UN/IRAQ:HIGH-LEVEL U.S.-UN DIALOGUE ON IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000576 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2014 TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV IZ SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ:HIGH-LEVEL U.S.-UN DIALOGUE ON IRAQ REF: A) STATE 41409B) USUN 2219 (2005) USUN NEW Y 00000576 001.3 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Alex Wolff, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Begin Summary. In a useful and detailed March 16 meeting, the U.S. and UN, led by S/I Ambassador Jeffrey and DPA U/SYG Gambari respectively, exchanged views on Iraq. The U.S. expressed appreciation for the work of the UN, especially SRSG Qazi, and urged an increased UN role, especially in humanitarian and development work. Ambassador Jeffrey also suggested a role for the UN in political facilitation, but noted that it would require significant U.S.-UN coordination. He envisioned a UN role in supporting the Iraqi constitutional review process, but confirmed that the Iraqis have to decide whether and how they want to move forward on this. Gambari and Qazi identified government formation and respect for human rights as on-going challenges for Iraq and said the UN has a comparative advantage and can play a valuable role in helping Iraq to meet these challenges. They said the UN looks forward to a greater role in humanitarian and development activities, but cautioned that without dedicated air assets, UNAMI will be hard-pressed to deploy staff to Basra and Erbil. They also urged the U.S. to bear in mind the regional context and to consider how regional actors could be brought into the process and proposed a Baghdad-based contact group. Jeffrey said the U.S. would continue to support regional initiatives that enjoy Iraqi support. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The meeting was standing room only, with close to forty participants. As with the last U.S.-UN high level dialogue in September 2005, U/SYG Gambari ran a model meeting that stuck to the previously agreed upon agenda and moved through all of the issues thoroughly and efficiently (ref B). The UN side included U/SYG for Department of Political Affairs (DPA),Ibrahim Gambari; SRSG for Iraq, Ashraf Qazi; U/SYG for the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) David Veness; U/SYG for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland; and the Director of the New York Office for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Bacre Ndiaye and include representatives from DPA's Asia and Pacific Division (APD) and Electoral Assistance Division (EAD),the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). S/I Ambassador James Jeffrey led the U.S. delegation, which included USUN Ambassador Jackie Sanders, IO PDAS Philo Dibble, Deputy S/I Robert Deutsch, Joint Staff J-5 BG Michael Jones, NSC BG Kevin Bergner, CENTCOM LtCol Goedecke, Joint Staff J-5 CDR Paul Lyons, DOD/OSD Iraq deskoff Shaun Steene, and State Iraq deskoff Aaron Jost. UK DPR Adam Thomson also attended. Post- Election Situation in Iraq -------------- ¶3. (C) Political Situation: Ambassador Jeffrey expressed appreciation for the UN contribution in Iraq and underscored the valuable work of SRSG Qazi. He provided our perspective on recent developments in Iraq. SRSG Qazi agreed that consensus on the Ministerial and Policy Council processes would be useful and might ease selection of the Prime Minister and expedite government formation, which could be a watershed political development. Role for UN -------------- ¶4. (C) Political Facilitation: Queried by Gambari about U.S. views of a UN role in political facilitation, Jeffrey said that SRSG has already been doing this work with great success. This difficult and important issue requires maximum U.S.-UN cooperation. There may be minor disagreements between the U.S. and the UN, but that should not mean less cooperation. There is work the U.S. is uniquely qualified to do, because of our security presence. But, there is work the UN is uniquely qualified to do, including manage the critical contacts with Ayatollah Sistani and help steer Harith al-Dari and Moqtada al Sadr in a positive direction. Sunni outreach remains an important issue; there is deep suspicion within the Sunni community of the political process. Qazi agreed USUN NEW Y 00000576 002 OF 004 the UN has some comparative advantage to bring to this process. ¶5. (C) Constitutional Review: Jeffrey said there are technical, legal problems to correct, but also substantive issues (natural resources management, federalism, debaathification) to be reviewed. But he cautioned the Iraqis must decide on the review modality before the UN and others can assist them. Gambari said the UN understands that there are suggestions of a deferral of the constitutional review, because it could be divisive. He said we should focus on unifying issues, but there are important constitutional issues to be addressed and the risk that the Sunnis will feel tricked into supporting the constitutional referendum. He said the UN has a capacity to support the constitutional review and queried U.S. thinking. ¶6. (C) Jeffrey acknowledged that there is a constitutional requirement for this review, and the substantive issues must be addressed, although most relate to future demands. We want to keep options open and to follow guidance from the Iraqi leaders on how the constitutional review/implementation process will contribute to national unity. The review can be deferred. ¶7. (C) Regional Engagement: Qazi suggested a regional contact group to discuss Iraq and UN-hosted conferences of this group in Baghdad. He noted that of the neighbors only Iran and Turkey have Embassies in Baghdad, which would need to be addressed. He said that this mechanism would fill a gap, and he would pursue the idea at the upcoming Arab League conference in Khartoum. Jeffrey agreed that regional engagement would be important, but said the Iraqis must be comfortable with any specific step, and that it would need to be in Baghdad at an appropriate local level and Iraqi led. Gambari noted that the mechanism should encourage the appointment of additional Ambassadors to Baghdad. Thomson urged SYG Annan to use his moral authority to press for an Arab League delegation in Baghdad. Jeffrey also identified the IRFFI as a key component of international engagement, and welcomed the work the UNDP and World Bank are doing with IRRFI on a possible preparatory meeting in Erbil before the potential donors' conf erence. He stressed the need to coordinate with the new Iraqi government. ¶8. (C) Elections: Qazi anticipated a busy 2006 and a role for the UN in standing up the new Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI),revising the electoral law, and supporting local elections. Ambassador Jeffrey praised the UN electoral role in 2005, noting the technical support for the IECI and the outreach to Sunnis. Gambari said a core UN electoral assistance ream would remain in Baghdad. He confirmed that there will not be an international member of the new IECI; there will only be a chief technical advisor. UK DPR Thomson pointed to local elections as one of the critical reasons the UN needs to establish and properly staff regional hubs. ¶9. (C) UNSC Review of MNF and UNAMI Mandates: Gambari noted that the UNAMI mandate expires in August, and the MNF mandate will be reviewed in June. Jeffrey said we appreciate UNAMI accomplishments, as underscored by SRSG Qazi's upcoming meetings with Washington Principals, and continue to believe UNAMI's broad, flexible mandate is appropriate. He said we envision a greater role for UNAMI and stronger UN-U.S. cooperation, but we do not expect the U.S./Coalition role to decline. UK DPR Thomson agreed on a broad mandate for UNAMI and on the continued presence of the MNF. Human Rights -------------- ¶10. (C) Gambari reiterated the concerns about the human rights situation contained in the SYG's latest report (S/1006/137) and queried U.S. advice on how the UN could best assist the Iraqi authorities with detention facilities and a human rights strategy. OHCHR Bacre Ndiaye urged the swift appointment of a human rights minister and the implementation of a national human rights strategy. He expressed concerns USUN NEW Y 00000576 003 OF 004 about reports of torture and the disrespect for legal guarantees during torture and about the security and rights of the defense in the Saddam trial. ¶11. (C) Jeffrey concurred with the UN analysis of human rights in Iraq, except for the criticisms of the MNF, and said the U.S. has a draft strategy for promoting human rights in Iraq that will be published next week. He said the environment is difficult for the promotion of human rights, but the Iraqi leaders must hear the political message that human rights matter. He said there are few problems with the correctional system or the army, but significant problems with the police. That suggests that the issue is political and requires a political solution. ¶12. (C) SRSG Qazi said the UN has concerns about the implementation of the doctrine of preventive detention, but acknowledged that these concerns are part of the U.S.-UN dialogue in Baghdad. He sought U.S. assistance in persuading the Iraqis to allow the UN to participate in the investigation of detention facilities. Humanitarian and Reconstruction Issues -------------- ¶13. (C) Gambari noted that the UN has focused on the political, constitutional and electoral aspects of its mandate, but would like to increase its humanitarian, development and reconstruction activities. U/SYG Egeland said Iraq has not experienced the humanitarian disaster that was anticipated, but the threat to civilians has been worse than expected, and protection of vulnerables must be at the top of the UN agenda. He said reconstruction has been difficult in the climate of insecurity, which explains the rate of disbursement of donor funds, and expressed concern that if donor money went unspent it would be lost. He also identified avian flu as a big potential risk in Iraq. ¶14. (C) Jeffrey urged more assistance from the UN agencies, while noting the lesson of U.S. reconstruction experience is that the Iraqis must do the work. He praised D/SRSG for humanitarian and reconstruction affairs Steffan di Mestura and said we want permanent UNDP and World Bank staff in Baghdad. He added that the IAMB has a mandate to assist better monitoring and transparency of Iraqi oil earnings and we would like more of that. It would ensure greater transparency and assure the Iraqi people and international donors that the money is going to the right place. Deputy S/I Deutsch reviewed the U.S. reconstruction efforts and emphasis on capacity building programs. ¶15. (C) Egeland pressed for future the U.S.-UN dialogue to include humanitarian actors and issues. He said there are concerns raised when the military does humanitarian work; that blurs the line between military and humanitarian actors, which some believe puts the latter at greater risk. He said the Afghanistan PRT experience had exposed these concerns. Jeffrey said terrorists create the risk for humanitarian workers, not the military doing humanitarian work, but suggested that Qazi raise specific concerns in Baghdad. BG Jones said U.S. forces are not looking for work, but will undertake humanitarian missions as needed, where others cannot, because they do not have the capacity or access. Gamabari and Egeland agreed that dialogue on this issue would be useful. Security and Operational Requirements -------------- ¶16. (C). U/SYG Veness expressed sincere appreciation for the enhanced U.S.-UN cooperation on security issues, which he had said had been obvious to him on his recent trip to Baghdad. He concurred with the threat perception described by BG Jones and said given the inevitable timeline of transition to the ISF, the UN aims for "self-sufficiency" by 2007. He said between now and then, the UN would increase its self-reliance for security and cooperation with the ISF. In order to meet this goal, the UN must maintain cross-border operations, be more disciplined, and begin a similar dialogue with the Iraqis. However, he said for the foreseeable future, the UN USUN NEW Y 00000576 004 OF 004 would need to continue to rely on the MNF for 1) warning and information gathering support; 2) medical support, especially for mass casualties; 3) evacuation; and 4) quick reaction force (QRF). ¶17. (C) Jones offered assurances that the transition to the ISF would be conditions based, MNF personnel would remain embedded with the ISF units, and we would maintain a dialogue to prevent surprises. ¶18. (C) Responding to the UK plea for a significant UN presence outside Baghdad, Qazi said he hopes to deploy staff to Erbil shortly, but this move has been on hold because the UN has inadequate air assets. Gambari said air assets is a "sore point," and said without them, the UN cannot put people in Basra and Erbil. Jeffrey assured him that we have undertaken good faith efforts to persuade others to provide the air assets and provided on a non-paper on countries the UN should target with the request. Follow Up -------------- ¶19. (C) Gambari requested future U.S.-UN dialogue on Iraq be held quarterly and suggested a subsequent meeting in Washington. He also suggested consideration of how the Iraqis could be part of the dialogue. Jeffrey welcomed the latter suggestion and agreed to get back to him on how to proceed with the dialogue. But noted that we might not want to include the Iraqis in some discussions; e.g., about Kirkuk. ¶20. (U) S/I Ambassador Jeffrey cleared on this cable. BOLTON