SE NATIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002233 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, IO A/S SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO SUBJECT: SE NATIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 4 meeting with SYG Kofi Annan, Presidential Special Envoy for the Sudan Andrew Natsios pushed for quick implementation of the Addis Ababa principles and highlighted the need for clarity on the mission's command and control. Annan expressed optimism in the face of conflicting communications from the Government of Sudan (GOS) that the Sudanese have accepted the Addis Ababa consensus agreement as reiterated, more or less, in the Abuja PSC agreement. Annan emphasized the importance of attaining a Sudanese commitment to the entire Addis Ababa deployment package for force generation and funding. Annan described AMIS commander General Aprezi as ineffective and uncooperative. Natsios said that January 1 is the effective deadline for the GOS to show seriousness about accepting the Addis Ababa consensus. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) USG Participants: SE Natsios, D/SE Andrew Steinfeld, USUN MSC LTC Murray, Poloff (notetaker). UN Participants: SYG Kofi Annan, D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown, DPKO Africa Director Dimiti Titov. -------------- Annan Remains Optimistic -------------- ¶3. (C) Annan put an optimistic spin on the discussions with President Bashir on the margins of the November 30 AU PSC meeting in Abuja. (NOTE: Annan was not present at the meeting, but had been briefed by officials from UN DPKO. END NOTE) Annan argued that the reported Sudanese acceptance of an AU-UN hybrid force at Abuja supersedes President Bashir's earlier written rejection of such a force in his letter to the UN SYG. Furthermore, the UN has received reports from UNMIS that the GOS cabinet endorsed the Abuja agreement on December 3. (NOTE: While Annan wanted to focus on the Abuja text rather than on President Bashir's negative letter to him, the Embassy of Sudan in Washington released a press release reiterating the points in President Bashir's letter to Annan while this meeting was taking place. END NOTE) Natsios responded that the USG is skeptical, especially given President Bashir's established strategy of delay and obfuscation. -------------- Commitment to the Whole Package -------------- �0A;¶4. (C) Annan emphasized the importance of attaining a Sudanese commitment to the entire Addis Ababa deployment package. The deployment phases are not options, but integrated steps towards the deployment of a robust peacekeeping force in Darfur. The UN is loathe to deploy significant assets to support a failing AMIS mission, without a guarantee that the transition to full UN capabilities and force protection is imminent. Annan avowed that the phase 2 (UN heavy assistance package) only makes sense in the context of rapid move to phase 3, an AU-UN hybrid force. ¶5. (C) Force generation for phases 1 and 2 could also be affected as most, if not all, of the technical assistance and logistical support for the heavy and light assistance packages for AMIS will have to come from non-AU countries. D/SE Steinfeld pointed out that non-AU countries would not contribute such assets without a guarantee that the UN would be rapidly assuming responsibility for the mission. Annan concurred and suggested the transition to phase 3 should take place "as quickly as possible." AMIS will need to be funded in the interim. UN funding for phase 3 will still take "some sorting out." -------------- AMIS Commander is Ineffective, Uncooperative -------------- ¶6. (C) Annan used unusually harsh language in his criticism of AMIS Commander General Aprezi. Annan described Aprezi as an "uncooperative, ineffective commander" and "somewhat of a control freak." (NOTE: USYG Guehenno made a similar point in an earlier meeting. END NOTE.) In a pointed interjection, DPKO Africa Director Dimiti Titov commented that some of Aprezi's arguments on force size and UN assistance &strangely coincide8 with those of the GOS. -------------- GOS Needs to Show Seriousness on Addis Ababa Consensus USUN NEW Y 00002233 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶7. (C) In regard to conflicting Sudanese statements about what is meant by AU-UN hybrid command, Natsios commented that the daily business of commanding troops requires absolute clarity of command and the question is whether the GOS has committed to accepting an effective force or remains intent on hobbling any force with unreasonable demands. Annan concurred and said it will be important to "test them as quickly as possible." Natsios replied that the window of time for the GOS to show a sincere commitment to the Addis Ababa consensus is not indefinite and the effective deadline, as far as it concerns relations with the USG, is January 1. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Annan's view is much more optimistic than that of USUN, SE Natsios and even DPKO U/SYG Guehenno who, in a prior meeting, stated that "Bashir has not made a strategic shift in his thinking." Annan clearly wants to put a positive spin on Darfur as he hands off to his successor. ¶9. (U) SE Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message. BOLTON