SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH DPKO USYG GUEHENNO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002282 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, IO A/S SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH DPKO USYG GUEHENNO REF: KHARTOUM 02890 Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 21 meeting with Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, UN DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno expressed skepticism that Sudanese President Bashir would provide a wholly forthcoming and constructive response to SYG Annan's letter outlining specific steps the Government of Sudan (GOS) must take to implement the Addis/Abuja framework. Guehenno and his deputies, who had received an initial readout following UN Special Envoy Ould Abdallah's December 21 meeting with President Bashir, predicted that the Sudanese response would stop short of a full and unambiguous embrace of the third phase of the Addis/Abuja framework in all its details. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) UN Participants: DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno, DPKO Deputy Hedi Annabi, DPKO Africa Director Dimitri Titov, UN notetaker. USG Participants: Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, Chief of Staff Envoy Andrew Steinfeld, USUN Poloff (notetaker). -------------- Guehenno: Bashir Playing the Same Games -------------- ¶3. (C) Guehenno and Annabi opened the meeting with a readout of the initial reports coming from UN Special Envoy Ould Abdallah's December 21 meeting with President Bashir (reftel). Ould Abdallah reported that Bashir appeared ready to implement phases one and two (UN light and heavy support for AMIS) and accept some blue helmeted forces. President Bashir, however, had not committed unambiguously to accepting a AU/UN hybrid command or given up his quibbling on the size of the peacekeeping force. Annabi reported that Bashir had repeated his demand for a new UNSC resolution before phase three of the Addis/Abuja framework is implemented. ¶4. (C) Repeating concerns DPKO raised previously on the importance of political clarity and Sudanese acceptance of all three phases of the Addis/Abuja framework, Guehenno said the prospect of an ambiguous Sudanese response to SYG Annan's letter concerned him because it would create uncertainty in the UNSC and prevent progress on the ground. If DPKO "deploys support to AMIS without the necessary muscle, the end result will be an incomplete force with bad troops." Likewise, force generation will be a problem as member states will balk at contributing the necessary military assets without the guarantee of UN protection. ¶5. (C) Natsios acknowledged these concerns, commenting that the U.S. would have to consider its options should President Bashir continue his policy of hindering the deployment of an effective peacekeeping force. With regard to how to respond to Bashir, Guehenno acknowledged the importance of all the stakeholders staying on message to pressure the GOS, while noting that SYG Annan would likely want a positive spin in his last days in office. -------------- Cease-fire Prospects -------------- ¶6. (C) Annabi reported that Bashir expressed deep skepticism to Ould Abdallah about the utility of a cease-fire given the proliferation of new rebel groups. Bashir reportedly blamed escalating violence in Darfur on the National Redemption Front (NRF) and Chadian interference. Ould Abdallah reported that Bashir had commented that the GOS would accept a cease-fire if NRF forces withdrew from areas they have seized from the SAF and SLA/Minawi. -------------- The Aprezi Problem -------------- ¶7. (C) Guehenno criticized AMIS Commander Aprezi, commenting that it is clear that "Bashir is using him" to hinder UN assistance to AMIS. Natsios agreed, commenting that the reports of internal strife within the AMIS chain of command are increasingly disturbing. Annabi interjected that Nigerian President Obasanjo had committed to replacing Aprezi, but had not yet taken any action. Natsios commented that a Rwandan commander would be preferable, given the superior contribution of Rwandan forces to AMIS. USUN NEW Y 00002282 002 OF 002 ¶8. (U) SE Natsios' staff cleared this message. WOLFF