SRSG PRONK DEPLORES AU DELAY AND WARNS GNU IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000390

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: SRSG PRONK DEPLORES AU DELAY AND WARNS GNU IS
'GANGING UP' ON AU


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Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a February 28 meeting with Ambassador
Bolton, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG) in Sudan Jan Pronk warned that the Government of
National Unity (GNU) was using anti-West and anti-UN rhetoric
to 'gang up' on African Union (AU) Members and other
countries on the continent in its aggressive lobbying
campaign against the prospect of United Nations (UN) troops
in Darfur. In response to Ambassador Bolton's question of
how to counter this pressure in African capitals, Pronk noted
he had suggested to the SYG that Special Adviser Brahimi be
dispatched to confront Sudanese President al-Bashir and AU
Commission Chairman Konare and recommended any intervention
the U.S. might consider be done at ministerial level and be
careful not to vilify the AU, since it was Konare who was the
main problem. Ambassador Bolton recommended that Pronk see
Congolese Permanent Representative (PR) Ikouebe while Pronk
was in town to reinforce the message that AU PSC postponement
was counterproductive. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) SRSG Pronk did not mince words at the opening of his
February 28 meeting with Ambassador Bolton, declaring he
'deplored' the decision of the AU to delay its planned PSC
meeting to March 10. He described his preparations already
underway in Khartoum for the eventual transition of the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping
operation, adding he would compare notes with UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Military Adviser
Major-General Mehta on March 1. Pronk noted that only the
military mandate for his planning was absent; a political,
humanitarian and civil mandate were already in place.


3. (C) Pronk was emphatic about the link between progress at
the Abuja Talks and the success of DPKO contingency planning,
offering four scenarios given projected outcomes. The first
supposed a full-fledged peace agreement, which both Pronk and
Ambassador Bolton agreed was virtually impossible. This
scenario would give rise to a Chapter VI mandate for an
eventual UN Darfur force. The second and third scenarios
Pronk presented (a 'good' peace agreement between parties or
in Abuja; a partial, 'fake' agreement along the lines of the
N'Djamena Agreement) would result in a combination Chapter
VI/Chapter VII mandate. Finally, the fourth scenario, one of
absence of a peace agreement all together, would necessitate
a Chapter VII mandate. Pronk favored the second scenario but
admitted that the third was more likely.


4. (C) Pronk thought that many of the existing AMIS forces
could be retained, singling out the Ghanaians and the
Nigerians, but that unity of command was crucial and that a
single UN leadership should be employed at the head of any
projected UN force. Pronk recommended that Africans and
Asians be incorporated into the force to prevent
'antagonizing' the GNU. Pronk feared 'cannibalization' of
the Southern Sudan force, which was necessary to ensure that
Khartoum did not further undermine the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, but he acknowledged that southern troops could
eventually be made available on a rotating basis.


5. (C) Pronk's biggest concern in getting to a mandate for
the eventual UN force was the latest trend exhibited by the
GNU of 'ganging up' on the AU, a tactic it was also applying
to other African countries. Although Khartoum 'always says
no first but in the end says yes,' Pronk noted the difficulty
in securing GNU consent this time around. Pronk said the
March 3 PSC meeting was postponed solely at GNU request to
get AU members to reverse their January 12 endorsement in
principle of an AMIS re-hatting, a substantive back-track, in
Pronk's estimation. Ambassador Bolton noted that this trend
did not bode well for the battle in the Security Council to
forward a resolution on AMIS transition, saying that we would
have not only a Qatar-backed, Sudan-led Arab League to
contend with, but AU Members' opposition (especially
Congo-Brazzaville) as well. Pronk reported that Konare was
particularly susceptible to Khartoum's pressuring and related
a quotation attributed to Konare in which Konare admitted to
having been 'pushed into transition' on January 12 by 'those
who will pay for it.'

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6. (C) Another worrying trend, according to Pronk, was
Khartoum's campaign against the UN, which had resulted in
threats against UN personnel, abductions and a declaration by
al-Bashir that Darfur would become a 'graveyard' for UN
troops, in response to which Pronk suggested follow-up from
SYG Annan with the GNU. He advocated a 'go slow' message to
convey that the UN needed to eventually but not now take over
from AMIS and to provide the AU with a solid exit strategy.
Pronk reiterated his call for a broad mandate of long
duration for the Darfur force.


7. (C) In response to Ambassador Bolton's questions on how to
counter the GNU's campaigns, which Pronk acknowledged were
the primary obstacle to transition, Pronk suggested that
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM),especially First
Vice President Salva Kiir, stop acting like National Congress
Party 'chameleons' and exercise more influence over Darfur
policy, which continues to be dictated by Khartoum. Pronk
assessed that this reticence was symptomatic of an SPLM and
Government of Southern Sudan tendency to back away from
Darfur's troubles, having already gone through enough of
their own and feeling no real connection to the west of
Sudan. Pronk noted that the SPLM similarly 'ignores' the
problems of Eastern Sudan, where the GNU has not abandoned
its military option.


8. (C) Pronk agreed that Konare's manipulation was not
necessarily representative of widespread AU sentiment toward
transition and cautioned against lobbying AU Members to
ensure they did not reverse the January 12 decision as
'repetitive.' Pronk recommended Ministerial, rather than
Ambassadorial, interventions to make clear that the problem
was not with the AU as a whole, and he mentioned his own
suggestion to the SYG that Brahimi be dispatched to confront
al-Bashir and Konare individually. Ambassador Bolton
recommended that Pronk see Congolese Permanent Representative
(PR) Ikouebe while Pronk was in town to reinforce the message
that AU PSC postponement was counterproductive.


9. (C) Pronk concluded by recommending that the Council use
the tools at its disposal to effect progress on Darfur,
including the Sudan Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts
Report and the International Criminal Court.


10. (C) COMMENT. Pronk's comments confirm the depths of GNU
hostility toward AMIS transition and do not bode well for
prospects of pushing a resolution, given Chinese, Qatari,
Russian and now possibly Congolese, Ghanaian and Tanzanian
sympathies. Council consultations on Darfur are tentatively
scheduled for March 6, a good opportunity for us to
re-evaluate Council opinion towards AMIS transition and to
focus any lobbying efforts accordingly. END COMMENT.
BOLTON