P5 MEETING ON UN SYG SUDAN PROPOSAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002157 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO, AF, PRM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO SUBJECT: P5 MEETING ON UN SYG SUDAN PROPOSAL ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: UN D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown briefed the P5 on November 14 regarding the UN's planned approach with the Government of Sudan (GOS) at the November 16 meeting of the UN, P5, African Union, and Arab League in Addis Ababa. The UN SYG plans to put forward the Phased Approach Paper (please see paragraph 12 for text) as the basis for discussions with the Sudanese on a peacekeeping deployment compromise. During discussions following the briefing, several delegations, including Russia and France, expressed a willingness to accept a hybrid command or AU-led force. The UK PermRep expressed support for an AU force as well. END SUMMARY. -------------- The Phased Approach Paper According to Malloch Brown -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Malloch Brown indicated that UN SYG intends to use the phased approach paper as the basis of discussion with the GOS. While the November 16 meeting with the GOS is only scheduled to last two hours, UN SYG will let discussion go on as long as is necessary to reach a compromise on a peacekeeping deployment in Darfur. ¶3. (SBU) The UN SYG intentionally left language regarding the third phase, hybrid command, vague so that the GOS would engage in the process. Malloch Brown conceding that the price of this flexibility was putting UNSCR 1706 "into play." Language regarding the objectives -- able to protect civilians, implement DPA, ensure humanitarian access -- is intended to preserve the key elements of UNSCR 1706. -------------- Discussion Timeline -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Malloch Brown said that SYG Annan had convinced the parties that the November 16 meeting is a "crossroads moment" and that the GOS in particular had to realize that the best opportunity to compromise on a peacekeeping deployment is now, at the end of the AU's mandate and before Annan leaves office. Malloch Brown added that "Nothing has been given away" (in UNSCR 1706) until all parties agree to a deal. ¶5. (SBU) Regarding approach, Malloch Brown said UN SYG hopes to come to a deal on key issues with the GOS at the November 16 meeting. All the key players and those with the most influence, such as the Egyptians, will be present. Afterwards, the package would be presented to the AU PSC at the November 24 meeting. UN SYG will then follow up with a ;high-level visit to Khartoum to work out remaining details. DPKO U/SYG Annabi is currently in Khartoum working out details of the light assistance package, i.e. phase one of the UN SYG paper. -------------- Sudanese Participation -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Notably, neither SYG nor the P5 had yet received confirmation that Bashir had decided to send appropriate representation to the November 16 meeting. UKUN reported that Mustafa Isma'il, the Sudanese Darfur Envoy is currently in London. HMG is encouraging Isma'il to attend the Addis Ababa meeting. All participants agreed that high-level GOS participation is essential for the success of the meeting and would be an important barometer of Sudanese seriousness. -------------- Disagreement on Command and Control -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In response to objections from the U.S. regarding the problematic nature of a hybrid command structure, Malloch Brown argued that there is no point in insisting on UN command if the P5 is prepared to agree to a peacekeeping force composed of only AU countries, "putting the UN top of an AU mission won't help anybody." Instead Malloch Brown put forward the idea of a strategic cell based Addis Ababa to give the AU needed capacity. USUN PolMinister Counselor responded that the USG remains concerned that the AU may be unwilling or unable to take on the demands of an expanded USUN NEW Y 00002157 002 OF 004 Darfur mission. UN leadership of the operation is essential both for force effectiveness and to guarantee funding. The question at hand is whether the Sudanese will reject any option that will restrain their military campaign. Malloch Brown responded that the SYG appreciated U.S. sensitivities on the issue, but "everyone needs to come to Addis prepared to make a deal." ¶8. (SBU) UKUN AMB Jones Parry agreed that unity of command is essential, but surprisingly concluded that HMG could accept either a UN or an AU-led force and command structure. French AMB de la Sabliere responded that France is willing to accept a hybrid command structure or AU-led force. PRC Wang, who gave few specifics about the Chinese position, emphasized the need for a common approach in advance of discussions with the Sudanese. -------------- P5 Role in Addis Discussions -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Delegations pushed Malloch Brown for details on what is expected from the P5 at the Addis Ababa meeting. Malloch Brown asked delegations to deliver the message to the Sudanese that "now is the time to make a deal" in advance of discussions and serve as "witnesses, participants and enforcers" during the meeting. Malloch Brown proposed a series of pre-meetings with the P5 and the AU in Addis Ababa to "divide up the script." -------------- Core Problems -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In addition to the disagreement over command modalities, Malloch Brown identified two areas where there are broad differences of opinion and extended discussions can be expected. The AU wants to retain control over the political aspects of the DPA and hand military matters over to the UN. The GOS strongly insists on the opposite. A hybrid force would entail non-African UN troops on the ground, which the Sudanese have indicated is a red line. ¶11. (SBU) UKUN AMB Jones Parry pressed hard regarding the status of TCCs for the first two phases of the UN SYG proposal, "Are the troops there if we reach an agreement?" After some initial waffling, Malloch Brown conceded that there was much work to be done in this area, but expressed optimism that clarity on the command issues would convince more countries to contribute. Malloch Brown repeated that an African-only force was a "clear, bright, red line for the Sudanese." The U.S. and others insisted on the need to leave open the possibility of pQticipation by traditional peacekeeping contributors, noting aloud that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to put together the necessary troop capacity and command structures from only African TCCs. ¶12. (SBU) Begin Text of UN SYG Phased Approach Paper: Darfur: The Phased Approach In order to strengthen the international community's response to the ongoing tragedy in Darfur, a possible phased approach to a strengthened peacekeeping presence in the region should be adopted. The envisioned sequence of steps in this approach should be consistent with the recommendations of the joint AU-UN technical assessment mission, which visited Darfur on 9-23 June 2006, as well as recent decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council requesting United Nations, assistance in enhancing AMIS. Agreement on this approach could form the basis for a joint position of the international community in advance of the 24 November meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council. As a component of any of the steps elaborated below, an enhanced UN involvement in Darfur's reconciliation and economic rehabilitation processes would be crucial. To this end, the UN could assume a greater role in efforts to assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and facilitate the inclusion of non-signatories to the Agreement. Enhanced UN involvement in the implementation of the bodies and processes envisioned by the Darfur Peace Agreement would USUN NEW Y 00002157 003 OF 004 also be a natural extension of this function. It would be crucial to prevail upon the parties to the conflict to implement a full cease-fire so as to enable these political processes to take root. The abiding priority of this strategic approach is the protection of civilians in Darfur. With this in mind, the phased approach has been developed based on the fundamental assumption that any peacekeeping presence in Darfur would follow the logic of general proposals on an international operation contained in the Secretary-General,s report of 28 July on Darfur, which proposed parameters, in security terms, for effective peacekeeping in the region. While the international community continues consultations with the Government of Sudan on creative steps towards the implementation of the peacekeeping presence authorized by Security Council resolution 1706, the phased approach, as described below, could be pursued. To ensure the fulfillment of the international community's key objectives in Darfur, this approach would be: a. Capable of contributing to the restoration of security and protection of civilians in Darfur b. Able to implement the security aspects of the Darfur Peace Agreement c. Ensure full humanitarian access The mission must therefore: a. Be logistically and financially sustainable b. Have a predominantly African character c. Have the strength and capacities described in the Secretary-General,s report on Darfur of 28 July 2006 SIPDIS d. Enjoy free and unhindered movement in Darfur The first step, of this sequence would involve the full and expeditious implementation of the short-term UN support package to AMIS proposed in the Secretary-General,s 28 July report on Darfur (591/2006),and endorsed by President Bashir. This $21 million support package is currently being delivered to AMIS in full coordination with the Government of Sudan. The Secretary-General has also proposed an enhanced support package of UN assistance to AMIS in his 28 July report on Darfur, which would be implemented as the second step, in the phased approach. The enhanced support package, which includes the deployment by the UN of several hundred military, police, and civilian personnel to AMIS, as well as substantial aviation and logistical assets, could be further augmented in order to maximize AMIS,s efficiency and impact. Discussions on the details of this package, which the Security Council has generally approved for delivery, are ongoing with the African Union. The Government of Sudan would be fully consulted on these details. The third step, would be an AU-UN hybrid operation. To this end, a jointly appointed AU-UN Special Representative/Envoy could lead the hybrid operation, reporting to both the African Union Commission and the United Nations. Additionally, the appointment of the Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander, as well as other key decision-making positions, could be coordinated between the African Union and the United Nations. The UN could also provide additional operational elements and enabling units in the area of logistics and engineering to increase the hybrid mission,s operational effectiveness. A hybrid operation would also benefit from substantial UN involvement in its command and control structure. With respect to troop and police generation, African countries will be approached as a matter of priority to contribute to both the second and third steps of the sequence. Traditional UN troop contributing countries with critical peacekeeping experience might also be approached, if necessary, to reach required strength and capacity. The Secretary-General, supported by the international USUN NEW Y 00002157 004 OF 004 community, would be prepared to recommend to the General Assembly that the United Nations provide full financing to the mission at any step of this sequence, as long as the objectives of paragraph 3 are met. Most importantly, the Government of Sudan will have to be fully and transparently consulted in any further development and/or implementation of this phased approach. It will be important for all stakeholders to continuously assist the Government and the people of Sudan in bringing just, inclusive and sustainable peace and stability to Darfur, with full respect for Sudan,s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As discussions on this phased approach proceed, all stakeholders should call for the immediate and complete cessation of hostilities and an end to all attacks on civilians, as well as full access to populations in need and security for humanitarian workers and their supplies. End Text. BOLTON