Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK2186
2006-11-23 00:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UN BUDGET: FIFTH COMMITTEE VOTE ON BUDGET

Tags:  AORC IS KUNR PREL UNGA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0813
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1393
RUEHKR/AMEMBASSY KOROR PRIORITY 0084
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0524
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0834
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1322
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002186 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2011
TAGS: AORC IS KUNR PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: UN BUDGET: FIFTH COMMITTEE VOTE ON BUDGET
IMPLICATIONS OF EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION RESOLUTION

REF: A. WALLACE-WARLICK ET AL. EMAILS 11/16

B. SECSTATE 188261

C. USUN 2146

Classified By: Ambassador Mark D. Wallace; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002186

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2011
TAGS: AORC IS KUNR PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: UN BUDGET: FIFTH COMMITTEE VOTE ON BUDGET
IMPLICATIONS OF EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION RESOLUTION

REF: A. WALLACE-WARLICK ET AL. EMAILS 11/16

B. SECSTATE 188261

C. USUN 2146

Classified By: Ambassador Mark D. Wallace; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (U) SUMMARY: On Friday, November 17th, the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)
and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly acted on the
program budget implications (PBI) of draft resolution
A/ES-10/L.19, in accordance with Rule 153 of the Rules and
Procedures of the General Assembly. The draft resolution
under consideration in the one-day Emergency Special Session
sought to create a fact-finding mission, with reporting to
the General Assembly, which had financial implications. The
ACABQ's consideration of the PBI took nearly all day and the
Fifth Committee did not take action on the draft decision
until well after 6PM based upon the procedural and
substantive inquiries of USUN MR. USUN, as instructed in ref
A, called for a vote on the draft decision on the PBI and
voted no. The final vote in the Fifth Committee was 143 in
favor, 5 opposed (U.S., Israel, Australia, Micronesia, and
Palau),and 2 abstentions (Canada and Kenya). The plenary
then took action on the draft resolution (reported septel).
END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Early the evening of Thursday, November 16th, USUN was
informed that the ACABQ and Fifth Committee would need to
consider the PBI associated with the draft resolution to be
acted upon by the Emergency Special Session. Due to the
short time frame, the Secretariat had only prepared the PBI
(A/C.5/61/12) late that afternoon and it was officially
available to Member States Friday morning. The late issuance
of both the draft resolution and the PBI raised procedural
questions.


3. (U) On Friday morning, the ACABQ began its consideration
of the PBI. Members raised a number of questions, in
particular the U.S. member, and answers to the questions were
sought in writing from the Secretariat due to the political
nature of the draft resolution. During the morning session
of the Fifth Committee, South Africa (on behalf of the Group

of 77 and China),questioned the working methods of the ACABQ
and noted the urgency with which the President of the General
Assembly had asked the Fifth Committee to consider this PBI.
She noted the Group's concern that the ACABQ had not yet
finished its work and asked for clarification of when the
ACABQ might conclude its consideration of the PBI. The
delegate also stated that the Committee might be forced to
proceed with its consideration of the PBI without a report
from the ACABQ. The EU and Ambassador Wallace emphasized the
importance of the Fifth Committee receiving the advice of the
experts in the ACABQ and cautioned against asserting
political pressure on the ACABQ. Ambassador Wallace also
emphasized the dangerous precedent the Group of 77 would
establish by taking action in the Fifth Committee without the
expert recommendation of the ACABQ - for the first time in
history.


4. (C) The Fifth Committee resumed its meeting on Friday
afternoon, where South Africa took the floor to once again
raise concerns regarding the time constraints that they
claimed were faced by the Committee. (Note: the Group of 77
expected that the Emergency Special Session would be
completed by the morning of November 17th and certainly
before the five o'clock close of business and were concerned
that many Group of 77 members would not be there to vote if
the session were extended or delayed. END NOTE.) Ambassador
Kumalo noted that there appeared to be an attempt to "run out
the clock" in the Fifth Committee. The Chairman of the ACABQ
briefed the Committee about the status of ACABQ's
consideration of the PBI and noted that further information
was still forthcoming from the Secretariat. (NOTE: During the
lunch break, it was clear that the Group of 77 and China had
put pressure on their experts in the ACABQ to quickly
conclude their discussion. END NOTE.) Ambassador Kumalo
requested that all language translation requirements be
waived to expedite the Fifth Committee's consideration.
(Note: a waiver of document language translation is a
position contrary to the Group's standard Fifth Committee
practice. END NOTE.) The Emergency Special GA Session
suspended its meeting, as the GA was unable to take any
action without a report from the Fifth Committee. The Fifth
Committee became full of Permanent Representatives

USUN NEW Y 00002186 002 OF 003


(Ambassadors Bolton and Wolff joined Ambassador Wallace in
the afternoon in the Fifth Committee) as all delegations
attempted to understand where things stood in the Committee.
The oral report of the ACABQ was introduced to the Committee
after 5:30 PM. Many members of the Fifth Committee had
expected the Advisory Committee to conclude its work during
the morning session.


5. (U) After the ACABQ report was introduced to the
Committee, the Chairman of the Committee proceeded to read
the oral draft decision for the Committee's action.
Ambassador Wallace asked for a suspension of the meeting so
that the ACABQ report and the draft decision could be
circulated in writing. After a brief suspension, Ambassador
Wallace raised a number of questions regarding the PBI and
the ACABQ report, in particular the relationship between the
fact-finding mission that would be created by the draft
resolution and the mission created by the Human Rights
Council in its recent resolution. Australia also inquired
about the possible duplication between the resolution under
consideration in the General Assembly and the one adopted by
the Human Rights Council. South Africa noted that he
respected the right of delegations to ask questions, but that
it appeared that the Committee was now caught up in delay and
asked the Chairman to take action. The EU noted that they
were ready to adopt the draft decision, which would not give
rise to additional requirements at the present stage and
allow for additional resources to be reported in the context
of the performance report.


6. (U) After a few further clarifications, the Chairman asked
the Committee whether it could adopt the draft decision.
Ambassador Wallace read the following explanation of vote,
before the vote, which was drawn from reftel B and Ambassador
Bolton's explanation of vote following the U.S. veto of the
draft Security Council resolution (reftel C):

BEGIN TEXT:

Mr. Chairman,

The United States cannot support the resolution that results
in the statement of program budget implications that the
Committee is currently considering. The text is one-sided
and unbalanced and will not advance the aspirations of the
Palestinian and Israeli people. Therefore, we cannot support
resources to implement this resolution.

My delegation notes that in the last day, the Third Committee
of the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution that
stresses the need to avoid politically motivated and biased
country-specific resolutions. Yet, today, we see that the
General Assembly is considering a resolution that is
politically motivated and biased towards the state of Israel.
The draft resolution before the General Assembly today
answers a significant question -- that of the relevance and
utility of the United Nations in the twenty-first century.
We question whether pursuing these types of resolutions
furthers the goals of the United Nations, as stated in the
Charter, and whether it is a good use of resources.

My delegation strongly believes in the principle of consensus
in this Committee. However, in light of the underlying
resolution, we cannot join consensus today on this matter and
therefore seek a vote on this decision.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

END TEXT.


7. (U) Israel's representative, also speaking before the
vote, said the reconvening of the Tenth Emergency Special
Session of the Assembly was another example of Member States
misusing and abusing the procedures of the General Assembly.
He, too, supported the Fifth Committee's practice of
consensus, but the draft decision before the Committee paved
the way for a one-sided and biased draft to be presented to
the Assembly. It ignored the fact that Palestinian actors
had forced Israel to defend itself, and did not call on the
Palestinian Authority to recognize Israel and curb violence.
If the UN was to be useful, genuine negotiations between the
parties represented the only way to settle the issue. Israel
could not support expending additional financial resources
for the implementation of political agendas, he said. The

USUN NEW Y 00002186 003 OF 003


headline of the resolution was politically biased, he noted,
even before the fact-finding mission was initiated. The
draft was also talking about occupied territories, when the
actions had taken place in the territory that Israel had left
over a year ago, he said.


8. (U) The Committee then proceeded to a recorded vote on the
draft decision: 143 in favor, 5 opposed (U.S., Israel,
Australia, Micronesia, and Palau),and 2 abstentions (Canada
and Kenya). After the vote, Australia's representative,
explaining his negative vote on the draft decision, said the
fact-finding mission that the Assembly set up by its text
would not serve any useful purpose in resolving the conflict
in the Middle East. He therefore recommended that the
inquiry should not be funded, even if from existing
resources. Australia had also voted against an inquiry that
had already been set up by the Human Rights Council. Thus,
if he disagreed on the inquiry in the first place, he would
certainly object to two such inquiries. Finland (on behalf
of the European Union) and Japan regretted that the Fifth
Committee deviated from its usual practice of taking
decisions by consensus.


9. (C) COMMENT: The EU, in particular, and Japan attempted to
lobby the U.S. (both at the Ambassadorial and delegate level)
to disassociate from the consensus rather than to vote
against the PBI. The representatives of these nations said
that the PBI was simply a technical issue and that politics
should not be involved, although they acknowledged that the
Fifth Committee and General Assembly as a whole were in fact
political bodies. Australia and Canada were sympathetic to
the U.S. position, though also concerned about the precedent
that would be set by another vote in the Fifth Committee.


10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Both the G77 and the EU found
themselves in difficult positions during the discussions.
The G77's frustration at the pace of work in the ACABQ put
them on the brink of calling for Fifth Committee action
without an ACABQ report, a position and precedent that would
not normally be suggested by the Group. Moreover, by
attempting to steamroll the procedural roadblock of the ACABQ
and the Fifth Committee, the Group of 77 found itself at odds
with the EU and risked losing support for the resolution - at
least in the Fifth Committee. The Group of 77 was therefore
faced with observing the procedures of the ACABQ in the Fifth
Committee (note: the very same procedures they typically
tout) or ignoring them in order to permit timely action on
the resolution in the GA Emergency Session. The EU wanted
the costs to be absorbed and were waiting for the ACABQ to
make such a recommendation. They were therefore dependent on
having an ACABQ report before the Fifth Committee. In
addition, the EU argued that they did not want to set any
precedents in the Fifth Committee and moving ahead without an
ACABQ report would be precedent-setting, putting them in an
difficult position. At the height of discussions, the
Finnish EU Presidency approached Ambassadors Bolton and
Wallace and asked again if the U.S. would disassociate from
the consensus in the Fifth Committee. Ambassador Wallace
asked whether that would cause the EU to abstain on the vote
on the underlying resolution, to which the response was "no."
Ambassador Bolton stated that he heard that the EU might
even co-sponsor the resolution before the Emergency Special
Session. One of the Finnish delegates remarked that they
might do just that (co-sponsor) given the U.S. position in
the Fifth Committee, causing embarrassment among several EU
members present. The Israeli Mission effusively thanked the
USUN MR Section for its efforts in the Fifth Committee to
oppose the resolution. END COMMENT.
BOLTON