶8. (SBU) Responding to vocal calls from several Members (UK, Greece, Denmark, Ghana, Japan) on the need to follow up on UNSCR 1591 (2005) with limited targeted sanctions to maintain Council credibility and to induce Abuja parties to reach a settlement, Qatari PR inquired as to the relative use such measures could be in effecting Darfur peace. China reiterated its 'cautious' position on sanctions. SRSG Pronk spoke in favor of sanctions pursuant to 1591 but recommended that the Council designate individuals from the middle of the list of names, rather than those at either extreme, in order to demonstrate greater flexibility and realism. MEMBERS ON CPA IMPLEMENTATION, LRA AND SC VISIT ¶9. (SBU) Chinese, Russian and Qatari delegates jumped on the positive steps SRSG Pronk highlighted on progress in CPA implementation, and the Tanzanian PR seconded Pronk's characterization of President El Bashir's trip to Juba and Rumbek as an example of 'enlightened leadership.' The Japanese and Slovakian representatives stressed the need to establish remaining CPA institutions as stipulated, especially security mechanisms, and the Ghanaian PR remarked that delay on creation of security institutions was producing an attitude of mistrust between the National Congree Party and SPLM. UK PR Jones Parry wanted to see more movement on implementing boundary decisions. The Chinese rep said it was a 'crucial moment' for the implementation of DDR and refugee return. Both the Chinese and the Danish delegates urged donors to live up to their Oslo pledges to create a peace dividend in south, as the Government of Japan had done, dispersing $80 million (80 percent of its Oslo pledge). ¶10. (SBU) The UK and Tanzanian PRs led the charge for the UN to follow up on UNSCR 1653 (2006) and present the Council with a briefing on how MONUC and UNMIS could cooperate to combat the LRA problem in southern Sudan; a briefing was subsequently scheduled for March 29. Danish PR Loj asked about GNU willingness to address long-run possibilities on the LRA issue, including cooperating with the ICC; Pronk confirmed GNU willingness in this regard. ¶11. (SBU) UK PR Jones Parry raised the possibility of a Council visit to Sudan, a proposal subsequently endorsed by the majority of Members. Pronk said any Council trip to Darfur would have to be done soon in order to be effective. Such a visit, according to Pronk, could be used to allay GNU fears that transition would result in infringement on Sudanese sovereignty and to correct misperceptions, including the idea that a UN deployment would be a repeat of the invasion of Iraq and that the UN was 'paving the way' for a NATO deployment. To this end Pronk also urged increased bilateral consultations with the GNU. UNSCR 1663 (2006) ¶12. (SBU) After much negotiation on the draft text (ref B), the Council adopted a resolution to renew UNMIS' mandate and to provide for the SYG to reach out to 'international and regional organizations' for assistance to AMIS during transition to a UN operation. The French remain indignant USUN NEW Y 00000618 004.2 OF 005 that the transition not be portrayed as a done deal in any Council text, largely to protect their own interests in Cote D'Ivoire and the DRC and to avoid a financial burden in Sudan. The Russians and Chinese continue to insist that a final signal from the AU is necessary before transition can be formally mandated and maintain their stance the GNU must offer its consent and approval in this regard. The other P-5 delegations, in spite of their rhetoric that something must be done in Darfur, are still on the whole unwilling to act expeditiously, and the process of AMIS transition, at least in New York, is forced to follow suit. ¶13. (U) Begin 1663 text: The Security Council, Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 1627 (2005) and 1653 (2006),and statements of its President, in particular that of 3 February 2006 (S/PRST/2006/5), concerning the situation in the Sudan, Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, Welcoming implementation by the parties of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, and urging them to meet their commitments, Acknowledging the commitments by troop-contributing countries in support of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS),and encouraging deployment in order for UNMIS to support timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an end to the violence and atrocities, Stressing the importance of urgently reaching a successful conclusion of the Abuja Talks and calling on the parties to conclude a peace agreement as soon as possible, Welcoming the Communique of the 46th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 10 March 2006, and its decision to support in principle the transition of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations operation within the framework of partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, to pursue the conclusion of a peace agreement on Darfur by the end of April 2006, and to extend the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 2006, Expressing its deep concern at the movement of arms and armed groups across borders such as the long running and brutal insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which has caused the death, abduction and displacement of many innocent civilians in the Sudan, Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Decides to extend the mandate of UNMIS until 24 September 2006, with the intention to renew it for further periods; Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIS; Reiterates its request in paragraph 2 of resolution 1590 (2005) that UNMIS closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels with AMIS, and urges it to intensify USUN NEW Y 00000618 005.2 OF 005 its efforts in this regard; Requests that the Secretary-General, jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultations with the Security Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, including the Government of National Unity, expedite the necessary preparatory planning for transition of AMIS to a United Nations operation, including options for how UNMIS can reinforce the effort for peace in Darfur through additional appropriate transitional assistance to AMIS, including assistance in logistics, mobility and communications, and that the Secretary-General present to the Council by 24 April 2006 for its consideration a range of options for a United Nations operation in Darfur; Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to provide maximum possible assistance to AMIS; Requests the Secretary-General and the African Union to consult with international and regional organizations and member states to identify resources to support AMIS during transition to a United Nations operation; Strongly condemns the activities of militias and armed groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),which continue to attach civilians and commit human rights abuses in the Sudan; and urges in this regard UNMIS to make full use of its current mandate and capabilities; Recalls resolution 1653 (2006) and its request that the Secretary-General make recommendations to the Council; and SIPDIS looks forward to receiving by 24 April 2006 these recommendations which would include proposals on how United Nations agencies and missions, in particular UNMIS, could more effectively address the problem of the LRA; Encourages the Sudanese parties to finalize the establishment of national institutions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR),as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and to expedite the development of a comprehensive DDR programme, with the assistance of UNMIS as provided in resolution 1590 (2005); Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. ¶14. (U) End 1663 text. BOLTON