UNSC/IRAN: EU3 IRAN ELEMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000433

SIPDIS

"NOTE BY CIB: DO NOT/NOT PROCESS. GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE"

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: EU3 IRAN ELEMENTS

REF: USUN 132 (NODIS)

Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) In a brief P3 meeting mid-day March 7, Ambassadors
agreed to defer the P5 meeting planned for later in the day
until the afternoon of Wednesday, March 8 at 5:00, when we
would have a read-out of the Secretary's discussion with
Russian FM Lavrov and when the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG)
would likely have discussed Iran. The P3 will also meet
again at 3:00 in the afternoon of March 8 in advance of the
rescheduled P5 meeting. PermReps Jones Parry and de la
Sabliere shared a revised draft of EU-3 elements for UNSC
action, which is an update of the draft elements provided in
January (reftel). They said the draft has not yet been
finalized by capitals. USUN hopes to reach P3 agreement on
the text in order to distribute to Russia and China at the P5
meeting. Text below.


2. (C) Action request: USUN requests Washington reaction to
the draft elements in advance P3 meeting March 8.


3. (C) Begin text.

Draft elements for Security Council action on the Iranian
nuclear programme

Security Council action is necessary to reinforce the
authority of the IAEA and of IAEA Board Resolutions and to
bring Iran back to the conditions of dialogue by calling upon
it to restore the suspension of all
enrichment-related/reprocessing activities in accordance with
IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. It should also call on
Iran to halt construction of a heavy water reactor, promptly
implement and ratify the Additional Protocol, and provide
transparency measures requested by the IAEA. The exact
nature of Security Council action will take into
consideration IAEA Board of Governors decisions and language
should as far as possible be based on Board Resolutions. The
Council should request a report from the IAEA Director
General within a short time frame on implementation of the
measures it has requested. We would want the Council to
react rapidly, working closely to maintain a strong
international consensus, and sharing views with partners.

More specifically, elements upon which the E3 builds is
approach are as follows:

-- Recall that the IAEA Board of Governors requested the
Director General of the IAEA to report to the Security
Council the steps required of Iran by the Board and all IAEA
reports and resolutions, as adopted, related to this issue.

-- Note with concern findings contained therein that Iran has
failed to comply with its Safeguard's Agreement as well as
the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the
nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the
course of IAEA verification and the resulting absence of
confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes;

-- Express serious concern that, despite repeated IAEA Board
calls and despite Iran's commitments under the Paris
Agreement, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities in
August 2005 and enrichment activities in January 2006, ceased
in February 2006 to act in accordance with the Additional
Protocol, and has taken none of the steps deemed necessary by
the IAEA Board in its resolution of 4 February 2006;

-- Express serious concern that Iran received from a
procurement network a document on reduction of uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) to metal, and on the casting and machining
of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into
hemispherical forms, and stress that the receipt and
continued possession by Iran of the documents, which contains
information suitable only for military purposes, raises
concern with regard to article II of the NPT;

-- Express serious concern over (i) the possible
weaponisation implications of the receipt and presence in
Iran of that document, since, as reported by the Director
General of the IAEA, this process is related to the
fabrication of nuclear weapon components, (ii) experiments
relating to polonium 210, and (iii) the lack of clarification
about the role of the military in Iran's nuclear programme
reported by the Director General of the IAEA;

-- Share the IAEA Director General's view that Iran's full
transparency is indispensable and overdue, note that the IAEA
is not in a position to conclude there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran, and agree that an
extensive period of confidence building is required from Iran;

-- Call upon Iran without delay: to re-establish full,
sustained and verifiable suspension of all enrichment related
and reprocessing activities, including research and
development, to be verified by the IAEA, and specifically
(including) the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and
their components, the assembly, installation, testing or
operation of gas centrifuges, work to undertake any plutonium
separation or to construct or operate any plutonium
separation installation, and all tests or production at any
uranium conversion installation; to halt the construction of
a heavy water reactor; to act in accordance with, ratify
promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and
to implement transparency measures, as requested by the
Director General, which extend beyond the Safeguards
Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to
individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use
equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and
development as the IAEA nay request in support of its ongoing
investigations;

-- Underline that full and sustained suspension is essential
to address outstanding issues and build confidence;

-- Remind all States of their obligations under Security
Council Resolution 1540 (2004) to establish and enforce
effective measures, including export controls, to prevent
proliferation;

-- Reaffirm that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

-- Express the conviction that through full, verified
implementation of the measures the Security Council has
requested, a negotiated solution can be found that guarantees
Iran's nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes;

-- Request that the Director General of the IAEA report to
the Council within 14 days on the implementation by Iran of
the actions it has requested, and agreed to keep the issue
under review.

End text.
BOLTON