UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000476 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016 TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: P3/P5 MEETINGS Classified By: Ambassador John Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d). P3 Meeting -------------- ¶1. (C) Role for the Germans: P3 Ambassadors met early in the afternoon of March 8 in advance of the P5 meeting later in the day. French PR de la Sabliere urged German participation in the next meeting. Ambassador Bolton said regardless of how the meeting was described -- P5-plus-1 or E3-plus-3 -- it would set a negative precedent if there was German participation in a discussion of Iran by the permanent members of the Security Council. Jones Parry said the UK could accept the 3-plus-3 formula. De la Sabliere agreed to the P5 formula for the meeting as planned, but anticipated real problems with the Germans. Both Jones Parry and de la Sabliere, however, winked as they made their points. ¶2. (C) Discussion of E-3 Text: -- To meet Washington's concerns that the E3 draft PRST did not include a specific time window for Iranian compliance with the demands of the IAEA and UNSC, Ambassador Bolton proposed inclusion of "immediately" in bullet 7, line 1. UK/FR thought that would be acceptable. They did not want to refer to a specific timeframe; i.e., fourteen days, which they thought would sound like an ultimatum and would recall the Iraq UNSCR's. They also asserted that the fourteen-day reporting requirement - the last bullet point of the elements accomplished the same objective. -- UK/FR thought it would be acceptable to add "formal requirements of the" prior to "safeguards agreement" in bullet 7, line 11. -- Ambassador Bolton proposed to add to bullet 8, line 2, after the word "confidence" the following: " and that continued enrichment activity would add to the importance and urgency of further action by the Council." UK/FR suggested instead an additional bullet to be injected right before the last bullet of the draft that would read: "Underlines that continued enrichment-related activity would add to the importance and urgency of further action by the Council." Subsequently, de la Sabliere reported that the Germans had accepted the amendments. -- UK/FR thought it would be acceptable to add to bullet, line 3 "exclusively" between the words "for" and "peaceful purposes." They preferred "exclusively" to the U.S.-proposed "only," since it is used in the September 2005 IAEA BOG resolution. ¶3. (C) Next Steps: P3 Ambassadors agreed to share the elements with the China and Russia at the P5 meeting and to walk them through the text in the meeting, rather than simply send them the text without comment or explanation after the meeting, as UK and French experts had earlier suggested. P3 Ambassadors also agreed to have a P5 meeting later in the week to discuss reactions from Moscow and Beijing. They recognized that the text would not stay for long within the P5, and it would be useful to circulate it to the full Council sometime next week. Jones Parry proposed an informal informal meeting of the UNSC next week, which would happen off UNSC premises and said that would be an opportunity to share the text with the full UNSC. De la Sabliere emphasized that obtaining P5 agreement on the text before it is circulated would be useful; it would make bringing along the full Council much easier. P5 Meeting -------------- ¶4. (C) P5 Ambassadors met on the evening of March 8 in the Perm Five conference room at the UN. Russian PR Denisov tried to correct what he said was a misunderstanding in the media ascribed to Foreign Minister Lavrov during his visit to New York. Denisov said Lavrov had not meant to include Iran in a list of possible participants in proposed talks on Iran involving the UN, the EU and the U.S. Lavrov reportedly meant to suggest only that contact with the Iranians should be maintained. Denisov also reported that the SYG had agreed with Lavrov at their meeting earlier in the day that it was vital to retain the "IAEA track" in dealing with Iran. ¶5. (C) Denisov also reported that Russian Political Director Kislyak had informed him that Kislyak was in touch with EU colleagues and specifically his German counterpart and had discussed the idea of a meeting of EU political directors with P5 counterparts either in Vienna or New York. Denisov opined that IAEA DG El Baradei was reluctant to come to New York at present. He also suggested that Lavrov would be willing to send his Vienna Ambassador to New York for such talks. Denisov concluded that Kislyak and his German counterpart had agreed that the "way ahead" still needed to be discussed and that there was no clear strategy for dealing with Iran. Denisov added that Lavrov had told him that President Bush had agreed with him that we must carefully think through all our steps on Iran. ¶6. (C) Speaking on behalf of the EU3, UKUN Perm Rep Jones Parry then outlined the EU's approach, reviewing the agreement at the London P5 1 meeting. They had agreed to demand Iran completely suspend all enrichment activity but to give a one month period for further diplomatic activity before taking further action. Unfortunately Iran had moved in the opposite direction since then by proceeding apace with centrifuge development and ignoring the IAEA and its February 4 resolution. The issue was Iran's failure to comply with IAEA demands and, worse, compounding the problem and the threat of its nuclear program by its actions. Meanwhile Iran's unacceptable nuclear R and D continued; it was therefore high time for the Council to reinforce the IAEA's demands and exert maximum pressure for full, verified suspension of all enrichment activities and extend full cooperation to the IAEA. ¶7. (C) Jones Parry added that the Council response should be incremental and calibrated, open always to resume negotiations should Iran comply with demands on the table. Unity of the Council should be maintained, but not at any price in the face of this threat. The IAEA's demands had to be reinforced in a timely and sufficient fashion-- more talk simply allows Iran's enrichment program to proceed. All Council members should be deeply concerned that within 12 months, Iran will have the clear potential to develop weapons. Jones Perry then highlighted the major elements in the current EU draft- without acknowledging that they reflect several U.S. amendments. (Latest draft emailed to Department with this report). Jones Parry concluded that the Council must respond appropriately and urgently because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery was an absolutely clear threat to international peace and security. ¶8. (C) French PR de la Sabliere added that the text of a Council response must be crafted carefully to support the IAEA; there is a problem with time as the time given in London has run out and the Council must now act. It was the EU hope that a Council Presidential Statement could be adopted by next week. P5 consensus was very important-- there were no surprises in the text. He asked that the three other P5 seek reaction of their capitals without delay and agree to meet again on Friday March 10. De la Sabliere noted that the PRST text called on the IAEA DG to report to the Council within 14 days of its adoption. This was essential to put a stop to the illicit activity on the ground in Iran, which continued. ¶9. (C) UK and France then circulated the PRST elements. Chinese PR Wang said simply that they would need time to study the results from Vienna and this text and he was not ready to engage in particulars. He noted that there was no final agreement on strategy in the Council and that diplomatic efforts elsewhere were still underway. Ambassador Bolton intervened to express support for the EU's points without fully endorsing the PRST text. Bolton noted that for four years the U.S. had been deeply concerned about Iran's drive to master centrifuge technology and now Iran was apparently on the threshold of overcoming the last technical hurdles and the capability to produce fissile materials. If Iran masters these processes, it will forever be beyond the reach of the IAEA or any other verification regime. The time for action is now; we should proceed deliberately to prevent Iran from crossing the technological threshold to nuclear weapons capability. ¶10. (C) Bolton agreed that the first step of the Council must be to strengthen the IAEA's demands, but we are at a critical juncture that demanded action. Ambassador Bolton also briefly reviewed a possible amendment to the PRST text, which tactic had been suggested by the UK and France at the earlier P3 meeting, saying that Iran should be called on to engage in "active cooperation", and to stop denial and deception activities, as noted by the IAEA's report itself. The issue of trust and confidence should be met head on. Bolton supported the call for another P5 meeting to consider the draft PRST the next day or at the latest on Friday. ¶11. (C) Russian PR Denisov noted that his Minister was traveling for the next few days and he could not guarantee such a quick response from Moscow. UK PR Jones Parry replied that delaying P5 action would not be well received by other Council members who were well aware that the P5 had begun its discussions. Denisov agreed to meet "if only for further discussion" but pleaded for confidentiality of discussions, asking that only the Germans be made aware of P5 discussions. All ambassadors agreed that nothing specific should be given to the press as yet. Unprompted, PR Wang laid down a marker, saying that he hoped those sponsoring action would not resort to "intimidation" by making public comments suggesting that Council unity is important, but not at any price. The P-5 agreed to meet again on March 10th in the afternoon after consultation with capitals, and would decide further steps at that point. BOLTON