GA PRESIDENT AND UNSYG CHEF DE CABINET CONSIDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000400 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY FROM AMB. BOLTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 TAGS: KUNR UNGA UNCHR SUBJECT: GA PRESIDENT AND UNSYG CHEF DE CABINET CONSIDER HRC TEXT FINAL; PALAU BACKING DOUBLES OUR SUPPORT REF: A. USUN 00398 ¶B. STATE 32805 Classified By: AMB. JOHN BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In our continuing consultations with other delegations, we unfortunately find no appetite to reopen the HRC text to accommodate U.S. requirements (reftels). General Assembly President Eliasson's office has sent a letter to the ACABQ (the committee considering resource needs to establish the HRC) stating that his HRC draft "should be considered as the final text." The EU has endorsed Eliasson's text, although they remain divided (with the UK as the principal holdout) on the desirability of a vote. Meanwhile, efforts continue to muster as large a majority as possible in support of the current text, with some considering modest gestures "outside the text" that they hope would lead the U.S. to join, or at least not to block consensus. End Summary. ¶2. (C) EU Position: Following lengthy discussions over the previous two days, the EU agreed late March 1 to support Eliasson's HRC text. As shared by an EU member with USUN, the EU position states: "The EU considers that the PGA's draft resolution meets the basic requirements for the establishment of the Human Rights Council. The EU could therefore accept this text as a compromise. The EU fully supports the PGA's efforts to secure the broadest possible backing for the early establishment of the Human Rights Council." USUN understands there were two EU members that disagreed with the text itself in the EU discussions, but in the end all joined EU consensus. We also understand that EU members had nuanced disagreements, particularly at the tactical level, and were particularly concerned about a split with the U.S., expressing regret that strong democracies would not stand together on this issue. They felt it was Eliasson's task to address Washington's concerns and to approach Washington. ¶3. (C) UK View: In return for joining consensus, the UK has issued a supplementary national statement agreed within the EU that states: "The United Kingdom could accept the compromise draft resolution text, although we would have preferred stronger language in a number of areas. The UK believes that the priority should now be to establish the conditions for the resolution to be put to the General Assembly to receive the broadest possible backing. In particular, the UK believes that for the Human Rights Council, and this new approach to the promotion and protection of human rights, to be effective, it will need the support of the United States. It therefore encourages discussion with the U.S. Administration in order to identify a basis for the widest possible support." ¶4. (C) In private discussions with individual EU and WEOG members, the greatest concerns seem to be that re-opening the text would lead to numerous other amendments by "the other side" that would weaken the text and the HRC. Some have cautioned that with any changes to the resolution, it could be a situation of "all bets are off" and, for example, provisions to constrain the use of country specific resolutions could be re-introduced. While we have heard the OIC might accept the current PP 7 language as it is currently formulated (addressing efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among cultures and religions) several Western countries are concerned that if the text is re-opened, the OIC would seek to strengthen this preambular language and/or move language addressing these issues into an operative paragraph. Several also have stated that changes to the voting majority or strict criteria for membership on the HRC would not be achievable, and have asked what U.S. "bottom lines" exist for agreement to the text if other changes could be made. All who have spoken to the precise points of exclusion for Security Council sanctions or a two-thirds requirement for election believe that such proposals would be rejected. French Perm Rep de la Sabliere in a conversation with Ambassador Bolton at noon on Thursday was particularly emphatic on this point. Further, they are concerned that a postponement of the discussion would hurt, rather than help, the process and the human rights machinery of the United Nations. Some continue to believe that the atmosphere will never be better than it is now to reach agreement on the HRC, noting that other delegations may have been maneuvered into a position of accepting something they may not be entirely comfortable with and would reject, given more time. ¶5. (C) At the same time, the EU continues to debate whether to support a vote to establish the HRC despite U.S. opposition. UK PermRep Jones Parry told us today that he was isolated in the EU on this point (we've heard from another EU Perm Rep that he defended himself by stating in the EU meeting that this was his instruction from Foreign Secretary Straw). UK DPR Thomson told us there was still hope that we could find a creative way of allowing the HRC to be adopted without U.S. opposition. He lamented, however, that Eliasson is not focused on how to do this operationally, worrying more at this stage about solidifying support for his text to demonstrate to the U.S. the degree of its isolation. (We understand from Ambassador Moley in Geneva that his EU Presidency counterpart has indicated that the Austrian Presidency in New York is still waiting to see if the U.S. will accept the current draft once the extent of the majority support for it is evident.) On the other hand, the letter to the ACABQ quoted in paragraph one was written on behalf of the President of the General Assembly. Moreover, a meeting of the Fifth Committee (which handles budget matters) has been scheduled for Monday. Both steps suggest PGA Eliasson is actively and wittingly preparing the ground for an UNGA vote early next week. ¶6. (C) As for next steps, Eliasson's Deputy Chef de Cabinet told Ambassador Wolff March 2 that Eliasson was pleased with his March 1 conversation with Ambassador Bolton (ref B) and wanted to remain in touch. SecGen Annan's Chief of Staff Malloch Brown told Ambassador Wolff March 2 it was increasingly clear from their soundings that re-opening the text "won't work". They also fear the negative effect of a delay of several months, particularly in the wake of what is certain to be a "disastrous" session of the Geneva Commission "with or without U.S. participation." Malloch Brown noted that, as a result, there was growing momentum toward a vote. He said Annan would try to reach Secretary Rice as soon as she returns from her trip to see what could be done to turn the U.S. position into a "soft no", in order to avoid an ICC-type situation. In this regard, Malloch Brown said that High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour was thinking about setting up the HRC for a "test drive" with a shortened review period to see how it works. We've heard similar ideas from other delegations (ref B),and expect this will be the increased focus of the Secretary General, Eliasson and other delegations in the coming days. ¶7. (C) On a brighter note, Palau Perm Rep Stuart Beck confirmed today that they fully support our position on HRC. They have asked for, and USUN will supply, talking points so that Palau can advocate our position publicly. BOLTON