NEPAL PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS AT THE UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 002165 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR IO/PSC, IO/UNP AND SCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UNSC SUBJECT: NEPAL PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS AT THE UN REF: A. KATHMANDU 3049 ¶B. USUN 2155 Classified By: DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ALEX WOLFF, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Following the November 8 peace agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists, the UN has begun contingency planning for its potential role in providing support for the implementation of the agreement, including assistance in the security sector ("arms management") and for the electoral process. To provide such assistance, however, the UN requires Security Council support and authorization. The trigger for this process is a formal request from the government of Nepal seeking UN support. Based on consultations with the Nepali and Indian missions in New York, USUN understands the Nepalese PermRep conveyed such a request November 16 to the Secretary-General. Upon receiving this request, the Secretary-General will forward the request to the Security Council. At that point, assuming the Department supports an expanded UN role in Nepal, USUN recommends the USG promptly seek a Presidential Statement (PRST) welcoming the peace agreement and authorizing the deployment of a Technical Assessment Team to consult with the Nepalese on the specifics of Nepali needs and to prepare recommendations on how the UNSC can respond to those needs. A PRST will provide two immediate benefits: it will send a public signal to Nepal of UN support for the political process, and enable the UN to disburse funds for planning and implementation. After the team shares its conclusions with the Council, USUN recommends the USG seek an UNSCR authorizing assistance related to the priority need of arms management. If necessary, authorization of additional UN support for medium-term assistance to the security sector and electoral issues could be handled in a second UNSCR. End Summary. ¶2. (C) D/POL/C and Poloff met November 15 with Lisa Buttenheim, director of the Asia and Middle East Divison at the UN,s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Ian Sinclair, chief of DPKO,s Military Planning Service. Buttenheim and Sinclair said that the UN was drawing up contingency plans for its potential mission in Nepal, but that many operational and logistic questions remained. The November 8 peace agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists calls on the UN to assist in arms management and future elections, but does not specify the competencies and responsibilities of the UN in these sectors, said Buttenheim. She said DPKO had heard informal assertions of certain demands (civilian clothing by the arms monitors, 24-hour monitoring, among others),but was uncertain of the validity of these demands. Were they the views of the Nepali government, the Maoists or India, or perhaps a combination of all three? They questioned the wisdom of forcing military observers to dress in civilian clothes, noting the security concerns such a practice would raise. Sinclair, who participated in a previous UN assessment mission to Nepal, added that it would be imprudent to focus solely on the issue of arms management without considering the entire security sector. For example, if the military is to be confined to barracks and the Maoist soldiers to cantonment sites, the importance of the role of the police would rise, and therefore the police would probably benefit from some UN assistance or advice. He also suggested that Nepal could benefit from international assistance in DDR and SSR. Likewise, Nepal might welcome support in demining and UXO. In short, he recommended the preparation of a comprehensive concept of operations. ¶3. (C) Buttenheim and Sinclair objected to the idea of sending a preliminary group of monitors prior to obtaining a better understanding of the roles and tasks of such monitors. For example, they asked, what would the monitors do? Would they be sent to cantonment sites immediately or would they stay in Kathmandu? Who would transport them and would provide for their security? These were just some of the many questions that would need to be answered, said the DPKO officials, adding that routine practice dictates that the deployment of such personnel requires Security Council support, for both political and financial reasons. ¶4. (C) D/POL/C agreed that the rapid pace of political developments in Nepal had inevitably resulted in unanswered questions that would need to be resolved in order to obtain Council support for an expansion of UN assistance. Both sides also agreed on the desirability of moving rapidly to support the peace agreement. Assuming Washington supports a UN role in helping the Nepalese, D/POL/C suggested the following scenario for consideration. Once the Nepalese send a letter formally requesting the UN,s assistance, the Security Council could move to adopt a Presidential Statement that would acknowledge the Nepalese request, congratulate them on coming to a peace agreement, and authorize the sending of a Technical Assessment Team to consult with the Nepalese on specific needs and report back for further UNSC action. Sinclair and Buttenheim welcomed the prospect of Council support, and confirmed that a team could be deployed within one to two weeks. (They also noted that TCC interest in providing military observers is high.) They urged that the team be given a mandate to consider the full spectrum of Nepali needs, arguing that it would be inefficient to send out multiple assessment teams. Sinclair speculated that the team could consult in country for approximately two weeks and take a third week to prepare a report of findings for the Council. A quick dispatch of a Technical Assessment Team would also serve as the immediate response that the Indians and Nepalese were pushing for, said Sinclair. Butthenheim, noting that the UN has already dispatched additional personnel to assess logistical needs, suggested the UN could also consider sending a "handful" of technical experts to work in the capital with the three parties to begin planning on how to implement the peace agreement. Such a limited "surge" could also address a Nepali political imperative to move quickly. ¶5. (C) Depending on the contents of the report of the technical assessment team, D/POL/C suggested that the Council should consider an UNSCR authorizing a monitoring and observation mission to support the "arms management" element of the peace agreement. Other issues, including additional assistance to the security sector and electoral assistance could be addressed in a subsequent resolution if necessary. ¶6. (C) Comment: Reftel B reported on the urgency with which both the Nepalese and Indian Missions view this matter, and sensitivities regarding aspects of a potential military mission. These concerns will need to be balanced against DPKO,s own concerns. End comment. BOLTON