UNSC/IRAN: EU3 IRAN ELEMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000433 SIPDIS "NOTE BY CIB: DO NOT/NOT PROCESS. GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE" SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016 TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP EU IR SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: EU3 IRAN ELEMENTS REF: USUN 132 (NODIS) Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Sanders for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) In a brief P3 meeting mid-day March 7, Ambassadors agreed to defer the P5 meeting planned for later in the day until the afternoon of Wednesday, March 8 at 5:00, when we would have a read-out of the Secretary's discussion with Russian FM Lavrov and when the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) would likely have discussed Iran. The P3 will also meet again at 3:00 in the afternoon of March 8 in advance of the rescheduled P5 meeting. PermReps Jones Parry and de la Sabliere shared a revised draft of EU-3 elements for UNSC action, which is an update of the draft elements provided in January (reftel). They said the draft has not yet been finalized by capitals. USUN hopes to reach P3 agreement on the text in order to distribute to Russia and China at the P5 meeting. Text below. ¶2. (C) Action request: USUN requests Washington reaction to the draft elements in advance P3 meeting March 8. ¶3. (C) Begin text. Draft elements for Security Council action on the Iranian nuclear programme Security Council action is necessary to reinforce the authority of the IAEA and of IAEA Board Resolutions and to bring Iran back to the conditions of dialogue by calling upon it to restore the suspension of all enrichment-related/reprocessing activities in accordance with IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. It should also call on Iran to halt construction of a heavy water reactor, promptly implement and ratify the Additional Protocol, and provide transparency measures requested by the IAEA. The exact nature of Security Council action will take into consideration IAEA Board of Governors decisions and language should as far as possible be based on Board Resolutions. The Council should request a report from the IAEA Director General within a short time frame on implementation of the measures it has requested. We would want the Council to react rapidly, working closely to maintain a strong international consensus, and sharing views with partners. More specifically, elements upon which the E3 builds is approach are as follows: -- Recall that the IAEA Board of Governors requested the Director General of the IAEA to report to the Security Council the steps required of Iran by the Board and all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, related to this issue. -- Note with concern findings contained therein that Iran has failed to comply with its Safeguard's Agreement as well as the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of IAEA verification and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes; -- Express serious concern that, despite repeated IAEA Board calls and despite Iran's commitments under the Paris Agreement, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities in August 2005 and enrichment activities in January 2006, ceased in February 2006 to act in accordance with the Additional Protocol, and has taken none of the steps deemed necessary by the IAEA Board in its resolution of 4 February 2006; -- Express serious concern that Iran received from a procurement network a document on reduction of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to metal, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms, and stress that the receipt and continued possession by Iran of the documents, which contains information suitable only for military purposes, raises concern with regard to article II of the NPT; -- Express serious concern over (i) the possible weaponisation implications of the receipt and presence in Iran of that document, since, as reported by the Director General of the IAEA, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, (ii) experiments relating to polonium 210, and (iii) the lack of clarification about the role of the military in Iran's nuclear programme reported by the Director General of the IAEA; -- Share the IAEA Director General's view that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue, note that the IAEA is not in a position to conclude there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran, and agree that an extensive period of confidence building is required from Iran; -- Call upon Iran without delay: to re-establish full, sustained and verifiable suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA, and specifically (including) the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components, the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges, work to undertake any plutonium separation or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation, and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation; to halt the construction of a heavy water reactor; to act in accordance with, ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and to implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, which extend beyond the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the IAEA nay request in support of its ongoing investigations; -- Underline that full and sustained suspension is essential to address outstanding issues and build confidence; -- Remind all States of their obligations under Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) to establish and enforce effective measures, including export controls, to prevent proliferation; -- Reaffirm that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security; -- Express the conviction that through full, verified implementation of the measures the Security Council has requested, a negotiated solution can be found that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes; -- Request that the Director General of the IAEA report to the Council within 14 days on the implementation by Iran of the actions it has requested, and agreed to keep the issue under review. End text. BOLTON