MARCH 15 P5 MEETING ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000528 SIPDIS SIPDIS PASS TO UNVIE BERLIN PARIS LONDON BEIJING AND MOSCOW E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016 TAGS: AA AORC EU IR KNNP IAEA SUBJECT: MARCH 15 P5 MEETING ON IRAN REF: USUN 0456 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The P-5 met at 8AM Wednesday, March 15 at the U.S. Mission to continue consultations on Iran. The Russians and Chinese continued to stonewall any progress on the British-French draft UNSC Presidential Statement, with no change in their positions since the March 14 P-5 and informal consultations. The UK and France may issue a revised text based on inputs from non-permanent members, but have no plans to include Russian changes. Another informal informal meeting of the full Council is scheduled for 4:30PM Thursday, March 16 at the French Mission, with a P-5 meeting following. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The P-5 met March 15 to continue discussion of the PRST draft text. Russian Amb. Denisov said that talks in Moscow with Iran had been &fruitless.8 Referring to France and UK,s proposed amendment to the final bullet, he said he had no new instructions. He speculated that he could possibly &do something8 with the idea of the IAEA DG reporting to both the IAEA and the Security Council simultaneously, but then backtracked to say that he preferred to stick close to the Russian text. He restated opposition to including &technical details8 in bullet five, arguing that these are already included in Board resolutions. Restating them in a Council statement could damage continuing negotiations with Iran. ¶3. (C) Chinese Amb. Wang said there was a high level official (unspecified) from Tehran in Beijing yesterday meeting with the Foreign Minister, and China,s message was that Iran must suspend nuclear activities, consider the Russian proposal positively and take quick action. Wang said the Iranians appear to be eager to send high-level people to capitals, and seem to want &a way out.8 Wang said he had no new instructions. Action should not send the wrong message but should reinforce the IAEA. While an urgent matter, he believes time must be left for diplomacy. ¶4. (C) Amb. Bolton said the UK-French revised final bullet was acceptable to the U.S. Regarding timing, we prefer 14 days, although this depends in part on how quickly we can get this text resolved. We should try to reach agreement in tomorrow,s informal informals, with the goal of issuing the PRST Friday. Failure to act will lead Tehran to believe that the Council is paralyzed, which would not be helpful to the P5 or the UNSC. ¶5. (C) French Amb. de la Sabliere said he had thought we were getting closer yesterday, but if that is not the case, &we will have to take the text as is.8 British Amb. Jones-Parry described that last bullet as &where the action is.8 He said he thought there was &general support8 from nine or ten non-permanent members to see the Council take action sooner rather than later. Wang disagreed, describing the E-10 reaction as &varied,8 as most are awaiting instructions from capitals. Jones-Parry, looking at Denisov and Wang, said &stonewalling is not helpful.8 We have offered that the DG report can go to BOG and UNSC simultaneously, but we do not accept that the UNSC should defer to the BOG. ¶6. (C) Amb. Bolton asked Denisov what was the deal-breaker for Russia. Was it El Baradei reporting directly to the SC? Denisov responded that we should leave the case with the BOG and the IAEA, and let them play the leading role in dealing with this matter. It is not the Council that makes decisions like monitoring, but the IAEA. Any report should go to the Board first, he said, then added that he could not say for sure without instructions, but perhaps simultaneous reports to the SC and Board might be possible. ¶7. (C) Amb. Bolton said the IAEA BOG has certain competencies, and the UNSC has certain competencies. There is an overlap of these competencies in the matter of Iran. Our objective should be a text that has the two working together, each to operate on its own where no overlap, and together where there is. The BOG cannot deal with matters of international peace and security. A report to both leaves both to their own competencies. There is no desire for the UNSC to take on IAEA responsibilities, but neither can we cede our responsibilities to the BOG. If that cannot be agreed, Bolton said it would be hard to see what the UNSC role is. De la Salbiere added that we need the SC to put pressure on Iran. Surely the SC can act without the Board. Referring back to the EU2 text, he said &we cannot go farther than the formula reporting to both the SC and the BOG.8 ¶8. (C) Wang then repeated the &IAEA is the watchdog8 argument, and where the Iran issue belongs. FMs agreed in London that after the March BOG , the SC, as a &special case,8 should reinforce the IAEA using its political will. We should send the message that the IAEA is doing the work and &we support you.8 If the DG needs more SC support, he can request it, but we should leave the time frame open to BOG and DG. ¶9. (C) Bolton and Jones-Parry both took issue with Wang,s inference that SC jurisdiction in this matter is weak relating to threats to international peace and security. Bolton said weapons development in Iran goes beyond the normal purview of the IAEA. Jones-Parry said there is a high degree of probability that Iran is working toward a nuclear weapons capability. The evidence leads to no other explanation. ¶10. (C) Wang said there is no material evidence to substantiate these claims, only suspicion of scope and nature. The IAEA should finish its work. We need Iran,s cooperation, to which Amb. Bolton asked, &How much cooperation have we gotten? How much has Iran cooperated with Russia and the EU during negotiations?8 The SC has not only responsibility for breaches but also threats to international peace and security. That is what we have here, he said. ¶11. (C) Jones-Parry said there are already nine references to the Director General, Agency or Board in the EU2 draft. The main message to Iran should be 1) comply; and 2) we support the Board. But we cannot make the SC or the P-5 dependent upon El Baradei. We have a right and responsibility to protect our prerogatives when there is a threat to international peace and security. ¶12. (C) Denisov said the core problem is our lack of strategy, and the overlapping competencies and division of responsibility between the political UNSC and the watchdog Agency. He expressed continuing concern about what happens after &day 14 passes.8 We do not want Iran to shut the door, he said. We want our Political Directors to discuss long-term strategy before we act in the Security Council. ¶13. (C) In response, de la Sabliere said &we want a PRST before our PDs meet.8 While we want to work to get P-5 agreement, there are limits on what we can agree. If agreement is not possible, it would be a mistake for SC council not to act. We are not going to change the text now. We will listen to the other Council members and go from there. ¶14. (C) Note: The P-5 will meet again after the March 16 informal informal meeting of the full Council, scheduled for 4:30PM Thursday. End Note. BOLTON