BRAMMERTZ SAYS HARIRI INVESTIGATION WILL TAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000549

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR L/UNA: TODD BUCHWALD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KCRM UNSC LE SY
SUBJECT: BRAMMERTZ SAYS HARIRI INVESTIGATION WILL TAKE
ANOTHER YEAR

REF: A. STATE 041410

B. BEIRUT 712

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: Ambassadors Bolton and Sanders met
March 15 with Serge Brammertz, Commissioner of the
International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC).
Brammertz issued his first UNIIIC interim report on March 14,
met with other P-5 ambassadors March 15, and briefed the
Security Council March 16 (septel). Brammertz described
severe staffing shortages as the UNIIIC's main challenge and
said the UNIIIC would not be ready for another year to
present usable findings.


2. (C) In response to U.S. questions, Brammertz also
provided his views on Syrian cooperation, the sanctions
mechanism provided by Resolution 1636 (2005),a possible
tribunal, the Lebanese government's investigations into the
attacks that occurred after Hariri's assassination, and
Lebanon's institutional capacity. Brammertz stressed the
need to see what actions Syria takes and said if Syria does
not cooperate, he would seek Security Council action before
June 2006. He also said it is premature for the UNIIIC to
designate suspects for the Committee established pursuant to
Resolution 1636 (2005) to sanction. Concerning a possible
tribunal to try the suspects responsible for the Hariri
assassination and its relationship to the UNIIIC, Brammertz
expressed a preference for the UNIIIC to continue its
investigation, taking into account the possibility of a
future tribunal, and then provide its work to the tribunal
once it is fully established. Brammertz also voiced concerns
about the Lebanese government's capacity to investigate the
attacks that occurred after Hariri's assassination and
stressed the need for international assistance to strengthen
Lebanon's institutions. END SUMMARY.

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Cooperation from Syria
--------------


3. (C) Acknowledging the UNIIIC's past problems with Syria,
Brammertz described his contacts with and expectations for
the Syrian government, acknowledging that Syria's actions
will demonstrate whether it is willing to cooperate. He said
he made clear to the Syrians that the UN Security Council's
resolutions provide the legal framework for the UNIIIC's
investigation, that the UNIIIC wants "transparent access" to
potential witnesses (including the ability to interview all
members of the Syrian government),and that the UNIIIC needs
to conduct meetings where and when it requests them.
Brammertz said the Syrians provided "positive signals" that
they accept these conditions, but the next few weeks would
show if Syria's agreement remained only "theoretical." If
Syria does not answer the detailed questions the UNIIIC has
posed, for example, Brammertz said he would not wait until
June 2006 to seek action from the Security Council.


4. (C) In response to a U.S. question, Brammertz said it is
difficult to determine if the Syrians have changed their
position substantively. He thought that by keeping a low
media profile and adopting a "respectful" approach, the
UNIIIC had made the Syrians "less nervous." The Syrians
appeared happy to find a way out of a "difficult situation,"
he said. Ambassador Bolton observed that the Syrians appear
to feel they are under less international pressure, while the
Lebanese are expressing an increased level of concern, even
though the reasons for these perceptions remains unclear.

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UNIIIC's Human Resources Challenges
--------------


5. (C) Brammertz then described his current work,
characterizing the lack of human resources as the UNIIIC's
main challenge. Investigations remain the focus, but the
UNIIIC is now providing legal guidance to ensure that the
investigators collect all evidence appropriately and
lawfully. The UNIIIC now has in-house experts and
technicians who are working to prepare evidence for a trial,
but Lebanon's volatile environment presents particular
technical difficulties for these experts. For example, he
said, the UNIIIC's experts have to "rebuild evidence from a
technical perspective." Even though there are now 14
investigators, 20 posts remain vacant, making the
investigation more challenging. Brammertz said he has sought
help from Interpol, the UN's other ad hoc tribunals (e.g. the
ICTY),and the Secretariat, but the difficulty of contacting
directly law enforcement agencies that could contribute


personnel complicates his efforts to hire new staff. After
Ambassador Bolton offered to follow up with Interpol
Secretary General Ron Noble, Brammertz said Noble is

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personally "very supportive" but cannot compel states to
contribute personnel.


6. (C) Uncertainty about whether the UNIIIC's mandate will
be renewed also makes it difficult to address these human
resource needs, he argued. In response, Ambassador Bolton
said the United States would push the Council to extend the
UNIIIC's mandate early to help insulate the UNIIIC's
operations from the vagaries of the mandate cycle. To help
prepare for such an early renewal, Ambassador Bolton asked
Brammertz to provide the Security Council with information
about projected resources needs by mid-April.

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Disinterest in 1636 Sanctions
--------------


7. (C) In response to Ambassador Bolton's question,
Brammertz said he thinks the way the sanctions mechanism
established by resolution 1636 (2005) is used depends on the
nature of any possible tribunal. If the tribunal has an
international character, he doubted whether it would be
appropriate for the 1636 Committee to designate names of
individual suspects for sanctions before the tribunal is
established. He thought it would be better for the UNIIIC to
wait before providing the 1636 Committee with a list of names
of suspects, suggesting that acting now might not assist the
investigation. He also said he is not yet in a position to
communicate a list of suspects to the 1636 Committee.
Ambassador Bolton commented that if resolution 1636 was
rewritten today, its sanctions mechanism might be oriented
more effectively to focus on persons who are obstructing the
UNIIIC's investigation as opposed to actual suspects.


8. (C) (Comment: The 1636 Committee adopted guidelines on
March 8 and is ready to assist the investigation by imposing
a travel ban and financial restrictions on any individual
suspected of involvement in Hariri's assassination,
regardless of the character of any eventual tribunal.
However, either UNIIIC or the Government of Lebanon must
first forward names of suspects to the Committee for action.
Former UNIIIC chief Detlev Mehlis also declined to exercise
this option. USUN has worked closely with the UK, France,
and Japan (Committee Chair) to remove potential obstacles and
excuses, which could otherwise be used by delegations,
especially China and Russia, to block action in the
Committee. With the adoption of guidelines, the most
significant pretext for inaction has been removed. End
Comment.)

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Orienting the UNIIIC toward a Possible Tribunal
-------------- --


9. (C) Ambassador Bolton also sought Brammertz's views on
the preliminary proposals for a tribunal to prosecute the
suspects in the Hariri assassination and the relationship
between the UNIIIC and that tribunal. Brammertz expressed
support for the establishment of an international tribunal
and said he had spoken with the Lebanese Ministry of Justice.
He voiced some doubt about proposals to establish a tribunal
by June 2006, before the UNIIIC completes its work and "we
know if we have a case to refer to a court." It will be one
more year before the UNIIIC has "a product (a court) can
use," he cautioned. Ambassador Bolton responded that
establishing a tribunal while the investigation remains
underway would show seriousness of purpose and signal
international confidence in the UNIIIC's investigation.
Clarifying that the UNIIIC's work would provide the basis for
the prosecution could also persuade potentially recalcitrant
witnesses to provide assistance. In response, Brammertz
expressed a preference for the UNIIIC to continue its
investigation, taking into account the possibility of a
future tribunal. He said it would be more "logical" for the
UNIIIC to continue its investigation and hand over its work
to a full tribunal than to have a tribunal established in
phases (beginning with the appointment of a prosecutor and
then to a later stage in which judges are appointed).


10. (C) Brammertz emphasized that any special tribunal
should try only the suspects responsible for the Hariri
assassination -- not the suspects in the 14 other attacks
since Hariri's assassination. He said staffing limitations
constrain his ability to assist the Lebanese government's
investigations of the 14 other cases, which he characterized
as "extremely weak" and chaotic. Lebanon's chief problem is


its limited forensics capabilities, which are a century out
of date and do not meet international standards, he said.
For example, multiple teams handled each crime scenes and
evidence from different crimes has been stored together, he
said. He then stressed the need for international assistance
for these 14 investigations, such as the assistance the Dutch
are providing in the investigation of Gebran Tueni's
assassination.


11. (C) More broadly, Brammertz said the international
community must take a comprehensive approach to strengthening
Lebanon's capacity to respond to future assassinations or
terrorist attacks. The enemies of Lebanon will wait to
strike until the UNIIIC has concluded its work and the
international community's attention has shifted, Brammertz
said, so providing assistance now is important to avoid the
need to establish another international investigation or
tribunal in the future.



BOLTON