BRAMMERTZ PRAISES SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH HARIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002265 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC SY LE SUBJECT: BRAMMERTZ PRAISES SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH HARIRI PROBE BUT CRITICIZES OTHER STATES FOR LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS REF: STATE 199552 Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During an open meeting of the UNSC on December 18, UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Head Serge Brammertz noted that his work had reached a "critical stage" which would prevent him from placing sensitive information about witnesses and suspects in the public domain. He described progress in the forensic investigation of Hariri's murder and noted that most of the possible motivations to kill the former PM related to his political activities. Brammertz characterized Syrian responses to Commission requests as "timely and efficient" and SARG coopeation overall as "generally satisfactory." Addressing the Council in the public session, Syrian PermRep Ja'afari extolled Brammertz's positive characterization of SARG cooperation and urged that those states which have not yet responded to some of UNIIIC's requests be publicly named. In the closed consultations following the open meeting, several delegations urged Brammertz to name non-cooperating states, but he replied that doing so would be an "inappropriate" way to encourage better results. Brammertz offered a vigorous defense of the time UNIIIC has taken to conduct its investigation, noting the complexity of the crimes, the difficult environment in Lebanon, and the limited investigative capacity of the GOL. He declined to specify when UNIIIC's work would conclude but assured the Council the investigation would extend beyond June 2007. ¶2. (C) Summary, cont'd. In a bilateral meeting with Ambassador Wolff on December 14, Brammertzsaid his overall strategy is to maintain good lines of communication with all parties to ensure that no one criticizes the process by which UNIIIC pursues its investigation. If no one criticizes the process, he argued it would be very difficult for them to criticize the end result. Asked how high up possible Syrian complicity might go, Brammertz suggested cagily that one working hypothesis -- but only one -- is that the crime could not have been committed without the knowledge of former Syrian Military Intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazali. If this hypothesis is correct, Brammertz expressed doubt that the order to carry out the crime came from the "number �A;one" in Syria, but said it is conceivable that such highers-up were informed afterwards. Earlier in the meeting, Brammertz noted that the Commission had begun work on a "knowledge project" to determine those among the perpetrators who either had knowledge of the crime beforehand and did nothing to stop it, or those who should have had knowledge of the crime and did nothing to stop it. End Summary. Brammertz Reveals Few Details of Probe in Public -------------- --- ¶3. (U) During his briefing to an open meeting of the Council, Brammertz revealed little beyond the information contained in his latest report. Noting that the investigation had reached a "critical stage," he asserted that placing information concerning suspects and witnesses in the public domain would make it more difficult to secure sensitive witness testimony and might prejudice future trials. With that caveat in mind, Brammertz reported that the Commission had concluded based on its forensic work that there had been only one blast -- of the Mitsubishi van near Hariri's motorcade -- that had most likely been triggered by a person either within the van or near it rather than a remote-controlled device. He described efforts to identify how Ahmad Abu Adass, the person who claimed responsibility for the attack in a video released shortly thereafter, had been selected and what then became of him. Brammertz said the majority of potential motivations to kill Hariri were linked to his political activities, while a smaller number were linked to his other (presumably financial) activities. Noting that the Commission continued to provide technical assistance to the GOL in its investigations of the other 15 attacks committed since October 2004 -- including the Gemayel assassination of November 2006 -- Brammertz said evidence had emerged of "considerable" links between those some of those attacks and between those attacks and the Hariri assassination. ¶4. (U) Turning to cooperation with UNIIIC from member states, Brammertz repeated the formula he has used in previous reports that Syria's responses to the Commission's requests had been "timely and efficient" and that overall the SARG's cooperation had been "generally satisfactory." UNIIIC had submitted 12 formal requests for assistance to Syria during the reporting period, he reported, and the Commission was satisfied with the timeliness and efficiency of the SARG's answers as well as with the logistical and security USUN NEW Y 00002265 002 OF 003 arrangements made for its investigators on Syrian territory. Other states, however, had not cooperated to the same degree. Noting that the Commission had submitted 60 requests to states other than Syria or Lebanon since March, Brammertz said that although most states had responded positively, some states had provided late or incomplete responses. (Note: In his written report, Brammertz said 22 requests sent to 10 separate member states were overdue. End Note.) The lack of responsiveness by these states had impeded or slowed the Commission's work on several fronts, Brammertz argued. Syrians Ask Brammertz to Name Non-Cooperators -------------- ¶5. (U) Addressing the Council during its public session, Syrian PR Bashar Ja'afari extolled Brammertz's characterization of SARG cooperation with the Commission. He expressed hope that the Commission would continue its investigation on the basis of the professional approach it had adopted thusfar and warned that the greatest risk UNIIIC faces is the effort "by some parties in the region and beyond" to exploit it to reach politicized conclusions without any basis in fact. Noting that the Commission had set out new hypotheses regarding Hariri's assassination, Ja'afari emphasized the need to consider all possible motivations behind the crime. He also urged the Commission to investigate the murder of the Mazjoub brothers, two suspected Palestinian Islamic Jihad activists, in Lebanon in May 2005. Lastly, Ja'afari called on all states to cooperate fully with the Commission and demanded that those that are not cooperating be named. It is especially important to name these non-cooperators, he said, because "certain parties" continue to criticize Syria in the media for its cooperation despite the UNIIIC's positive review. UNSC Members Express Full Confidence in Brammertz -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) During closed UNSC consultations following the public session, nearly all delegations joined Ambassador Wolff in expressing full support for the Commission's work and welcoming the SYG's intention to extend Brammertz's appointment until June 2007. Russia, joined by China, Qatar, and Greece, commended the Commission for not reaching any hasty conclusions and welcomed its intention to consider all possible motivations behind Hariri's assassination. Noting earlier suggestions that UNIIIC might be able to conclude its work by December 2006, several delegations asked when the Commission would be able to present its findings. On Syrian cooperation, the UK, France, and Denmark joined Ambassador Wolff in calling on all states to cooperate fully and noting that Syria was obligated under various Council resolutions to provide "full and unconditional" cooperation. China, Russia, Japan, Ghana, Tanzania, Congo, Argentina, and Qatar all welcomed Syria's cooperation with the Commission and expressed varying degrees of concern about the failure of other states to offer similar cooperation. Several of these delegations asked if the non-cooperating states could be named and whether the UNSC could take any action to help ensure cooperation with the Commission. ¶7. (SBU) Responding to member state interventions in the closed session, Brammertz argued that naming non-cooperating states would not be the most "appropriate" way to induce them to improve. Some states had not yet cooperated because they claim they have no legal basis to do so, others report that the information requested is confidential or that the witnesses are the subject of ongoing national investigations, and others had either lost the requests or simply failed to answer. Brammertz said he plans to send letters to these states in the next quarter reminding them of their obligations. If they fail to comply, he would inform the SYG and ask him to intervene. Only if this approach fails would he consider asking the UNSC for assistance. ¶8. (SBU) In terms of the timing of when the Commission could conclude its investigation, Brammertz said he could not specify a date but cautioned it would probably not conclude by June 2007. Arguing that several years was the standard for such investigations in most countries, Brammertz argued that his work was even more difficult because of the complexity of the attack, the technical assistance required for the other 15 cases, the slowness of the UN system, and the lack of cooperation from certain member states. Most importantly, though, Brammertz said the investigation would take a while because the GOL's investigative capacity was limited at best. He made a strong pitch for bilateral assistance to increase Lebanese capacity, lest another attack take place in the future for which the Lebanese have no USUN NEW Y 00002265 003 OF 003 international help. Brammertz Offers a Bit More in Private -------------- ¶9. (C) During a bilateral meeting with Ambassador Wolff and poloff (notetaker) on December 14, Brammertz said his overall strategy is to keep very good lines of communication open with all parties to ensure that no one criticizes the process by which UNIIIC pursues its investigation. If no one criticizes the process, Brammertz averred, it would be very difficult for them to criticize the end result. This strategy informed his characterization of Syrian cooperation. While the Syrians are the "best student in class" in terms of the timeliness and efficiency of their responses, Brammertz conceded that he continues to have concerns about the quality of the answers provided by certain Syrian witnesses (Note: Brammertz did not include this point in his last report but did mention it in his penultimate submission to the UNSC. End Note.). In these cases, he has protested to the Syrians and those witnesses have been re-interviewed, usually with better results. These concerns have led him to characterize SARG cooperation as "generally satisfactory" rather than "full." ¶10. (C) On the timing of when UNIIIC might present its findings, Brammertz suggested that the Commission might/might be able to conclude its investigation by June or December 2007 if/if a star insider witness emerges who could connect all the evidence UNIIIC has unearthed. No such witness has yet emerged, however, so Brammertz said he could not specify when the investigation would conclude. He suggested that establishing the tribunal would have a beneficial effect on enticing witnesses to come forward -- especially former Syrian officials -- because a prosecutor could offer them better physical protection and the assurance that a case would be brought to trial. ¶11. (C) Asked how high up possible Syrian complicity might go, Brammertz suggested cagily that one working hypothesis -- but only one -- is that the crime could not have been committed without the knowledge of Syrian Military Intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazali. If this hypothesis is correct, Brammertz expressed doubt that the order to carry out the crime came from the "number one" in Syria, but said it is conceivable that such highers-up were informed afterwards. Earlier in the conversation, Brammertz noted that the Commission had begun work on a "knowledge project" to determine those among the perpetrators who either had knowledge of the crime beforehand and did nothing to stop it, or those who should have had knowledge of the crime and did nothing to stop it. He suggested that it is possible to reconstruct the "chain of command" in Lebanon during the period of Syrian occupation by examining phone records. It is not plausible, for example, that a Lebanese intelligence official did not have a working relationship with a Syrian official if his call logs indicate they spoke several times a day. WOLFF