QATAR PERMREP: WE CAN BEST HELP WITH DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001935 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO, PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO SUBJECT: QATAR PERMREP: WE CAN BEST HELP WITH DARFUR OUTSIDE UNSC Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 5 meeting with US Special Envoy for the Sudan Andrew Natsios at the United Nations, Qatar PermRep Nassir Abdul Aziz al-Nasser said Qatar is eager to play an expanded role in creating a solution to the crisis in Darfur and can best influence the Government of Sudan (GOS) outside of the Security Council. Natsios underscored the necessity of prompt implementation on UNSCR 1706 and his approach to persuading non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) to play a constructive role in the political process by addressing underlying development problems. END SUMMARY. -------------- Qatar Urges Caution on the UNSC; Quiet Approach with Bashir -------------- ¶2. (C) Qatar PermRep Nassir Abdul Aziz al-Nasser urged a cautious approach to the Sudan saying, "any sanctions or aggressive statements will prove counterproductive with the Sudanese." AMB al-Nasser described Bashir as deeply isolated and paranoid that the US views the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur as "a prelude to regime change." "Diplomatic posturing" will only reinforce these notions in Khartoum, isolate moderates, and bolster "those around Bashir who are giving him bad advice." Rather, al-Nassir argued the US should focus its efforts on "quiet diplomacy" and persuading the GOS that accepting a UN force is ultimately in their own best interests. ¶3. (C) Al-Nassir offered Qatar's assistance and influence in persuading the Sudanese to accept a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur saying, "We have a special relationship with the Sudanese, and we can help you outside of the Security Council." Al-Nassir made the case for greater Qatari involvement in diplomatic efforts, highlighting Qatar's substantial pledges of development assistance and support for AMIS. The more aggressive an approach the UNSC adopts, however, the less influence Qatar can exert over the GOS. Al-Nassir quipped that if the UNSC takes an aggressive stand against the GOS, "Bashir will ask us (Qatar) why haven't you helped me on the Security Council?" ¶4. (C) Natsios acknowledged Qatar's particular position on the UNSC and potential to influence the GOS, but cautioned that it was important for everyone, including the Sudanese, to use words carefully. The October 3 letter from the Sudanese UN Permanent Mission addressed to potential troop contributors was "entirely unacceptable for a UN member state." Likewise, the US cannot accept Bashir's refusal to accept the peacekeeping provisions UNSCR 1706 indefinitely. Al-Nassir promised to pass both messages to the Sudanese. -------------- DPA Non-Signatories -------------- ¶5. (C) Natsios outlined his plans to persuade DPA non-signatories join the political process and address underlying development issues in north Sudan that fuel the conflict in Darfur. AMB al-Nassir praised Natsios' knowledge of the region and the wisdom of addressing development issues. Al-Nassir concurred that it will be important to balance pressure on Bashir with pressure on rebel groups that reject the DPA. Al-Nassir closed the meeting by again offering Qatar's assistance saying, "Let's bring all the DPA non-signatories to Doha for talks." ¶6. (U) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios staff cleared this message. BOLTON