UNSC/IRAN: NOVEMBER 3RD MEETING P5 PLUS ONE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002123 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL UNSC PGOV IR SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: NOVEMBER 3RD MEETING P5 PLUS ONE REF: STATE 178693 ¶1. Summary: The P5 plus one met on Friday, November 3, at the UK Mission at 11:30 to discuss the EU3 draft resolution on Iran. Russia reiterated its complaints about the EU3 text and circulated its extensive &corrections8 (emailed to State and NSC),which Ambassador Churkin described as consistent with the overall P5 plus one strategy agreed by Foreign Ministers. China claimed it had not studied the Russian revisions, but Ambassador Wang said they could possibly alleviate many of China's concerns regarding the EU3 draft. When Ambassador Bolton asked for an explanation as to where the EU3 draft oversteps the &elements8 paper agreed by Political Directors, Churkin and Wang ) drawing a clear distinction between &agreements8 reached by Foreign Ministers and &discussions8 between Political Directors - said their Political Directors never agreed to the elements paper. German Ambassador Matussek contended that Political Directors had indeed reached agreement in Vienna on specific elements, and the agreed &methodology8 merely called on New York to translate the elements paper into a Security Council resolution. Specific revisions were not debated in detail, as P3 Ambassadors first wanted to report back to capitals. Following the meeting, USUN circulated U.S. edits to the EU3 draft to P5 plus one Missions, so capitals could review them along side Russia,s extensive revisions. End Summary. ¶2. Churkin began the meeting by circulating Russia's extensive revisions to the EU3 text. He then read from prepared remarks, which began by criticizing the EU3 draft as going beyond the P5 plus one framework and certain to antagonize Iran. The resolution should convince Iran to comply with the IAEA, not cause Iran to refuse cooperation with the IAEA, which, in turn, would leave the world without any monitors. The measures should be imposed stage-by-stage, commensurate with Iran's actions, and they should be reversible. ¶3. Churkin then reviewed Russia's edits to the text. He said a blanket reference to Chapter VII would send the wrong signal to Iran and raise fears about the use of force. Regarding the EU3,s subtle reference to the UNSC,s role in addressing threats to peace and security, he said there is no present threat to address. (Note: The UK and Germany made similar comments when the U.S. deployed its guidance on 
inserting a threat determination during P3 plus one discussions. End note.) ¶4. Moving to the resolution's operative paragraphs, Churkin said that the current draft is too broad and would deny Iran what it needs to develop peaceful nuclear power. The focus of the resolution,s demands should be narrowed to preventing Iran from receiving assistance that would help with sensitive elements of a nuclear fuel cycle. He said pages five through eight should be deleted because the measures, such as a travel ban and assets freeze, go beyond what was agreed to by Foreign Ministers. The measures would antagonize Iran and back it into a corner. Limits on IAEA assistance are inappropriate in this context because the IAEA is independent and the Council should not instruct it. The measure would also provoke Iran to cease cooperation with the IAEA. The Bushehr exemption is no longer necessary in light of the Russian edits to the paragraph on preventing the transfer of nuclear items. If an item were deemed safe for Bushehr, then certainly it would be safe for other peaceful projects as well. New Russian paragraphs would give a clearer impulse to a negotiated solution to the Iran problem. ¶5. Amb. Bolton responded by showing Churkin the &elements8 paper agreed to by Political Directors in Vienna. He asked what in the EU3 text is not found in elements paper. Ambassador Bolton then said Russia has produced a text today that if not 180 degrees opposite to what Political Directors agreed upon, it was at least 135 degrees. Churkin and Wang ) drawing a clear distinction between &agreements8 reached by Foreign Ministers and &discussions8 between Political Directors - replied that their Political Directors did not agree to the elements paper because their concerns were never taken into account. German Ambassador Matussek claimed that Political Directors had indeed reached agreement in Vienna on specific elements, and the agreed &methodology8 merely called on New York to translate the elements paper into a Security Council resolution. French Ambassador de La Sabliere and U.K. Ambassador Jones Parry also took turns arguing against Churkin,s version of the outcome of USUN NEW Y 00002123 002 OF 002 Political Director discussions, while conceding that they were not present during those meetings. ¶6. Ambassador Churkin responded that Foreign Ministers had reached agreement and the "philosophy" that emerged from those discussions was a phased approach. The P5 plus one package for Iran remains in effect and UNSC efforts should be focused on getting Iran back to the table. The resolution should reflect the spirit of the IAEA resolutions. Churkin went on to say that some Political Directors had attempted to alter agreements reached by Foreign Ministers and &we here in New York8 are just trying to make the best of the situation. Churkin agreed that certain ideas were discussed by the Political Directors, but Russia reserves its right to take what it believes is the right approach. He believes the Iranians are interested in continued dialogue and suggested that the UNSC should foster a negotiated solution. ¶7. Ambassador Bolton suggested that to expedite matters it would be useful to explore where differences or misunderstandings exist in the &elements8 paper, and report to capitals. The U.S. views the EU3 draft as generally consistent with the broad agreements reached by Foreign Ministers and Political Directors, but if there is disagreement on what was agreed by capitals the P5 plus one would have a difficult time moving forward in New York. He suggested that Political Directors might want to talk again and discuss what was and was not agreed. Churkin at first said that he could try, but then reconsidered. He replied that the Russian edits reflect Russia's official response to the EU3 draft. ¶8. Ambassador Wang made brief remarks. He believes that Political Directors had a general exchange. The elements were presented by the EU3, but that does not mean the P5 plus one reached agreement. China supports efforts by the EU and Solana to reach agreement. Any UNSC action should leave room for a diplomatic solution. Sanctions have a role but they are not the objective. The UNSC should support the IAEA and not weaken it because the Iran problem should be resolved within the IAEA framework. Iran is not North Korea, yet the EU3 text relies too much on 1718 language. Wang then said he was in Beijing last week, and the general feeling is of concern about the consequences of this text. Wang claimed that China is still studying the text, and it will study the Russian text as well, but at first glance the Russian text should be considered because it would alleviate many of China's concerns. ¶9. As the meeting came to a close, Ambassador Bolton said he would send electronically the US edits to the EU3 resolution later that day, so that capitals would be able to review U.S. edits along side Russian revisions. Ambassadors agreed to discuss next steps after conferring with capitals. BOLTON