BRAMMERTZ PRAISES SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH HARIRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002265

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC SY LE
SUBJECT: BRAMMERTZ PRAISES SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH HARIRI
PROBE BUT CRITICIZES OTHER STATES FOR LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS

REF: STATE 199552

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During an open meeting of the UNSC on
December 18, UN International Independent Investigation
Commission (UNIIIC) Head Serge Brammertz noted that his work
had reached a "critical stage" which would prevent him from
placing sensitive information about witnesses and suspects in
the public domain. He described progress in the forensic
investigation of Hariri's murder and noted that most of the
possible motivations to kill the former PM related to his
political activities. Brammertz characterized Syrian
responses to Commission requests as "timely and efficient"
and SARG coopeation overall as "generally satisfactory."
Addressing the Council in the public session, Syrian PermRep
Ja'afari extolled Brammertz's positive characterization of
SARG cooperation and urged that those states which have not
yet responded to some of UNIIIC's requests be publicly named.
In the closed consultations following the open meeting,
several delegations urged Brammertz to name non-cooperating
states, but he replied that doing so would be an
"inappropriate" way to encourage better results. Brammertz
offered a vigorous defense of the time UNIIIC has taken to
conduct its investigation, noting the complexity of the
crimes, the difficult environment in Lebanon, and the limited
investigative capacity of the GOL. He declined to specify
when UNIIIC's work would conclude but assured the Council the
investigation would extend beyond June 2007.


2. (C) Summary, cont'd. In a bilateral meeting with
Ambassador Wolff on December 14, Brammertzsaid his overall
strategy is to maintain good lines of communication with all
parties to ensure that no one criticizes the process by which
UNIIIC pursues its investigation. If no one criticizes the
process, he argued it would be very difficult for them to
criticize the end result. Asked how high up possible Syrian
complicity might go, Brammertz suggested cagily that one
working hypothesis -- but only one -- is that the crime could
not have been committed without the knowledge of former
Syrian Military Intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazali.
If this hypothesis is correct, Brammertz expressed doubt
that the order to carry out the crime came from the "number
one" in Syria, but said it is conceivable that such
highers-up were informed afterwards. Earlier in the meeting,
Brammertz noted that the Commission had begun work on a
"knowledge project" to determine those among the perpetrators
who either had knowledge of the crime beforehand and did
nothing to stop it, or those who should have had knowledge of
the crime and did nothing to stop it. End Summary.

Brammertz Reveals Few Details of Probe in Public
-------------- ---


3. (U) During his briefing to an open meeting of the Council,
Brammertz revealed little beyond the information contained in
his latest report. Noting that the investigation had reached
a "critical stage," he asserted that placing information
concerning suspects and witnesses in the public domain would
make it more difficult to secure sensitive witness testimony
and might prejudice future trials. With that caveat in mind,
Brammertz reported that the Commission had concluded based on
its forensic work that there had been only one blast -- of
the Mitsubishi van near Hariri's motorcade -- that had most
likely been triggered by a person either within the van or
near it rather than a remote-controlled device. He described
efforts to identify how Ahmad Abu Adass, the person who
claimed responsibility for the attack in a video released
shortly thereafter, had been selected and what then became of
him. Brammertz said the majority of potential motivations to
kill Hariri were linked to his political activities, while a
smaller number were linked to his other (presumably
financial) activities. Noting that the Commission continued
to provide technical assistance to the GOL in its
investigations of the other 15 attacks committed since
October 2004 -- including the Gemayel assassination of
November 2006 -- Brammertz said evidence had emerged of
"considerable" links between those some of those attacks and
between those attacks and the Hariri assassination.


4. (U) Turning to cooperation with UNIIIC from member states,
Brammertz repeated the formula he has used in previous
reports that Syria's responses to the Commission's requests
had been "timely and efficient" and that overall the SARG's
cooperation had been "generally satisfactory." UNIIIC had
submitted 12 formal requests for assistance to Syria during
the reporting period, he reported, and the Commission was
satisfied with the timeliness and efficiency of the SARG's
answers as well as with the logistical and security

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arrangements made for its investigators on Syrian territory.
Other states, however, had not cooperated to the same degree.
Noting that the Commission had submitted 60 requests to
states other than Syria or Lebanon since March, Brammertz
said that although most states had responded positively, some
states had provided late or incomplete responses. (Note: In
his written report, Brammertz said 22 requests sent to 10
separate member states were overdue. End Note.) The lack of
responsiveness by these states had impeded or slowed the
Commission's work on several fronts, Brammertz argued.

Syrians Ask Brammertz to Name Non-Cooperators
--------------


5. (U) Addressing the Council during its public session,
Syrian PR Bashar Ja'afari extolled Brammertz's
characterization of SARG cooperation with the Commission. He
expressed hope that the Commission would continue its
investigation on the basis of the professional approach it
had adopted thusfar and warned that the greatest risk UNIIIC
faces is the effort "by some parties in the region and
beyond" to exploit it to reach politicized conclusions
without any basis in fact. Noting that the Commission had
set out new hypotheses regarding Hariri's assassination,
Ja'afari emphasized the need to consider all possible
motivations behind the crime. He also urged the Commission
to investigate the murder of the Mazjoub brothers, two
suspected Palestinian Islamic Jihad activists, in Lebanon in
May 2005. Lastly, Ja'afari called on all states to cooperate
fully with the Commission and demanded that those that are
not cooperating be named. It is especially important to name
these non-cooperators, he said, because "certain parties"
continue to criticize Syria in the media for its cooperation
despite the UNIIIC's positive review.

UNSC Members Express Full Confidence in Brammertz
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) During closed UNSC consultations following the
public session, nearly all delegations joined Ambassador
Wolff in expressing full support for the Commission's work
and welcoming the SYG's intention to extend Brammertz's
appointment until June 2007. Russia, joined by China, Qatar,
and Greece, commended the Commission for not reaching any
hasty conclusions and welcomed its intention to consider all
possible motivations behind Hariri's assassination. Noting
earlier suggestions that UNIIIC might be able to conclude its
work by December 2006, several delegations asked when the
Commission would be able to present its findings. On Syrian
cooperation, the UK, France, and Denmark joined Ambassador
Wolff in calling on all states to cooperate fully and noting
that Syria was obligated under various Council resolutions to
provide "full and unconditional" cooperation. China, Russia,
Japan, Ghana, Tanzania, Congo, Argentina, and Qatar all
welcomed Syria's cooperation with the Commission and
expressed varying degrees of concern about the failure of
other states to offer similar cooperation. Several of these
delegations asked if the non-cooperating states could be
named and whether the UNSC could take any action to help
ensure cooperation with the Commission.


7. (SBU) Responding to member state interventions in the
closed session, Brammertz argued that naming non-cooperating
states would not be the most "appropriate" way to induce them
to improve. Some states had not yet cooperated because they
claim they have no legal basis to do so, others report that
the information requested is confidential or that the
witnesses are the subject of ongoing national investigations,
and others had either lost the requests or simply failed to
answer. Brammertz said he plans to send letters to these
states in the next quarter reminding them of their
obligations. If they fail to comply, he would inform the SYG
and ask him to intervene. Only if this approach fails would
he consider asking the UNSC for assistance.


8. (SBU) In terms of the timing of when the Commission could
conclude its investigation, Brammertz said he could not
specify a date but cautioned it would probably not conclude
by June 2007. Arguing that several years was the standard
for such investigations in most countries, Brammertz argued
that his work was even more difficult because of the
complexity of the attack, the technical assistance required
for the other 15 cases, the slowness of the UN system, and
the lack of cooperation from certain member states. Most
importantly, though, Brammertz said the investigation would
take a while because the GOL's investigative capacity was
limited at best. He made a strong pitch for bilateral
assistance to increase Lebanese capacity, lest another attack
take place in the future for which the Lebanese have no

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international help.

Brammertz Offers a Bit More in Private
--------------


9. (C) During a bilateral meeting with Ambassador Wolff and
poloff (notetaker) on December 14, Brammertz said his overall
strategy is to keep very good lines of communication open
with all parties to ensure that no one criticizes the process
by which UNIIIC pursues its investigation. If no one
criticizes the process, Brammertz averred, it would be very
difficult for them to criticize the end result. This
strategy informed his characterization of Syrian cooperation.
While the Syrians are the "best student in class" in terms
of the timeliness and efficiency of their responses,
Brammertz conceded that he continues to have concerns about
the quality of the answers provided by certain Syrian
witnesses (Note: Brammertz did not include this point in his
last report but did mention it in his penultimate submission
to the UNSC. End Note.). In these cases, he has protested to
the Syrians and those witnesses have been re-interviewed,
usually with better results. These concerns have led him to
characterize SARG cooperation as "generally satisfactory"
rather than "full."


10. (C) On the timing of when UNIIIC might present its
findings, Brammertz suggested that the Commission might/might
be able to conclude its investigation by June or December
2007 if/if a star insider witness emerges who could connect
all the evidence UNIIIC has unearthed. No such witness has
yet emerged, however, so Brammertz said he could not specify
when the investigation would conclude. He suggested that
establishing the tribunal would have a beneficial effect on
enticing witnesses to come forward -- especially former
Syrian officials -- because a prosecutor could offer them
better physical protection and the assurance that a case
would be brought to trial.


11. (C) Asked how high up possible Syrian complicity might
go, Brammertz suggested cagily that one working hypothesis --
but only one -- is that the crime could not have been
committed without the knowledge of Syrian Military
Intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazali. If this
hypothesis is correct, Brammertz expressed doubt that the
order to carry out the crime came from the "number one" in
Syria, but said it is conceivable that such highers-up were
informed afterwards. Earlier in the conversation, Brammertz
noted that the Commission had begun work on a "knowledge
project" to determine those among the perpetrators who either
had knowledge of the crime beforehand and did nothing to stop
it, or those who should have had knowledge of the crime and
did nothing to stop it. He suggested that it is possible to
reconstruct the "chain of command" in Lebanon during the
period of Syrian occupation by examining phone records. It
is not plausible, for example, that a Lebanese intelligence
official did not have a working relationship with a Syrian
official if his call logs indicate they spoke several times a
day.
WOLFF