UN REFORM/PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION: FINANCIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000457 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2011 TAGS: PREL EAID KPKO KUNR UNSC UNGA SUBJECT: UN REFORM/PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION: FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AGREE, BUT PBC REMAINS STUCK ON MEMBERSHIP ISSUES REF: USUN 326 Classified By: Ambassador Alex Wolff, Deputy Permanent Representative, for reasons 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (U) Summary. The selection of the thirty-one members of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) Organizational Committee remains stalled over the regional breakdown of the ECOSOC seats (reftel). USUN, however, has managed to facilitate a rotational agreement among the top ten financial contributors regarding their representation on the PBC over the first two-terms, which allows for participation by each of the top contributors. The agreement will allow the financial contributors to name their representatives as soon as ECOSOC acts, in accordance with the process spelled out in the resolutions. ¶2. (C) The donors' discussions were not without controversy as Germany, in particular, demanded a longer-term rotational scheme to ensure that Japan would not become a de facto permanent member of the PBC (a proposal the Japanese termed "insulting"). In the end, the leading contributors were able to agree on a rotation for the first four years while agreeing that the German proposal would serve as "an indicative template" beyond that. As is common in New York, the agreed language masks an underlying unresolved difference of opinion. End Summary. Identifying the big donors -------------- ¶3. (U) The UNGA and UNSC resolutions to operationalize the PBC determined that five top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions to the UN system "selected by and among the ten top providers" shall be members of the PBC Organizational Committee. The UN Secretariat was asked to produce the list of top contributors, based on a rolling three-year average of contributions to all UN funds, programs and agencies. The list was immediately controversial. A/SYG Bob Orr, in presenting the first draft to member states, noted that there was no agreed upon UN system-wide financial reporting that allowed for the easy collection of data. Countries lower on the initial list (e.g., Italy) complained that important UN agencies had been omitted. EU countries complained that their share of contributions made to the UN system through Brussels were not reflected. ¶4. (U) The final list included a more complete accounting of UN contributions and was accepted as definitive for the purposes of this year's PBC selection process. It also illustrated the disparity in UN contributions. Over three years, the U.S. provided a total of nearly 11.5 billion dollars to the UN system; Japan nearly 5.5 billion dollars; and the UK nearly 3.5 billion. The Germans were next on the list at 2.4 billion dollars over three years. Netherlands, Italy, Norway, France, Sweden and Canada (at 1.6 billion) rounded out the top ten. Though not listed, we understand that Denmark is in the eleventh position, but with a substantial gap between its contributions and those of Canada. Arguing among friends -------------- ¶5. (U) Already on the PBC via the Security Council (along with the UK and France),USUN agreed to facilitate the decision among the ten donors on the process of selecting the five representatives. There was quick agreement within the group that the top five donors not already on the PBC would serve for the first two-year term. With five seats to divide among seven countries, there was also agreement that each of the top contributors should be given an opportunity to serve on the PBC within the first two terms (four years). The difficulty came in determining whether or not - and then how - to address rotation beyond those four years. ¶6. (C) Among the Europeans, particularly the Italians and Dutch, there was a desire to prevent Germany from setting itself apart from the rest of the Europeans. The Germans, in turn, would not agree to a rotation scheme that included them but not the Japanese (rumored to reflect German unhappiness with Japan's failure to remain with the G-4 on Security Council expansion). The Japanese, seeing their contribution as significantly higher than any of the other seven, took offense at the suggestion that they should agree now to come off the PBC in 2011. (Japanese DPR Ozawa told the assembled group of ten that Japan considered it an "insulting" proposal.) Canada and Norway were unhappy that the EU countries had quickly sought to establish a group negotiation position. ¶7. (U) Ambassador Wolff, over a period of weeks, emphasized the importance of avoiding a protracted negotiation among the leading donors that could cause a delay in the establishment of the PBC. He successfully secured agreement from the ten on the immediate issue of representation (the top five for 2006-2007, with Sweden and Canada to join the top three for 2008-2009). The contributors also agreed that the German-proposed longer-term rotation would serve as "an indicative template" for future years, but would be reviewed by the group prior to the third term. Reassuring the Japanese -------------- ¶8. (C) In practice, the vague language relating to the German scheme will have little effect four years from now, when the issue will be re-opened by the donors. We should expect another political negotiation, reflecting the rivalries of that time. The Japanese delegation in New York appears to understand this, but remains deeply upset that the Europeans "ganged up" on the one Asian country among the top contributors. Our Japanese contacts also report serious concern in Tokyo that the language of the agreement might be used to force them off the PBC in the future. We do not believe that to be the case. As long as Japan's contributions remain so significantly higher than all the others campaigning for a seat, we believe they should have the political capital here in New York to maintain their participation in the PBC for as long as they like. BOLTON