Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK2181
2006-11-22 21:09:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:
GEORGIAN PERMREP HOLDS BRAINSTORMING SESSION ON
VZCZCXRO7033 PP RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUCNDT #2181/01 3262109 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 222109Z NOV 06 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0804 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0919 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3829
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002181
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG YI
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN PERMREP HOLDS BRAINSTORMING SESSION ON
ABKHAZIA WITH NEW YORK FRIENDS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002181
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG YI
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN PERMREP HOLDS BRAINSTORMING SESSION ON
ABKHAZIA WITH NEW YORK FRIENDS
1. (SBU) Summary: The Georgian Mission to the UN is getting
busy. On November 3, Georgian Permrep Irakli Alasania hosted
the New York Friends for a discussion titled "on a
comprehensive peaceful solution to the conflict in Abkhazia."
Alasania made obvious efforts to be accommodating to the
Russian representative, as Russia's UN Mission had refused to
attend the discussion under its original billing "on
internationalizing the peacekeeping format for Abkhazia."
The Russian representative, although presenting his views in
a collegial fashion throughout, focused his comments almost
entirely on calls for Georgia to speedily implement portions
of UNSCR 1716 addressing Georgia's Kodori operation. In a
November 17 meeting with poloffs, scheduled at his request,
Alasania advocated the internationalization of police in Gali
as a first step toward a more general internationalization of
foreign security forces. End summary.
Alasania Seeks Input, Including Criticism
2. (SBU) On November 3, Georgian Permrep Irakli Alasania
hosted the New York Friends (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia
and Slovakia) at his mission for a brainstorming session on
the subject of "a comprehensive peaceful solution to the
conflict in Abkhazia." Throughout the meeting Alasania made
an obvious effort to be as accommodating as possible to
Russia's views; the Russians had declined to attend the
meeting under its original billing as a discussion on
"internationalizing the peacekeeping format for Abkhazia."
Alasania opened the meeting by expressing pleasure that
Russia agreed to participate, saying that "as a member of the
Friends and as facilitator, Russia's involvement is
indispensable." Alasania noted that the meeting between
Foreign Ministers Bezhuashvili and Lavrov in Moscow earlier
in the week had helped Georgia and Russia understand one
another's concerns on important issues, including Abkhazia.
3. (SBU) Alasania then invited the Friends to help him think
about how to proceed in New York and produce new, effective
approaches on Abkhazia. By way of example, Alasania
suggested that now that controversy surrounding Georgia's
Kodori operation had settled down, the Friends might revisit
the once-promising agreement on non-resumption of hostilities
to see if it were ripe again for discussion. Alasania raised
UNSCR 1716 that renewed UNOMIG's mandate, saying it had to be
implemented, including portions calling for improved
conditions for returnees and opening a human rights office in
Gali. He invited input on what the New York Friends thought
could be achieved at the next Friends meeting in Geneva and
what actions Georgia might take to show its commitment to
solving the problem only through peaceful means. Alasania
likewise invited ideas on how Georgia could work with the
Abkhaz to ensure they follow through on previous Geneva
commitments. Furthermore, Alasania said we should also
reflect on how Russia could be more successful as a
facilitator because he thought it obvious that the present
arrangement with Russian CIS peacekeepers alone was not
successful. He thought in particular that we ought to
consider tackling law enforcement in Gali or even DFM
Karasin's suggestion of expanding the CIS force to include
other CIS countries.
New York Friends Offer Questions and Suggestions
4. (SBU) Germany's Deputy Permrep asked Alasania what
internationalization within the CIS might look like.
Alasania replied that no other CIS countries had volunteered
to be troop contributors and, in fact, no non-CIS countries
had volunteered either. He said Russian peacekeepers clearly
were needed at some level to give the Abkhaz a sense of
security. However, it was a heavy burden for Russia alone as
evidenced by the fact that over a 100 of its peacekeepers had
been killed in the past ten years. He stated that it had
been a brave step for the Russians to come in alone in the
90's. However, we couldn't stick just with the format of 12
years ago, said Alasania, because the region had evolved. On
criminality in Gali in particular, Alasania noted that even
the head of the CIS force had said he could not grapple with
criminality as his forces were not trained to handle it.
5. (SBU) Vadim Smirnov the Russian Political Counselor in
New York (who before the meeting started conspicuously joined
Alasania and the Friends in a glass Georgian wine) stated
that he was pleased to hear that the Georgian side had taken
Bezhuashvili's meeting with Lavrov seriously because it had
laid out "what needed to be done to achieve more normalized
relations." He decried, however, that the Georgian Mission
had originally advertised the day's meeting as one on
USUN NEW Y 00002181 002 OF 003
changing the peacekeeping format in Abkhazia, changed it to a
generalized discussion of the Abkhazia conflict, but seemed
to be trying to revert the focus to peacekeeping formats that
Russia preferred not to discuss. Smirnov said we should
indeed prioritize and look at what the sides could do, but
that should come at a later stage only "after UNSCR 1716 was
fully implemented," including talking about Kodori and
adherence to the Moscow agreement. Alasania rebutted the
Russian, querying him on whether he "meant that we should try
to bring back Kvitsani" and pointing out that the Kodori
operation had made possible the resumption of joint patrols.
On violations, Alasania said he took issue with the UN's
analysis of the violations, but agreed that there probably
had been some violations. Alasania asked Smirnov what steps
he would recommend, to which the Russian replied that Russia
was only the facilitator and not a party to the conflict, but
the resolution had confirmed "the important role of CIS
forces and cooperation with the UN and these should be fully
implemented first." Later, the Russian asked Alasania why he
thought the Abkhaz were resisting accepting police and
Alasania answered that he thought the Abkhaz wanted to avoid
a permanent international presence. He asked Alasania
whether Police would still be needed if we increased
confidence, but Alasania replied that they would be because
the Abkhaz could not agree to participate in Georgian law
enforcement structures and would thus need the political
cover of something international. Alasania said he hoped
that Russia would help get the Abkhaz to agree to civilian
police in Gali because the track record had proved that "when
Russia wants to get something done in Gali, it gets done."
6. (SBU) USUN's Deputy Political Counselor suggested to
Alasania that instead of looking at the situation on the
ground from a supply side, perhaps we should step back and
look at the totality of need in terms of what it would take
to accomplish our goals on law enforcement and return of
refugees. In other words, in addition to the approximately
1700 CIS forces and 120 UNOMIG observers, what would it take,
setting aside for a moment the color of the uniforms, to get
the job done? USUN also reiterated the US position that and
all violations of the Moscow agreement by either side should
be properly recognized, but that we did not criticize the
Kodori operation in principle, especially given that the
joint patrols had resulted from it. Alasania responded that
there was an urgent need for police on the ground in Gali as
there was currently no sense of security there. He said that
just a few hundred police would be sufficient. At the same
time, argued Alasania, we should also get the Abkhaz to agree
to the 20 civilian police that had been authorized in the
first place. The French expert said the situation in
Abkhazia was frustrating, but we should avoid hasty steps
that would make things worse. There were many things in
UNSCR 1716 that needed to be implemented: the situation in
Kodori should be "brought back into line with the Moscow
Agreement, no more, no less", the resumption of joint patrols
was an important step that "we should welcome and not just
note with satisfaction", civilian police and international
police in Gali would be a very good idea that was embraced by
Jean Arnault. The UK's expert that he agreed UNSCR 1716 was
a basis for steps that we should take even if it was not
agreed with Russia that "the result of the Kodori operation
had been a situation in breach of the Moscow agreement and
that this should be addressed as a priority." The UK expert
also said he agreed "the Kodori operation had resulted in an
increase in tension." If there were unilateral steps the
Georgian side could take to build confidence that would be
beneficial. Talking about internationalizing the
peacekeeping format was a topic that "raised concern and
suspicions, but civilian police could be a very good idea and
were hard to argue against." At one point in the meeting,
Alasania also stated that he was lobbying hard to get rid of
all remaining sanctions on the Abkhaz.
Georgia and Kosovo
7. (SBU) As the meeting drew to a close, Alasania asked
those present for informal thoughts on how the conclusion of
the Kosovo Future Status Process could affect Georgia. This
precipitated a long debate between the Russian and the UK's
Deputy Permrep (a Balkans expert) in which the Russians
argued that the resolution of Kosovo's status could set a
precedent for other conflicts unless it "is resolved in the
correct way" and the UK argued that the UN Security Council
had always viewed distinct problems completely separately and
that there had never been a single case of linking problems
in different parts of the world, so we should not risk
USUN NEW Y 00002181 003 OF 003
adverse consequences by changing that now. USUN's Deputy
Political Counselor cited a recent Wall Street Journal
article calling Kosovo "a region administered by the UN that
was formerly part of a state that no longer existed -- hardly
a precedent for anything."
Alasania Suggests International Police in Gali Might Satisfy
Tblisi's Concerns
8. (SBU) In a November 17 meeting with poloffs, scheduled at
his request, Alasania said the internationalization of police
in Gali could be a first step toward a more general
internationalization of foreign security forces. He said
that if some agreement on this could be reached among all the
Friends at the next Geneva meeting, he could probably
convince Tblisi to back off from plans to insist on the
withdrawal of CIS peacekeepers from Abkhazia. Alasania said
that he had in general terms pitched such a compromise to
Russian Permrep Churkin in a meeting earlier that same day,
but Churkin had been noncommittal on police in Gali and said
he needed to consult with Ambassador Bocharnikov.
BOLTON
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG YI
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN PERMREP HOLDS BRAINSTORMING SESSION ON
ABKHAZIA WITH NEW YORK FRIENDS
1. (SBU) Summary: The Georgian Mission to the UN is getting
busy. On November 3, Georgian Permrep Irakli Alasania hosted
the New York Friends for a discussion titled "on a
comprehensive peaceful solution to the conflict in Abkhazia."
Alasania made obvious efforts to be accommodating to the
Russian representative, as Russia's UN Mission had refused to
attend the discussion under its original billing "on
internationalizing the peacekeeping format for Abkhazia."
The Russian representative, although presenting his views in
a collegial fashion throughout, focused his comments almost
entirely on calls for Georgia to speedily implement portions
of UNSCR 1716 addressing Georgia's Kodori operation. In a
November 17 meeting with poloffs, scheduled at his request,
Alasania advocated the internationalization of police in Gali
as a first step toward a more general internationalization of
foreign security forces. End summary.
Alasania Seeks Input, Including Criticism
2. (SBU) On November 3, Georgian Permrep Irakli Alasania
hosted the New York Friends (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia
and Slovakia) at his mission for a brainstorming session on
the subject of "a comprehensive peaceful solution to the
conflict in Abkhazia." Throughout the meeting Alasania made
an obvious effort to be as accommodating as possible to
Russia's views; the Russians had declined to attend the
meeting under its original billing as a discussion on
"internationalizing the peacekeeping format for Abkhazia."
Alasania opened the meeting by expressing pleasure that
Russia agreed to participate, saying that "as a member of the
Friends and as facilitator, Russia's involvement is
indispensable." Alasania noted that the meeting between
Foreign Ministers Bezhuashvili and Lavrov in Moscow earlier
in the week had helped Georgia and Russia understand one
another's concerns on important issues, including Abkhazia.
3. (SBU) Alasania then invited the Friends to help him think
about how to proceed in New York and produce new, effective
approaches on Abkhazia. By way of example, Alasania
suggested that now that controversy surrounding Georgia's
Kodori operation had settled down, the Friends might revisit
the once-promising agreement on non-resumption of hostilities
to see if it were ripe again for discussion. Alasania raised
UNSCR 1716 that renewed UNOMIG's mandate, saying it had to be
implemented, including portions calling for improved
conditions for returnees and opening a human rights office in
Gali. He invited input on what the New York Friends thought
could be achieved at the next Friends meeting in Geneva and
what actions Georgia might take to show its commitment to
solving the problem only through peaceful means. Alasania
likewise invited ideas on how Georgia could work with the
Abkhaz to ensure they follow through on previous Geneva
commitments. Furthermore, Alasania said we should also
reflect on how Russia could be more successful as a
facilitator because he thought it obvious that the present
arrangement with Russian CIS peacekeepers alone was not
successful. He thought in particular that we ought to
consider tackling law enforcement in Gali or even DFM
Karasin's suggestion of expanding the CIS force to include
other CIS countries.
New York Friends Offer Questions and Suggestions
4. (SBU) Germany's Deputy Permrep asked Alasania what
internationalization within the CIS might look like.
Alasania replied that no other CIS countries had volunteered
to be troop contributors and, in fact, no non-CIS countries
had volunteered either. He said Russian peacekeepers clearly
were needed at some level to give the Abkhaz a sense of
security. However, it was a heavy burden for Russia alone as
evidenced by the fact that over a 100 of its peacekeepers had
been killed in the past ten years. He stated that it had
been a brave step for the Russians to come in alone in the
90's. However, we couldn't stick just with the format of 12
years ago, said Alasania, because the region had evolved. On
criminality in Gali in particular, Alasania noted that even
the head of the CIS force had said he could not grapple with
criminality as his forces were not trained to handle it.
5. (SBU) Vadim Smirnov the Russian Political Counselor in
New York (who before the meeting started conspicuously joined
Alasania and the Friends in a glass Georgian wine) stated
that he was pleased to hear that the Georgian side had taken
Bezhuashvili's meeting with Lavrov seriously because it had
laid out "what needed to be done to achieve more normalized
relations." He decried, however, that the Georgian Mission
had originally advertised the day's meeting as one on
USUN NEW Y 00002181 002 OF 003
changing the peacekeeping format in Abkhazia, changed it to a
generalized discussion of the Abkhazia conflict, but seemed
to be trying to revert the focus to peacekeeping formats that
Russia preferred not to discuss. Smirnov said we should
indeed prioritize and look at what the sides could do, but
that should come at a later stage only "after UNSCR 1716 was
fully implemented," including talking about Kodori and
adherence to the Moscow agreement. Alasania rebutted the
Russian, querying him on whether he "meant that we should try
to bring back Kvitsani" and pointing out that the Kodori
operation had made possible the resumption of joint patrols.
On violations, Alasania said he took issue with the UN's
analysis of the violations, but agreed that there probably
had been some violations. Alasania asked Smirnov what steps
he would recommend, to which the Russian replied that Russia
was only the facilitator and not a party to the conflict, but
the resolution had confirmed "the important role of CIS
forces and cooperation with the UN and these should be fully
implemented first." Later, the Russian asked Alasania why he
thought the Abkhaz were resisting accepting police and
Alasania answered that he thought the Abkhaz wanted to avoid
a permanent international presence. He asked Alasania
whether Police would still be needed if we increased
confidence, but Alasania replied that they would be because
the Abkhaz could not agree to participate in Georgian law
enforcement structures and would thus need the political
cover of something international. Alasania said he hoped
that Russia would help get the Abkhaz to agree to civilian
police in Gali because the track record had proved that "when
Russia wants to get something done in Gali, it gets done."
6. (SBU) USUN's Deputy Political Counselor suggested to
Alasania that instead of looking at the situation on the
ground from a supply side, perhaps we should step back and
look at the totality of need in terms of what it would take
to accomplish our goals on law enforcement and return of
refugees. In other words, in addition to the approximately
1700 CIS forces and 120 UNOMIG observers, what would it take,
setting aside for a moment the color of the uniforms, to get
the job done? USUN also reiterated the US position that and
all violations of the Moscow agreement by either side should
be properly recognized, but that we did not criticize the
Kodori operation in principle, especially given that the
joint patrols had resulted from it. Alasania responded that
there was an urgent need for police on the ground in Gali as
there was currently no sense of security there. He said that
just a few hundred police would be sufficient. At the same
time, argued Alasania, we should also get the Abkhaz to agree
to the 20 civilian police that had been authorized in the
first place. The French expert said the situation in
Abkhazia was frustrating, but we should avoid hasty steps
that would make things worse. There were many things in
UNSCR 1716 that needed to be implemented: the situation in
Kodori should be "brought back into line with the Moscow
Agreement, no more, no less", the resumption of joint patrols
was an important step that "we should welcome and not just
note with satisfaction", civilian police and international
police in Gali would be a very good idea that was embraced by
Jean Arnault. The UK's expert that he agreed UNSCR 1716 was
a basis for steps that we should take even if it was not
agreed with Russia that "the result of the Kodori operation
had been a situation in breach of the Moscow agreement and
that this should be addressed as a priority." The UK expert
also said he agreed "the Kodori operation had resulted in an
increase in tension." If there were unilateral steps the
Georgian side could take to build confidence that would be
beneficial. Talking about internationalizing the
peacekeeping format was a topic that "raised concern and
suspicions, but civilian police could be a very good idea and
were hard to argue against." At one point in the meeting,
Alasania also stated that he was lobbying hard to get rid of
all remaining sanctions on the Abkhaz.
Georgia and Kosovo
7. (SBU) As the meeting drew to a close, Alasania asked
those present for informal thoughts on how the conclusion of
the Kosovo Future Status Process could affect Georgia. This
precipitated a long debate between the Russian and the UK's
Deputy Permrep (a Balkans expert) in which the Russians
argued that the resolution of Kosovo's status could set a
precedent for other conflicts unless it "is resolved in the
correct way" and the UK argued that the UN Security Council
had always viewed distinct problems completely separately and
that there had never been a single case of linking problems
in different parts of the world, so we should not risk
USUN NEW Y 00002181 003 OF 003
adverse consequences by changing that now. USUN's Deputy
Political Counselor cited a recent Wall Street Journal
article calling Kosovo "a region administered by the UN that
was formerly part of a state that no longer existed -- hardly
a precedent for anything."
Alasania Suggests International Police in Gali Might Satisfy
Tblisi's Concerns
8. (SBU) In a November 17 meeting with poloffs, scheduled at
his request, Alasania said the internationalization of police
in Gali could be a first step toward a more general
internationalization of foreign security forces. He said
that if some agreement on this could be reached among all the
Friends at the next Geneva meeting, he could probably
convince Tblisi to back off from plans to insist on the
withdrawal of CIS peacekeepers from Abkhazia. Alasania said
that he had in general terms pitched such a compromise to
Russian Permrep Churkin in a meeting earlier that same day,
but Churkin had been noncommittal on police in Gali and said
he needed to consult with Ambassador Bocharnikov.
BOLTON