HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: MOVING TOWARDS A VOTE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000422

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016
TAGS: PHUM KUNR UNGA PREL UNHRC
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: MOVING TOWARDS A VOTE ON
PGA TEXT

REF: A. (A) USUN 400


B. (B) USUN 295

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Deputy Permanent Representat
ive to the United Nations, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On March 3, the Swiss and
Liechtenstein PermReps reiterated to Ambassador Wolff that
re-opening of the text of the draft Human Rights Council
(HRC) resolution to accommodate core U.S. requirements is not
a realistic option. They remain eager to identify whether
there is anything "outside the text" that could help to
address U.S. concerns. UNGA President Eliasson, who
reportedly still hopes to bring the U.S. on board by
"dissociating" itself from the text rather than breaking
consensus, continues to rally support for his draft and to
prevent efforts by others to open the text. Our
interlocutors also indicate eagerness to explore mechanisms
that might allow for U.S. participation in the HRC after its
creation. Meanwhile, the Russian Mission Counselor told USUN
that Cuba will call for a re-opening of the text when the
draft resolution is presented and advocate for amendments.
Action on the budget for the HRC took place March 3 in the
ACABQ and is expected March 6 in the Fifth Committee -- where
we intend to call for a vote and vote "no," consistent with
our policy approach on the HRC draft -- this sets the stage
for possible UNGA plenary action on the draft as early as
next week. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

SWISS AND LIECHTENSTEIN SEEK TO AVOID A VOTE, BUT DON'T SEE
RE-OPENING OF TEXT


2. (C) On March 3, Ambassador Wolff met with Swiss PermRep
Ambassador Maurer and Liechtenstein PermRep Ambassador
Wenaweser to discuss UNGA President Eliasson's resolution
text on the Human Rights Council. (Maurer and Wenaweser
collaborate closely with Eliasson and have been used as
sounding boards with us in the past.) They reiterated that
it is not a realistic option to re-open the HRC draft, and
questioned whether there is anything "outside the text" that
could help to address U.S. concerns. They said Eliasson
still hoped to bring the U.S. on board, and had not yet made
a final decision on how he will move forward. Given clear
U.S. statements regarding the PGA's draft resolution, they
did not expect that the U.S. would support an unchanged text,
but asked -- if the text is brought forward for action --
whether it would be possible for the U.S. to "dissociate"
from the text rather than to break a consensus by calling for
a vote; or if that was not possible, to somehow present a
"soft" no vote.


3. (C) Ambassador Wolff reviewed the U.S. position and key
issues that would need to be addressed for the U.S. to
support the text (State 32895). He reiterated U.S.
preference for a "cooling off" period if the improvements
sought in the text were unattainable. He stressed that
other delegations should not view bringing the resolution
forward quickly for action as a means to pressure the United
States to support an unchanged text. This was a mistaken
tactic that would backfire. Maurer and Wenaweser suggested
that perhaps the quality of membership issue could be
addressed through other channels, such as a Community of
Democracies (CD) decision for its members not to support the
HRC candidacies of any state subject to Security Council
sanctions for human rights violations. They suggested that
if such agreement were reached, democracies could in effect
block the membership of an unsuitable candidate. Ambassador
Wolff noted that the CD was untested and members would have
competing loyalties to their regional groups. Even if such a
mechanism could be established, it would be a hollow exercise
without a provision for election to the HRC by a 2/3 majority
GA vote. Maurer and Wenaweser agreed that, in any case,
there would need to be a change in the UN culture for
elections and how delegations consider the candidacies of
other Member States.


4. (C) Maurer and Wenaweser stressed the desirability of
avoiding a U.S. call for a vote on the HRC resolution,
wondering if it would be possible for the United States to
dissociate from the resolution rather than break a consensus
by calling for a vote. They also expressed concern about a
possible "no" vote by the United States in the Fifth
Committee, with Maurer in particular worrying about setting a
precedent for voting in this Committee, particularly in
advance of the management reform and budget negotiations.
Ambassador Wolff recalled U.S. statements saying that, if
there is an attempt to adopt the current text, the U.S. would
call for a vote and vote "no". This logic also applied to
the Fifth Committee vote. We were not seeking any linkage of
our HRC position to other reform issues, and would not be


intimidated by this point. If others chose to do so, there
was little we could do.


5. (C) Maurer and Wenaweser then questioned what impact a
U.S. "no" vote would have on U.S. participation in the Human
Rights Council (and at the upcoming CHR). Ambassador Wolff
advised that we have not made any decisions on what, if any,
relationship we would maintain with a body we would vote
against. Maurer and Wenaweser indicated a willingness to
continue to explore mechanisms to improve the package if
doing so might help facilitate U.S. participation in the HRC
after its creation. While they indicated they would need to
consider measures "outside" the resolution text, Maurer did
question whether "as the only possible change to the text
itself" a shortening and strengthening of the review period
for the HRC from five to three years would be helpful.


6. (C) At a March 3 lunch hosted by the Australian PR for a
dozen PermReps from all regions to discuss the HRC, each
expressed a desire for some arrangement that would allow the
U.S. to participate in the new HRC (albeit not to a
sufficient degree to agree to support opening the text to
accommodate U.S. needs). They thought bringing this to a
vote would be bad for the U.S., bad for the HRC, and bad for
the UN. In particular, they feared the effect of an isolated
U.S., the spillover onto the management reform debate, and
the effect on the UN's human rights "machinery." They urged
that we convey to Washington the depth of their concern and
the hope that reconsideration would result in a decision not
to block consensus by voting "no." Amb. Wolff said the U.S.
understood the situation well, and others should not
underestimate the seriousness of our position. The HRC
debate was taking place against a backdrop of broader UN
reform, and the inability to redress effectively the problems
of the Geneva Commission would not reflect well on the
institution.

RUSSIA PRESENTS A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT VIEW


7. (C) Also on March 3, the Russian Mission Counselor told
USUN/ECOSOC Minister Counsellor that Russia will not call for
a reopening of text, though he indicated provisions with
which they are not entirely happy. If the United States or
another Member State calls for an up-or-down vote, he said
Russia is not yet sure how it will vote; Moscow instructions
remain pending. However, Russia noted that Cuba has
presented Eliasson with several amendments to the draft text,
and claimed that when the draft resolution is presented, Cuba
will call for a re-opening of the text and advocate for its
amendments. (We are e-mailing to IO a copy of the Cuban
proposals, which relate to the handling of country-specific
resolutions, right to development, the number of HRC
sessions, and OPs 7 and 8 of the Eliasson text.) He noted
that Russia supports some of Cuba's proposals, but declined
to offer specifics. Russia also claimed that many
delegations now feel confused and they are wavering in their
positions, mentioning Japan and Canada in particular.


8. (C) Russia concurs with the U.S. view that the process has
been flawed. Russia recalled that from the beginning (during
Outcome Document negotiations),Russia had called for an
intergovernmental working group to conduct line-by-line
negotiations on the Human Rights Council. However, he said
some seven months have passed and Russia believes it is too
late to try to commence such a process at this point.


9. (C) On the specific provisions of the text, he said,
surprisingly, that Russia supports the U.S. position on the
SC sanctions criterion (although the Russian delegation never
voiced such support at any point before). Russia prefers a
simple majority election process for HRC members, but he said
Russia is prepared to compromise and accept the absolute
majority provision in the current draft. Russia also opposes
the provision for holding special sessions of the HRC.
Finally, he voiced adamant opposition to any term limits for
HRC members, which he described as a matter of principle.

MORE ON ACABQ AND FIFTH COMMITTEE ACTION ON THE HRC PBI


10. (C) On March 3 the ACABQ approved its report on the
Program Budget Implications (PBI). The Fifth Committee is
scheduled to consider the PBI on Monday, March 6. In a
conversation with Ambassador Wolff, UK DPR Adam Thompson
echoed concerns of Switzerland and Liechtenstein about a vote
in the Fifth Committee on the PBI, saying that calling for a
vote in the Fifth Committee would be "explosive" and would be
seen as a provocation by the G-77 that would lead hardliners
to argue more persuasively for voting on any management
reform matters. (Comment: The G-77 has already set a
precedent for voting in the Fifth Committee when they called


for a vote on conference servicing in December. This was the
first vote in nearly 20 years in this Committee. End
Comment.) Amb. Wolff said a "no" vote on the HRC budget
followed logically our decision to vote no on the HRC.

BOLTON