UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' NOVEMBER 27 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 002203 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL UN YI SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' NOVEMBER 27 MEETING WITH KOSOVO PRESIDENT FATMIR SEJDIU Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF, REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Under Secretary Burns reassured Kosovo President Sejdiu of U.S. resolve to complete the final status process for Kosovo, despite the two month delay in negotiations to accommodate Serbian parliamentary elections. Burns acknowledged that the Serbs, supported by the Russians in the UN Security Council, would continue to present obstacles in the path of concluding the process, but that the U.S. would work to overcome the difficulties. Ambassador Wisner called on Sejdiu to use the delay to lay the groundwork for the transition from UNMIK to the new international civilian mission (ICO),and to continue explaining final status to the Kosovo people. Sejdiu appealed for Martti Ahtisaari's draft report to clearly state that Kosovo should be independent. He understood there would be more difficulties ahead and he pledged Kosovars unity throughout the process of completing final status. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. Under Secretary Burns Ambassador Alejandro Wolff Ambassador Frank Wisner Ambassador Jackie Sanders P Staff - Anja Manuel USUN - Kirk McBride USUN - Drew Schufletowski EUR Note taker - Stephen Gee KOSOVO President Fatmir Sejdiu Skender Hyseni, Senior Advisor Muhamet Hamiti, Advisor Vjosa Osmani, Interpreter U.S. SUPPORT FOR KOSOVO'S FINAL STATUS ¶3. (C) Under Secretary Burans made clear at the outset that, despite the short delay in completing the final status negotiations, the United States is not wavering in its support for a final status that is acceptable to the people of Kosovo. The U.S. believes Martti Ahtisaari's decision to postpone releasing his report until after January 21, 2007 Serbian elections was the correct course to take; it prevents the Radicals from using the report's conclusions to generate nationalist sympathies among the electorate. Burns acknowledged that the Serbs would continue to seek delays even after the elections, and that there would likely be Russian objections in the UN Security Council to a new resolution. Burns said the U.S. is opposed to recycling the negotiations and would work against further delays in the process. ¶4. (C) Sejdiu thanked Burns for all the U.S. had done for Kosovo, and said Kosovo would never forget the enormous U.S. investment of money and troops to protect its people. The President acknowledged the delay in negotiations had raised concerns among Kosovars about the final outcome, and asked that Martti Ahtisaari's report to the Security Council clearly call for Kosovo independence. Sejdiu also said he was worried about the integrity of northern Kosovo. Serb control of the north through the parallel structures, as well as continuous threats and provocations, prevented Albanians from returning to their homes in North Mitrovica and the Serb majority northern municipalities. It would be better to integrate Kosovo, with Serbs returning to their homes in the south and Albanians returning to their homes in the north. TASKS AT HAND ¶5. (C) Burns and Ambassador Wisner focused Sejdiu on the tasks at hand. Burns emphasized the importance of maintaining civil order in Kosovo. The one thing certain delay final status further would be an outbreak of violence, he said. KFOR will do its job and maintain security, but Kosovar leaders must prevent violence from breaking out. Ambassador Wisner added that there was much that needed to be done while waiting for Ahtisaari's report: completing work on the standards; preparing for the transition from UNMIK to the new international civilian office; preparing to write a new constitution; and explaining final status to the Kosovars. All of these actions must be completed in order to be ready for final status. Burns emphasized that unity of the Unity Team (senior leaders from political parties) must be maintained in order to accomplish all of the tasks. He said he had delivered the same message to opposition leader Hasim Thaci earlier in November in Washington. ¶6. (C) Sejdiu answered Burns that the Unity Team would stay unified-- there would be plenty of time for politics after final status. In preparation for the transition, the Unity Team had already created special transition teams and was prepared to draft a constitution. He promised to maintain close cooperation with the U.S. and allies during this process. ¶7. (C) Both Burns and Wisner encouraged Sejdiu to continue active diplomacy throughout the status process. Burns suggested Sejdiu should talk to Germany and Italy in particular about the transition. Wisner told Sejdiu it is critical to get a representative in New York who can be the point person for the UN process. BOLTON